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Abstract 
Ownership, a sociocultural concept experienced at an intrapersonal level as thoughts 
and feelings than an object is mine; is an important feature of our daily experience. 
However, norms and laws define our behaviour in response to others’ belongings. 
Research is beginning to elucidate that the ownership status of an object, whether an 
object is mine or yours, influences a range of cognitive processes. Findings generally 
indicate that objects associated with the self receive prioritised processing, compared 
with objects associated with others. However, within the lesser investigated cognitive 
domain of action production, there is some initial evidence to suggest that we are 
sensitive to other’s belongings; with knowledge of self and other-ownership modulating 
the visuomotor system. Therefore, the present thesis aimed to extend these findings in 
two key ways. Firstly, on the basis of indirect evidence obtained from movement 
kinematics, by investigating whether ownership mediates the tendency to approach or 
avoid objects. Secondly, by investigating the influence of ownership status in an action 
context yet to be considered: during the avoidance of obstacles within the workspace.  
Broadly, this thesis presents findings consistent with indirect evidence that 
ownership status does influence approach and avoidance behaviour; and evidence that the 
visuomotor system possesses some sensitivity to the ownership status of obstacles as we 
navigate the workspace. However, in accordance with previous work, the effects 
obtained, particularly in relation to other-ownership, were sensitive to task context. In 
addition, alternative explanations of self-ownership effects (for example, resulting from 
attentional mechanisms) were difficult to fully discount using indirect measures, such as 
response time. Therefore, while adding to the limited body of research concerning the 
effects of ownership on the visuomotor system; the current work highlights the need for 
future research concerning motoric effects to recruit more direct measures of action-
related processes.  
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When I get up in the morning, I make coffee in my mug, eat my bagel while 
checking my phone for my emails, drive my car to work, and log on to my computer to 
work on my research project. When I attend a meeting, someone is sitting in my seat. I 
do not legally own it; it is the property of the university, but I have feelings that it is 
mine. I always sit there. Someone mentions an idea that I talked about only last week; 
and that instantaneous feeling of theft of my idea arises. Ownership is a guiding 
principle of thought and behaviour, and attesting to its importance, scholars have long 
theorised about the origins, functions, and consequences of personal property for man 
(e.g., James, 1890; Locke, 1690; Sartre, 1943). Recently, there have been attempts to 
synthesise the wealth of literature to create a coherent account of ownership (see Pierce, 
Kostova, & Dirks, 2003). However, such work has largely relied on observations and 
anecdotal descriptions of ownership experiences. More recently, across numerous 
disciplines (e.g., consumer behaviour, behavioural economics, and developmental 
psychology), there has been increased interest in empirically investigating ownership. 
The first half of this review will conceptualise ownership, firmly situating theoretical 
concepts about its function and development alongside empirical findings.  
Despite longstanding interest in how self-relevant (e.g. own name, own face) 
stimuli influence cognitive processes, such as attention and memory, investigation 
concerning how ownership is represented and processed at a cognitive level has 
remained relatively slow to emerge. During the past decade, there has been a surge in 
findings concerning the cognitive treatment of objects associated with the self, albeit, 
often utilising objects arbitrarily and temporarily associated with the self to extend 
knowledge regarding self-relevant biases in general. Such research has started to inform 
understanding of how cognition is performed for self-object associations. However, 
consideration of the cognitive treatment of objects belonging to others remains 
relatively understudied, with other-ownership often being treated as merely a less 
salient comparison condition to illustrate superior self-object processing. Other-
ownership possesses social importance, as it determines what we are permitted to do (or 
not do) with someone else’s property. To act appropriately in a social world full of 
owners, we must also reason about others' property, and respect others' rights. 
Therefore, research concerning ownership must also account for how we behave in 
relation to objects belonging to others, alongside biases associated with our own 
property. Therefore, the second half of this review will analyse work concerning biases 
elicited by self-associated objects, and examine the small body of work pertaining to 
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whether the action system displays sensitivity to other-ownership cues.  
Conceptualising ownership 
Ownership, which can be broadly defined at an individual level as experiencing an 
object as mine (Pierce et al., 2003), has historical longevity as an aspect of lived 
experience, dating back at least as far as 100,000 years (Leaky, 1981; Marginer, 1960). 
Tendencies for ownership are enduringly cross-cultural (Hobhouse, Wheeler & 
Ginsberg, 1915; Webster & Beatty, 1997), although, despite economic globalisation and 
Westernisation, the experiences and effect of ownership may still differ across cultures 
(for example, the possessions most valued; Watson, Lysonski, Gillan, & Raymore, 
2002; the effects of ownership on object valuation; Maddux et al., 2010). Attesting to its 
importance as a governing construct of our lives, children exhibit attachment to objects, 
such as blankets, from at least six months of age (Furby & Wilke, 1982; Lehman, 
Arnold, & Reeves, 1995), and begin to use self-related possessive pronouns (mine) in 
conversations with peers to express ownership, from around eighteen months (Bates, 
1990; Hay, 2006).  
Despite possessing a tacit sense of what it means to own, operationalising 
ownership is not simple. Ownership extends beyond physical possession of a thing, 
remaining when we are not executing control over the object (Stake, 2004). It is part 
real (i.e. the object) and part individual (experiencing an object as mine; Pierce et al., 
2003). However, ownership is also social; the notion of ownership arises from a 
sociocultural landscape that acknowledges the concept of, and possesses norms and 
laws governing, ownership (Bentham, 1914; Etzioni, 1991; Snare, 1972). Ownership 
defines how ourselves, and others, behave in relation to property we own, and 
reciprocally shapes appropriate responses to other’s belongings. In any discussion of 
ownership, the distinction between ownership ascribed by law, and the experiential state 
of ownership (commonly referred to as psychological ownership; see Pierce, et al., 
2003), must be highlighted. Ecologically, legal and psychological ownership are often 
confounded. However, psychological ownership can develop for physical objects in the 
absence of legal ownership (for example, see Peck & Shu, 2009; Reb & Connolly, 
2007). 
When considering what is subject to ownership claims, most frequently, a sense of 
psychological ownership is experienced for physical objects (Isaacs, 1933; Prelinger, 
1959); from consumables (Ellis, 1985), through to more treasured family heirlooms and 
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mementos (Curasi, Price, & Arnould, 2004). However, we frequently extend 
expressions of ownership beyond objects that can be manipulated, to ideas and space 
(Brown & Robinson, 2011), our workplace (for example, see van Dyne & Pierce, 2004); 
and even sounds (Isaacs, 1933). However, the degree of the bond experienced for 
possessions varies (Kleine, Kleine, & Allen, 1995; Kleine & Baker, 2004). Therefore, 
some have argued for a distinction between attachment to objects (a sense that the 
object is ‘me’, with the owner curating a deep emotional bond over time; Kleine et al., 
1995), and psychological ownership (a feeling of mine; for a review of material 
possession (attachment), see Kleine & Baker, 2004). Certainly, it is intuitively logical to 
view feelings of ownership as a continuum. Experiencing the same experiential sense of 
ownership for a disposable pen as we do for our treasured childhood teddy bear would 
cause undue distress on every occasion that one is appropriated from our desk by a 
colleague. Hereafter, this review focuses on the development and consequences of 
psychological ownership, although often confounded with legal ownership in laboratory 
settings, for everyday items.  
Ownership as object 
As discussed, the entities for which we experience ownership are diverse, and 
identifying objects subject to feelings of ownership is uninformative about its 
development and consequences. Rather than aim to taxonomise objects possessed, 
research has sought to quantifiably measure the elicitation of ownership, and the effect 
this has on object evaluations.  
Ecologically, we tend to choose what we come to own. While choice does mediate 
object valuations of owned objects (Huang, Wang, & Shi, 2009), simply endowing 
someone with an object in the absence of choice is sufficient in producing biased 
evaluations for the item. For example, arbitrarily assigning participants ownership of a 
reasonably low-worth item in laboratory settings (for example, a pen or drink sleeve) 
produces explicit and implicit preferences for the self-object, relative to unowned and 
others’ possessions (Beggan, 1992; Beggan & Allison, 1997; Huang et al., 2009; 
Nesselroade et al., 1999; Nuttin, 1987; Yeung, 2012). This finding, dubbed the mere 
ownership effect (Beggan, 1992; Nuttin, 1987), has been observed for both physical 
objects (Beggan, 1992; Nesselroade et al., 1999; Huang et al., 2009; in children, see 
Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012), and non-tangible ‘objects’, such as arguments (De 
Dreu & van Knippenberg, 2005).  
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Another measure that appears to serve as a proxy for, and may result from 
(Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009), ownership, is monetary valuation. In 
paradigms exploring economic trading behaviour, some participants are assigned an 
object (for example, a mug or pen; Kahneman Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Shu & Peck, 
2011), with the option to sell during the experiment. Participants assigned the item 
specify the price they would be willing to accept to sell the object (willingness to 
accept; WTA), while others not given an object indicate the value they would pay in 
order to acquire it (willingness to pay; WTP). Contrary to ‘rational’ economic rules, 
sellers frequently demand larger monetary amounts to surrender the item, compared 
with prices offered to acquire it (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984). Even imagining being given an object is sufficient to produce this effect 
(Carmon & Ariely, 2000). 
This pattern of behaviour, termed the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980), has been 
robustly replicated using many types of objects such as; lottery tickets or entries for a 
draw (Casey, 1995), event tickets (Adamowicz, Bhardwaj, & Macnab, 1993), chocolate 
(e.g. Knetsch, 1989; Reb, & Connolly, 2007), and wine (van Dijk & van Knippenberg, 
1998; for a review, see Horowitz & McConnell, 2002). Endowment effects also occur 
for intellectual property, such as creative work (Buccafusco & Sprigman, 2010; 
Buccafusco & Sprigman, 2011). However, some have questioned whether the WTA-
WTP gap is a result of task procedures producing participant misconceptions (Plott & 
Zeiler, 2005; However, see Ladner, Loomes, & Sugden, 2011).  
Traditionally, this effect has been attributed to loss aversion (for a review of all 
alternative theories, see Morewedge & Giblin, 2015); that individuals experience losses 
(vs. the status quo) as more painful than gains. In the case of buying and selling goods, 
relinquishing an object as a seller is considered a loss, whereas receiving an object not 
owned is a gain for the buyer. Therefore, sellers require more monetary reimbursement 
to do so (Kahneman et al., 1990; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Thaler, 1980). 
However, the task procedure regularly confounds ownership, with sellers owning the 
endowed items, and buyers being non-owners. Therefore, akin to the mere ownership 
effect, increased monetary valuations may result ownership contributing to avoidance of 
losses due to loss of ownership (Chatterjee, Irmak, & Rose, 2013). 
In support of an ownership account of the WTA-WTP gap, Morewedge et al. 
(2009), observed that those buying a mug who already owned one (owner-buyers), 
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offered similar prices to owners selling (owner-sellers), in contrast to buyers who did 
not own a mug, offering the lowest price to acquire one. In addition, owner-buyers were 
willing to pay more to acquire an item when purchasing on behalf of another, relative to 
non-owner buyers, and compared with what non-owner sellers required when trading 
for another individual. Such findings support an ownership account of the endowment 
effect; as loss aversion assumes owner-buyers would behave like regular buyers, and 
sellers would always demand higher prices than buyers (also see List, 2003; Peck & 
Shu, 2011). In summary, assigning ownership of an object increases owner’s 
preferences and valuations of the item, relative to unowned items.  
Although merely being assigned an object appears sufficient to produce a sense of 
ownership, indexed via increased evaluations, specific object-based experiences can 
also drive its development, particularly in the absence of legal ownership. The ‘routes’ 
to ownership have long been of interest to scholars (e.g., James, 1890; Sartre, 1943). 
Pierce et al. (2003), synthesised the routes to ownership proposed in previous literature 
into three main processes: control (e.g., Furby, 1978; McClelland, 1951; Rudmin & 
Berry, 1987; Sartre, 1943), familiarity (Furby, 1978; James, 1890; Rudmin & Berry, 
1987), and creation or investment (e.g. Belk & Coon, 1993; Locke, 1690; Sartre, 1943). 
Recently, progressing beyond attempts to merely quantifiably measure the effects of, 
often legal, ownership on valuations in endowment research; studies have attempted to 
empirically identify mechanisms through which psychological ownership develops; 
albeit often using object valuations as outcome measures.  
For example, potentially supporting control as a route to ownership, Peck and Shu 
(2009) found that briefly touching an object increased feelings of perceived ownership; 
compared with those who could view the object for the same length of time but were 
not permitted to interact with the item (see also Reb & Connolly, 2007). In addition, the 
length of time an object is owned influences the owner’s financial valuation of the item 
(Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998; see also Peck & Shu, 2011). Although not a direct 
measure of familiarity, repeated exposure to objects increases familiarity, and may 
therefore underlie this temporal effect. Furthermore, in a study that more directly 
manipulated familiarity, Wolf, Arkes, and Muhanna (2008), found that more time spent 
examining objects, prior to making offers, increases the price buyers are willing to pay 
for an object; suggestive of feelings of increased ownership.  
Finally, there is also accumulative evidence to support the role of creation and 
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investment of labour in feelings of psychological ownership. Studies have found that 
participants are willing to pay more for items they have assembled (Norton, Mochon, & 
Ariely, 2012), or designed (Franke, Schreier, & Kaiser, 2010), compared with the WTP 
for those who have not invested labour. Creating poetry and art also increases the 
creator’s monetary valuations, compared with valuations offered by those who merely 
own, but did not create, them (Buccafusco & Sprigman, 2010; Buccafusco & Sprigman, 
2011). Therefore, processes such as touch and familiarity serve to increase feelings of 
psychological ownership, particularly in the absence of legal rights.  
Ownership as individual 
As discussed, we express feelings of ownership for numerous forms of objects. 
Coming to own an object increases our monetary valuation of it, and its favourability. 
Although purely being endowed with an object appears to produce a degree of 
psychological ownership, mechanisms such as choice, control, familiarity, and 
investment with the object, facilitate its development. However, focus on the outcomes 
does not elucidate what ownership means at an individual level, nor why we own.   
At an intrapersonal level, ownership can be envisaged as a connection between the 
self and an object (Litwinski, 1942; Wilpert, 1991). However, this relationship between 
person and thing is proposed to extend beyond objective knowledge of having 
ownership. Notions of ownership as a merging of who we are and what we have; a 
combining of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ are persistent (for example, see James, 1890; Sartre, 
1943; Belk, 1988). Therefore, ownership can perhaps be conceptualised as thoughts and 
affective states, that a target object is ‘mine’ (Pierce et al., 2003), with that object not 
only connected to the self through owning, but coming to be part of the self (Belk, 
1988).  
It is proposed that this combining of mine and me results from acquiring and 
possessing objects with self-congruent meanings and values (either reflecting our 
personal identity, or social identity; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In line with this, 
individuals report owning more items related to their identities, such as ‘athlete’ 
(Kleine, Kleine, & Kernan, 1993). When considering consumer preference, people 
favour brands congruent with their perceived identity (e.g., Escalas & Bettman, 2005; 
Chan, Berger, & Boven, 2012); and avoid acquiring items associated with group 
identities with which the buyer does not feel affiliated (Berger & Heath, 2007).  
However, the development of self-object associations at a cognitive level may be 
 
 
	
8 
 
more simplistic. Implicit measures of construct association reveal faster responses for 
self-related word stimuli when preceded by an object for which they had been assigned 
ownership at the start of the experiment; relative to response times when primed by an 
object not owned (Ye & Gawronski, 2016; also see LeBarr & Shedden, 2017). This 
finding suggests that individuals ‘instantaneously’ associate objects that have been 
assigned with the self. At a neural level, thinking about owned objects increases activity 
in brain regions linked to self-related cognition (medial prefrontal cortex; see Kim & 
Johnson, 2012), illustrate neural connectivity between the ‘self’ and possessions. In 
cases where ownership is not explicitly granted, touch and investment of labour may 
assist in creating a self-object association. 
Providing further support for the ease at which objects become associated with the 
self, the increase in explicit valuation of an object upon being endowed with it, is 
assumed to result from the positive self-evaluations individuals hold about themselves, 
and their motivations to maintain their positive self-concept. Just two examples of the 
positive bias people exhibit regarding the self, include; judging themselves as 
performing better than others when grading their performance (e.g., John & Robins, 
1994), processing positive self-relevant information faster, and recalling more positive 
than negative self-attributes (Kuiper & Derry, 1982; for a review of self-enhancing 
biases, see Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 2005). 
Illustrating the connection between positive self-concept and ownership, studies 
have aimed to ‘damage’ individuals’ sense of self, through methods such as negative 
task feedback (e.g., Diesendruck & Perez, 2015; Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010) and 
interpersonal rejection (Dommer & Swaminathan, 2012), to observe the effect on object 
valuations. Individuals often seek means to enhance the self after self-threat (e.g. Argo, 
White, & Dahl, 2006), further increasing valuations of self-owned items may help to 
bolster the self. Such manipulations commonly increase individual’s selling prices 
(Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010; Dommer & Swaminatahan, 2012; although see Walasek, 
Matthews, & Rakow, 2015), or decrease the willingness to part with valued possessions 
(Diesendruck & Perez, 2015; also see Morrison & Johnson 2011; Keefer, Landau, 
Rothschild, & Sullivan 2012).  
In addition to becoming associated with the psychological ‘self’, possessions may 
extend the physical self. Acquiring objects with instrumental functions allows us to act 
upon the environment in ways we would otherwise be incapable (Belk, 1988; Furby, 
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1978), for example, our hammer allows us to drive the nail into the wall. At a cognitive 
level, tools influence our perception of the environment; making objects that fall outside 
of arm’s reach appear closer to the body when we intend to touch them with a tool, vs. 
without the tool (e.g., Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2005). Similarly, tools extend what is 
experienced as near space (e.g., Longo & Lourenco, 2006). Therefore, although 
ownership is not required to garner such effects, objects also facilitate a greater sense of 
ability to act upon the environment, physically extending our sense of self. 
Ownership instinct?   
At the individual level, ownership appears to be experienced as a connection 
between the self and an object. However, findings that objects become associated with 
self do little to explain the genesis of our drive to acquire property. Some purport that 
ownership functions as an innate adaptive mechanism serving survival (for example, see 
Ellis, 1985; Hare, Reeve, & Blossey, 2016; Litwinski, 1942; Stake, 2004). Evidence 
cited to support this notion is drawn from findings that numerous species such as, 
butterflies (Davies, 1978), finches (Senar, Camerino, & Metcalfe, 1989), wasps (Eason, 
Cobbs, & Trinca, 1999), and non-human primates (Ellis, 1985) exhibit possessive 
behaviour over territories when challenged by others seeking to acquire it. However, 
such findings only allude to the propensity for possession. Although possession and 
ownership are interconnected, ownership extends beyond possession, requiring others to 
respect another’s resource (Hare et al., 2016), even when it is not within their physical 
possession (Brosnan, 2011).  
However, there is substantially less cross-species evidence of respect of possession. 
Non-human primates do exhibit some degree, for example, non-owner baboons do not 
attempt to acquire a can of food from the possessor when they had observed the owner 
eating it (Sigg and Falett, 1985; for other examples of primates respecting possession, 
see also Kummer & Cords, 1991; Russ, Comins, Smith, & Hauser 2010). Also eluding 
to the concept of ownership in non-human primates, chimpanzees, like humans, exhibit 
the endowment effect, more greatly valuing an object given to them, measured by a 
reticence to trade for an alternative (Brosnan et al., 2007; Brosnan, Jones, Gardner, 
Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2012; for evidence in capuchin monkeys, see Lakshiminaryanan, 
Chen & Santos, 2008). However, this effect in chimpanzees only occurs for 
endowments that have ecological value, such as food (vs. tokens; Brosnan et al., 2007), 
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and for tools only when they can be used to reach food (vs. when the food is 
unobtainable with the tools; Brosnan et al., 2012).  
Beyond instinct  
 For humans, it is likely that property acquirement extends beyond adaptive instinct 
to secure resources to survive; we acquire more than we need to purely survive, and in 
contrast to the evidence available from other species, experience ownership for objects 
that do not serve survival and may not even be tangible.  
In addition, ownership as a construct is mediated by sociocultural differences. For 
example, the endowment effect appears to be culturally mediated, with increased 
seller’s valuations, relative to buyer’s offers, absent for East Asian participants (vs. 
Westerners). Furthermore, when independent self-construal was primed in the East 
Asian sample, the endowment effect was observable (Maddux et al., 2010). As 
discussed, increased valuations (e.g., Morwedge et al., 2009) and preference for 
endowed objects (e.g., Beggan, 1992), are assumed to result from self-enhancing biases 
(for a review, see Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Pelham et al., 2005). In Eastern cultures, 
self-enhancement biases are generally observed to be absent or reduced (for example, 
see Heine & Hamamura, 2007; Markus & Kityama, 1991).  
However, it must be noted that the notion of self-enhancement being absent in East 
Asian samples is contentious (see Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Alongside findings that 
East Asian samples display self-enhancing behaviour in relation to highly valued 
cultural norms (such as modesty; Cai et al., 2011), the cultural emphasis on modesty 
and not being ‘boastful’ may mediate the explicit expression of overt self-enhancing 
behaviour, rather than represent a lack of self-enhancement behaviour (Cai et al., 2011). 
Such findings do, however, indicate that ownership experiences, or at least their explicit 
expression, are mediated to a degree by cultural practices and social norms.  
Ownership as social: Beyond ‘mine’ 
When considering ownership, much research has focused on the experiences and 
effects of self-owned property, neglecting the social component of ownership. 
Ownership at the individual level may involve a connection experienced between 
person and object; although the experience may vary as a product of sociocultural 
experience. However, ownership is also interpersonal, requiring agreement between 
people (owners and non-owners), in relation to an object (Singer, 2010). Ownership can 
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only be maintained through others’ respect for ownership claims (Rose, 1985).  
For ownership claims to be respected, they must be made for objects (physical or 
non-physical) that others consider to be ‘ownable’. We may experience a sense of 
ownership for something, but if others do not collectively agree that the item is subject 
to ownership claims, we do not own it. Although we normatively accept ownership 
claims for material objects, there is evidence that both adults and children also routinely 
accept claims of ownership extended to ideas. However, we do not accept ownership for 
all entities; such as common words (Shaw, Li, & Olson, 2012; also see Olson & Shaw, 
2011). 
Further to collective agreement of what can be owned and shared understanding 
what ownership means, such as the rights the status of ownership bestows upon the 
owner, for example rights to use and control other’s use (Snare, 1972), is also required 
to maintain the construct of ownership. An object being ‘mine’ means I have the right to 
use it, even when I am not in current physical possession, and you do not have the right 
to use it. An object being ‘yours’, means I have no right to act upon it. If ownership did 
not confer the owner with entitlement over the object, its communication would be 
meaningless. Without the entrenchment of such sociocultural understandings of 
ownership, and respect for this framework, there are just objects and people; who may 
physically possess something at a moment in time, but have no claims over it. In turn, 
while others should respect our ownership claims, we must also adhere to norms to 
respect the possessions of others. As developmental psychologists are greatly interested 
in how children reason about abstract ideas (e.g. others’ mental states, moral concepts), 
the abstract nature of ownership understanding has resulted in much research 
concerning this process being conducted with children. 
Developing understandings of ownership rights 
Attesting to the social nature of ownership and its dependence upon the respect of 
others, observational methods frequently report conflicts between children over objects 
during play (e.g., Shantz, 1987; Ross, 1996). However, children begin to demonstrate 
knowledge of ownership rights and use them to settle such disputes from an early age. 
From two years of age, children appeal to ownership as grounds for settling disputes 
about who has the right to interact with an object (Ross, 1996; Neary & Friedman, 
2014; also see Nancekivell & Friedman, 2014). Similarly, children protest at another 
violating their own property rights (someone taking their object or throwing it away), 
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from around two years of age, before beginning to challenge a violator of other’s rights 
at around three (Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011; see also Schmidt, Rakoczy, & 
Tomasello, 2013). Children are also sensitive to more subtle elements of ownership 
rights, such as owner’s approval (indicative of consent, or lack of) of other’s 
interactions, when considering whether property rights are violated. Children evaluating 
others’ interactions with property that resulted in negative responses from the owner 
considered such behaviour as less acceptable, compared with object interactions that 
elicited a positive response. However, the approval or disapproval of a non-owner when 
the owner interacted with the object did not influence judgments (Van de Vondervoort, 
& Friedman, 2015).  
Such examples of children’s understandings of ownership rights only consider 
cases where ownership by one party is undisputed, and the associated rights are 
violated. Children also develop sophisticated reasoning concerning who should be 
assigned ownership in disputes about the owner. A cross-cultural study on children aged 
three to five years required them to decide who owned an object during a dispute 
between two individuals. Children favoured creators of objects as owners, and were 
more likely to assign ownership to someone familiar with an object. This finding was 
observed across children from different cultures; comparing children from the United 
States, Brazil, Vanuatu and China (Rochat et al., 2014). As discussed, creative labour is 
a long cited route to ownership development (e.g. Locke, 1690), and social emphasis is 
also placed on creation as source of legitimate ownership claims (see also Kanngiesser, 
Itakura, & Hood, 2014). Therefore, children appear to develop normative reasoning 
regarding ownership from an early age.  
The lack of differences observed in Rochat et al.’s (2014) cross-cultural study of 
ownership attribution is, perhaps, surprising. Given that our ideas of ownership are 
proposed to be socially situated, we would anticipate differences, especially when 
comparing children from rural areas with egalitarian values; such as those living in 
Vanuatu, with children from urban, individualistic areas, such as the United States 
(Rochat et al. 2014). Therefore, the basis on which we reason ownership may be 
broadly similar across cultures. However, one finding that signaled subtle differences in 
resolving ownership disputes was the Chinese children’s more frequent recruitment of 
splitting an object, rather than assigning to one individual. The authors attribute such 
behaviour to the emphasis placed on sharing and the collective within the Chinese 
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children’s preschool environment in line with the interdependent self-construal (vs. 
independent) commonly observed in individuals from Eastern cultures; with the self-
defined as relational (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Other research observes increased 
levels of spontaneous sharing amongst Chinese children (Rao & Stewart, 1999), when 
compared with American children (Birch & Billman, 1986), potentially supporting the 
splitting of resources observed.  
To respect other’s ownership of physical and immaterial property, and its 
associated rights, we must infer who owns something. Unlike other characteristics of 
objects, such as shape and colour, ownership cannot be directly perceived through 
object observation.  
Inferring others’ ownership 
One central way in which we establish ownership is through others’ language use, 
attending to the use of first, second, and third-person possessive pronouns (e.g. ‘my’ 
mug, ‘your’ pen, ‘their’ watch), when people refer to objects. Children develop the 
ability to use possessive pronouns to communicate ownership from approximately 18 
months of age (Bates, 1990; Hay, 2006), and can distinguish between objects belonging 
to themselves and to familiar others (Fasig, 2000). However, children may possess 
some comprehension of others’ use of possessive pronouns from around twelve months 
(Saylor, Ganea, & Vázquez, 2012). Although children do not reliably accomplish 
correct attribution of ownership based on verbal information in more complex 
scenarios, such as keeping track of verbal information concerning ownership (own and 
researcher’s) while objects are spatially repositioned (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 
2012), and in the presence of conflicting physical cues (Blake, Ganea, & Harris, 2012), 
until later.  
Verbal cues about ownership are an important basis for inferences, but they are not 
always available. Therefore, in some scenarios, we must rely on other information when 
attempting to identify object ownership. Developmental research suggests we possess a 
range of heuristics to assist in ownership attribution. When observing actors 
manipulating objects, one principle adopted by adults (Friedman & Neary 2008a), and 
reliably in children from around three years of age (Friedman & Neary, 2008b), is to 
attribute ownership to the first individual we witness possessing it. Possession may act 
as a cue from which to reason about the history of ownership. For example, when 
presented with information about object history, such as child A bringing an object to 
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the park, but child B playing with it before Child A, children were more likely to select 
Child A as the owner, overriding the first possession heuristic (Friedman, Van de 
Vondervoort, Defeyter, & Neary, 2013; also see Kanngiesser et al., 2014). 
When other information is available, children also infer ownership from, arguably 
more complex, non-verbal cues, such as the emotional reaction of one of two parties 
when an object is broken (sad reaction), or fixed (happy reaction; Pesowski & 
Friedman, 2016). Furthermore, between four and five years, children also begin to 
utilise their knowledge of ownership rights during ownership attributions; assigning 
ownership to an individual controlling the right of others to use an object (Neary, 
Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009). Knowledge of whether the object is normative for the 
gender or age of the possible owner is also recruited heuristically, by both adults and 
children (Malcom, Defeyter, & Friedman, 2014). Early development of ownership 
understanding, and the ability to infer ownership, attests to the social importance of the 
need to respect owners and their belongings.  
Ownership and cognition: Self-relevance 
Cognitive psychologists have long been interested in whether self-relevant stimuli, 
such as our own names, are afforded advantages during stimulus processing (e.g., 
Cherry, 1953; Moray, 1959, Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997). 
However, beyond the evaluative biases elicited by ownership, the cognitive basis 
(whether ownership alters the ways in which objects are treated by the cognitive 
system) has historically received little attention. This is somewhat surprising, given that 
self-ownership represents a form of self-relevance through which biases can be 
investigated. In addition, ownership is a salient feature of our environment, pertinent to 
object-based processing.  
Biases for self-objects, such as the ability to quickly identify what is ours within the 
environment and remember our belongings, is paramount in protecting them from 
appropriation or inappropriate use by others. Given that work previously presented 
within this chapter suggests that at least some of our tendency to acquire objects appears 
to be an evolutionary mechanism serving survival and property also ‘prop ups’ our 
sense of self (Belk, 1988), biases for ownership have clear adaptive (Cunningham, 
Brady-Van den Bos, Gill, & Turk, 2013), but also psychological, benefits. Over the past 
decade, research has started to explore the nature of cognitive processing for owned 
objects; indicating that objects associated with the self do bias a range of cognitive 
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processes, such as memory, attention, and perceptual identification in a manner akin to 
other self-relevant stimuli.  
Memory 
One of the most significant findings illustrating that the self shapes cognitive 
processes is the self-reference effect (SRE) in memory (Rogers et al., 1977; see also 
Kuiper & Rogers, 1979); the finding that individuals recall more information when 
related to the self during encoding, compared with stimuli encoded in relation to 
another. Traditionally, mnemonic advantage for stimuli encoded with reference to the 
self was demonstrated by comparing recall of trait words under different conditions 
while evaluating whether it describes the self (e.g., “are you motivated?”), compared 
with semantic (e.g., “is motivated the same as ambitious?”), phonemic (e.g., “does 
motivated rhyme with cultivated?”), and structural (e.g., “does ‘motivated’ have capital 
letters?”), encoding conditions (Rogers et al., 1977). Although semantic encoding 
produces enhanced recall when compared with phonemic and structural conditions (e.g., 
Craik & Tulving, 1975), the self-reference condition produces the most superior 
performance (Rogers et al., 1977). When extending the paradigm to compare trait 
adjectives encoded in relation to another (e.g., “is Donald Trump motivated?”), the self-
reference advantage remained (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; for a meta-analytic review, see 
Symons & Johnson, 1997).  
Beyond increased recall of items encoded with self-reference, the self-condition 
increases the number of ‘remember’ versus ‘know’ responses (the self-reference 
recollection effect (SRRE); Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). Remember (i.e. can recollect 
specific details of the stimulus’s earlier presentation), and know (a sense of familiarity 
that the stimulus has been seen before), experiences are assumed to reflect two distinct 
aspects of recognition memory - with remember responses signaling episodic 
recollection resulting from elaborative encoding producing rich representations (see 
Gardiner & Java, 1993; Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000; although for 
questioning of the states as functionally independent, see Dunn, 2008; Hockley, 2008).   
It is purported by some, that the SRE arises from incoming information being 
related to, and enriched by, the extensive body of self-knowledge; aiding elaborative 
encoding (Klein & Loftus, 1988). However, the SRE can be obtained under conditions 
that do not require explicit evaluative encoding in relation to the self. For example, 
when participants merely report whether trait adjectives are displayed above or below 
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their own, or another’s, name (and face; Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008). This 
incidental advantage, not relying on explicit elaboration, is suggestive that ownership 
could also be privy to similar mnemonic advantages.   
More recently, ownership has been adopted as another, more ecologically 
reflective, means through which to investigate less explicit evaluative self-encoding 
behaviour. Cunningham Turk, Macdonald, and Macrae (2008), asked pairs of 
participants to imagine they had won a shopping basket of items. The items won were 
presented on cards, to be sorted into two shopping baskets (one red, the other blue), one 
owned by the self, and one belonging to the other participant. Red and blue marks on 
the images indicated whom the object belonged to. After sorting the cards, participants 
completed a surprise recognition test. In accordance with the trait-adjective SRE, 
participants correctly recognised more self-owned items than those owned by the other 
participant. Beyond greater recall, self-owned items also elicited more recollection, 
rather than familiarity, mnemonic experiences (van den Bos, Cunningham, Conway, & 
Turk, 2010). This effect is robust, replicated in both adults (e.g. Turk, van Bussel, 
Waiter, & Macrae, 2011; Kim & Johnson 2012), and children (Cunningham, Vergunst, 
Macrae, & Turk, 2013). 
Such findings demonstrate that recall advantages for information related to the self 
also extend to self-associated objects, perhaps unsurprising given the importance of 
being able to remember what items within the environment are ours. Findings produced 
from this paradigm are also informative about the nature of the SRE in general; as akin 
to Turk et al. (2008), there was no requirement to explicitly relate incoming objects to 
self-representations during the shopping task. Therefore, it is not necessarily the 
application of information to existing rich self-knowledge that results in the SRE, as 
traditionally suggested (e.g. Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988). Instead, 
this ‘minimal’ SRE may result from biased attention allocation for self-owned property. 
Attentional resource availability is a prerequisite for deeper elaborative encoding of 
material, resulting in more ‘remember’ recall instances, compared with conditions 
where attention is divided (for example, see Mangels, Picton, & Craik, 2001; Gardiner 
& Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). In accordance with an attentional account, Turk et al. 
(2013) observed that dividing attention during the encoding period of the shopping task 
abolished the episodic ownership effect (greater remember responses), observed in van 
den Bos et al. (2010). There is a wealth of research illustrating that attention prioritises 
 
 
	
17 
 
self-relevant stimuli, potentially underpinning the SRE.  
Attention 
The volume of incoming information experienced at any moment cannot be 
effectively processed simultaneously (Bargh, 1982; Allport, 1989). Therefore, elements 
of this vast array must be selected to receive further processing, and attention is the 
mechanism through which this selection occurs (Allport, 1989). Visually, attention can 
be guided based on salient physical properties of stimuli, such as colour (Theeuwes, 
1992; Mounts, 2000), motion (Theeuwes, 1994; Theeuwes, 2010), or sudden onset 
(Jonides & Yantis, 1988).  
However, attention allocation is also affected by top-down goals. We can be 
attuned to attend to certain stimuli based on prior information about their features, we 
can possess an ‘attentional set’ for certain types of stimuli (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
2007; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005; Simons, 2000). We may also possess 
‘habitual’ attentional sets for some categories of stimuli that possess meaning for the 
observer (those that signal threat; Blanchette, 2006; Most, Smith, Cooter, Levy, & Zald, 
2007; or possess social significance, e.g., faces; Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003; Devue, 
Laloyaux, Feyers, Theeuwes, & Brédart, 2009). Self-relevant information constitutes 
another category of stimuli that appears to receive prioritised selection. Preferentially 
attending to self-relevant cues within the environment has clear ecological advantages 
in terms of tracking what is important for processing. 
The cocktail party effect, the finding that (in this case, auditory) self-relevant 
stimuli, such as your name, can capture attention when presented in an unattended 
channel (Moray, 1959; Wood & Cowan, 1959), is one of the earliest findings that self-
relevant stimuli possess special cognitive significance. In the visual domain, self-
relevant stimuli can potentially impair performance when appearing as distractors 
(Wolford & Morrison, 1980; Brédart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006; although see 
Devue & Brédart, 2008), and are more likely to be detected when unexpectedly 
appearing in an array than non-self relevant words (Mack & Rock, 1998; although see 
Bundesen, Kyllingsbaek, Houmann, & Jensen, 1997).  
Findings that self-relevant stimuli interfere with primary task processing has 
resulted in claims that self-relevance automatically ‘captures’ attention; that such 
stimuli are attended to without volition. However, inconsistencies in the replicability of 
such effects ultimately suggest that self-relevant stimuli may require some available 
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attentional resources to be processed. For example, Devue and Brédart, (2008), failed to 
replicate primary task interference from own face distractors, observing that the 
interference quickly dissipates after a few presentations of the self-relevant stimulus (for 
other failures to observe automatic attention capture, see Harris & Pashler, 2004; 
Bundesen et al., 1997; Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakar, 2003; Keyes and Dlugokencka, 
2014).  
However, although the automaticity of attention allocation to self-relevant stimuli is 
questionable, self-relevant stimuli are certainly subject to prioritised selection when 
attentional resources are available. Self-relevant stimuli interfere with processing when 
presented centrally (but not peripherally; Gronau et al., 2003), and are detected faster in 
an array when task-relevant (e.g., Harris & Pashler, 2004; Tong & Nakayama, 1999; 
Yang, Wang, Gu, Gao, & Zhao, 2013). Self-relevant stimuli are also accorded more 
processing, indexed by a larger P300 event-related potential (ERP) component; even 
compared with the resources devoted to processing task-relevant stimuli (Gray, 
Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Ninomiya, Onitsuka, Chen, Sato, & Tashiro, 
1998; Shi, Zhou, Liu, Zhang, & Han, 2011; Zhou et al., 2010).  
Such attentional effects have been observed across a myriad of types of self-
relevant stimuli; such as own name (Alexopoulos, Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 2012; 
Arnell, Shapiro, & Sorensen, 1999; Mack & Rock, 1998; Shapiro, Caldwell, & 
Sorensen, 1997; Tong & Nakayama, 1999; Wolford & Morrison, 1980; Yang et al., 
2013), own face (Brédart et al., 2006; Ninomiya et al., 1998; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006; 
Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010; Zhu et al., 2016), autobiographical information visually 
presented (e.g., home town; Gray et al., 2004), participant’s national flag (Fan et al., 
2011), and first person possessive pronouns (Shi et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2010).  
More recently, attentional biases for owned property have been identified, using a 
novel paradigm developed to explore early stage self-object processing while 
controlling for confounds such as familiarity, the label-shape matching task 
(Yankouskaya, Palmer, Stolte, Sui, & Humphreys, 2016). In the label-shape matching 
paradigm, a 2D shape (e.g. triangle, square, circle), is associated with a label (for 
example, you, friend, stranger). A matching task is performed, where the participant 
must indicate if a label-shape pair is congruent (matches the initial learned shape-label 
pairing), or incongruent (it has been reassigned, for example, self shape with friend 
label), with the initial allocations (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012). To observe whether 
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attention is biased toward self-objects, participants performed an adapted version of the 
matching task with the shape appearing to the left or right of the visual field. Correct 
label-shape pairings were responded to by performing an anti-saccade (look away from 
the shape), and responses to mismatched pairings with saccades toward the shape. 
Relative to friend and stranger shapes, participants produced more errors when 
performing anti-saccades for self-owned pairings, suggesting that self ‘owned’ stimuli 
hold attention (Yanouskaya et al., 2016). 
Label-shape associations appear to be a crude form of self-object association due to 
their arbitrary and temporary association. Therefore, it is possible to question their 
ecological relevance when specifically considering how object ownership, rather than 
self-relevant information in general, may influence attentional processes. However, 
once formed, the shape-label pairings are difficult to discard when reassigned in a 
second task (Wang, Humphreys, & Sui, 2016). This suggests the degree of association 
is less temporary than may be intuitively supposed.  
In addition, attentional biases for self-associated objects do extend beyond 
geometric shapes to more ecologically valid objects. ‘Owned’ objects in the 
Cunningham shopping task (Cunningham et al., 2008) similarly influence such 
attentional processes. Replicating findings that other categories of self-relevant stimuli 
moderate the amplitude of the P300 ERP component, an index of attentional processing 
(see Gray et al., 2004), Turk et al. (2011) observed greater amplitude of the P300 
component at the moment the object was flagged as self-owned (vs. experimenter’s), 
during the task.  
Complementing these findings, Truong et al. (2016), observed a tendency to report 
seeing a self-owned object (previously associated to the self in a learning phase) before 
the object belonging to the research assistant, when both were presented simultaneously 
(temporal order judgment task; TOJ). Such prior entry of one stimulus when two are 
presented simultaneously (and at varying onset asynchronies) is assumed to reflect 
attentional processes facilitating stimulus perception (for a review, see Spence & Parise 
2010). The authors interpret this finding as illustrating an attentional set for ‘own’ 
biasing detection of self-owned belongings (Truong et al., 2016).   
Perceptual advantages?  
The findings reviewed so far indicate that, like other types of self-relevant stimuli, 
owned objects are prioritised during the allocation of attentional resources, and receive 
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a mnemonic advantage, possibly because of greater attention allocation. However, 
objects associated with the self may also receive facilitated processing earlier in the 
processing stream, during stimulus categorisation.  
For example, in the label-shape matching task it has been robustly observed that 
participants are faster to identify congruent matches for self-shapes (‘you / yourself’), 
than for a variety of other labels including: ‘friend’ ‘mother’, ‘stranger’ and ‘none’ (Sui 
et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2015a; Sui, Rothstein, & Humphreys, 2013; Schäfer, 
Wentura, & Frings, 2015). This self-prioritization effect remains when controlling for 
potential confounds such as word length, frequency, and is also present when using real 
names rather than abstract ‘you, friend, stranger’ tags (Sui et al., 2012). Taken together, 
these findings allude to self-relevant ‘objects’ exerting a prepotent effect on perceptual 
processing. Congruent with this explanation, responses to ‘self’ shapes, compared with 
non-self stimuli, are less sensitive to degradation of the stimulus (Sui et al., 2012), a 
manipulation assumed to influence early stages of visual processing (Mechelli, 
Humphreys, Mayall, Olson, & Price, 2000). In addition, akin to the effects of 
interference of a distractor stimulus with high perceptual salience (e.g., high contrast), 
when responding to a low salience target, self-shape distractors interfere with responses 
to other-shape targets, but not vice versa (Sui, Liu, Mevorach, & Humphreys, 2015), 
indicating that objects associated with the self, have greater salience during perceptual 
processing. 
However, the cognitive stage at which such biases occur is disputed. Whether faster 
matching responses for self results from facilitated processing of stimulus 
characteristics, or represents response biases (a bias toward earlier response, based on 
less stimulus information), has recently been explored (Golubickis, Falben, 
Cunningham, & Macrae, in press). Prior to a categorisation task using objects (pens or 
pencils), participants were informed they owned all objects from one category (pens or 
pencils), while another individual (stranger, or friend), owned the other. Participants 
then categorised the objects, pressing one key for self-owned, and another for 
stranger/friend. Mirroring findings from the shape-label matching task (e.g. Sui et al., 
2012), participants were faster to categorise self-owned objects, suggesting self-
prioritisation bias is present during real object discrimination.  
However, the data was subjected to hierarchical drift diffusion model analysis 
(HDDM; Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013), which separates processing effects 
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(information uptake regarding the stimulus) from response biases (the point at which 
individuals have enough evidence to respond; White & Poldrack, 2014). HDDM 
identified this self-prioritisation effect as resulting from response bias, rather than 
enhanced information gathering (see also Macrae, Visokomogilski, Golubickis, 
Cunningham, & Sahraie, 2017). Therefore, it appears individuals may have different 
thresholds for the amount of perceptual information required to initiate self-owned 
responses, relative to other-owned rather than processing self-owned stimuli ‘faster’.  
Neural mechanisms of self-object processing 
Whether self-prioritisation effects reflect enhanced perceptual processing, or altered 
thresholds for response initiation, objects owned by the self, akin to other self-relevant 
stimuli, are preferentially treated at various levels of cognition. These findings raise 
questions concerning the neural basis of such biases, and whether they reflect a discrete 
network sensitive to ‘self’.  
A neural region consistently implicated in the production of self-relevant biases is 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; for a meta-analysis of cortical midline structures 
recruited in self-referential processing, see Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff & Bermpohl, 
2004). In addition to regions associated with memory and elaborative encoding, the 
mPFC is preferentially active during self-relevant evaluations in trait-evaluation tasks 
(Kelley et al., 2002), and similarly, in response to self-owned items in the shopping 
basket task (Turk et al., 2011). Furthermore, suggesting a causal role for the mPFC in 
self-memory biases, the magnitude of activation has been found to predict the 
subsequent recall of self-traits (Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004); 
and self-owned stimuli (Turk et al., 2011; see also Kim & Johnson, 2012).  
Beyond self-owned objects eliciting mPFC activation at the point of forming self-
object associations, it is also spontaneously activated when merely presented with a 
possession the participant had previously been tasked with imagining owning, and the 
magnitude of such activation predicted changes in object preference (mere ownership 
effect; Kim & Johnson, 2014). Therefore, there appears to be a key overlap in the way 
owned objects are processed, and how other self-relevant stimuli are treated. This lends 
further support to the theoretical notion that owned objects are treated as extensions of 
the self (Belk, 1988), and that self-object associations are virtually instantaneous (Turk 
et al., 2011; Kim & Johnson, 2012; LeBarr & Shedden, 2017).  
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Self shape-label biases also mediate activation of medial prefrontal regions 
(ventromedial prefrontal cortex; Sui et al., 2013). However, in addition, the left 
posterior, superior temporal sulcus (LpSTS), an area implicated in guiding attention in 
our social environment (e.g., Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), is also recruited (Sui et al., 
2013). Based on these findings, Humphreys and Sui (2016) formulated the SAN (Self-
Attention Network), proposing that the vmPFC is sensitive to the presence of self-
relevant stimuli, in turn activating the LpSTS, to prime orienting to self-owned items. 
Findings that self-biases in matching and memory are abolished in a patient with mPFC 
damage, while greater self-biases result from LpSTS lesions supports the functional 
connectivity of this network (Sui, Enock, Ralph, & Humphreys, 2015).  
Is self always special?  
It appears we possess a neural network instigated in processing ‘self’ stimuli and 
facilitating subsequent encoding (for suggestion that the function of SAN is to ensure 
self-relevant information is encoded, see Cunningham 2016). However, self-objects are 
not infallibly prioritised. In addition to the mPFC-LpSTS network that assists in 
sensitivity for self, an independent control network acts to suppress attention to self-
stimuli when inappropriate. For example, a neural region recruited when visually salient 
distractors must be inhibited (the intra-parietal sulcus; Mevorach, Shalev, Allen, & 
Humphreys, 2009), is similarly active when ‘overriding’ a socially salient self-
distractor, to respond to a low socially salient ‘other’ shape (Sui et al., 2015). Therefore, 
we do have some volition in suppressing attention to self when required.  
Self-biases are also mediated by contextual demands. For example, in the label-
shape matching task, participants were not sensitive to social saliency (a self distractor, 
considered ‘high salience’ interfering with an other-target), when the task required 
discrimination of the shape presented, rather than categorising whom the shape 
‘belonged’ to (Liu & Sui, 2016; for contextual mediation when detecting location, see 
Stein, Siebold, & van Zoest, 2016). The presence of self-prioritisation in the shape-label 
matching paradigm is also influenced by top-down expectancies. For example, 
increasing stimulus probability of the ‘other’ pairings improves performance, relative to 
equal probability conditions. Although, it is important to note that a reduction in 
stimulus probability does not impact self-owned matches, as it does mother and stranger 
responses (Sui, Sun, Peng, & Humphreys, 2014). Therefore, self-relevant objects do not 
possess absolute salience.  
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Akin to explicit evaluative biases associated with ownership (Maddux et al., 2010), 
self-object processing biases are also mediated by sociocultural experiences that 
influence self-construal. As predicted by interdependent self-construal that emphasises 
interconnectedness with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), East Asian participants 
displayed greater recall for mother-owned objects, relative to self-owned, in the 
shopping task. This contrasted with Western participants, who displayed the normative 
self-referential effect (Sparks, Cunningham, & Kritikos, 2016), and was consistent with 
findings that Asian participants perform equally for traits encoded with relation to the 
self and mother (vs. stranger; e.g. Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Zhang et al., 2006). However, 
representation of the self on low level perceptual matching tasks is potentially malleable 
regardless of sociocultural experience; such biases extend to social groups individuals 
identify with, such as own and rival football teams (Moradi, Sui, Hewstone, & 
Humphreys, 2015). Performance in the standard shape-label paradigm also falls on a 
continuum, although self receives the greatest advantage, familiar others such as mother 
elicit faster response times compared with stranger labels (e.g., Sui et al., 2012).  
Findings that perceptual matching enhancement extends beyond objects associated 
with self labels, and that stimuli associated with others do receive some degree of 
prioritised processing over stranger, may suggest self-processing is not special. Instead, 
self-biases may result from more general processes in response to other stimulus 
characteristics. For example, familiarity is one such general stimulus feature that could 
possibly account for the observed differences. However, given that low stimulus 
probability differentially affects response facilitation for matches for a highly familiar 
other compared with self-matches (Sui et al., 2014), it is unlikely that familiarity solely 
accounts for the prioritisation of self.  
It is also plausible that self-prioritisation effects could be underpinned by the 
differential valence or reward value of self-stimuli relative to familiar other and stranger 
items (for valence, see Ma & Han, 2010; for reward, see Northoff & Hayes 2011). As 
previously discussed, we possess positive self-biases (Pelham et al., 2005), that extend 
to owned objects, increasing evaluations (e.g., Beggan, 1992; Nesselroade et al., 1999; 
Ye & Gawronski, 2016). Mirroring self-prioritisation effects and, therefore, situating 
valence as a possible mechanism, response times during categorisation of positive 
stimuli (for example, happy facial expressions, positive words, and other positive 
images), are faster than those for negative valence (for example, see Cunningham, 
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Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003; Lehr, Bergum, & Standing, 1966; Leppanen 
& Hietanen, 2004). Similarly, distractors previously associated with a high reward value 
have been found to capture attention, relative to low reward distractors (Anderson, 
Laurent, & Yanis, 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2013). When directly comparing shape-
label matching performance between shapes associated with differing reward value (£9, 
£3, £1), with self, friend, and stranger matching, high reward stimuli were also 
categorised faster than low-reward, akin to self-shape performance (Sui et al., 2012). 
However, the influence of reward value and self-relevance on stimulus processing does 
appear to differ under other task contexts, suggesting self-processing biases are not 
solely underpinned by the greater reward value of self-stimuli (see Sui, Yankouskaya, & 
Humphreys, 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 2015b; Sui & Humphreys, 2015c). When 
comparing self-relevance judgments with reward tasks (gambling; Enzi, de Greck, 
Prosch, Tempelmann, & Northoff, 2009), and viewing affective imagery (Phan et al., 
2004), there is some overlap in neural regions associated with affect across task types. 
However, other neural regions were only active during self-tasks. Therefore, it is likely 
that self-object associations are at least partially underpinned by an affective or reward 
component, but the self-biases discussed do not only result from affective qualities.  
Ownership beyond a vehicle for self-relevant biases 
Despite self-relevant stimuli, including self-owned property, receiving processing 
advantages, the research discussed still indicates that such biases are flexible; we do not 
always prioritise self, insensitive to other cues. However, shapes matched to other, or 
property belonging to another, is often used as a comparative group of less importance, 
to illustrate superior performance for self. While tracking our own objects within the 
environment is important to protect our property, it is also necessary and advantageous 
that we quickly identify and remember whether objects are owned, and who owns them, 
to avoid potentially costly interactions. A study by DeScioli, Rosa, and Gutchess (2015) 
observed that recall for items was superior for object-person pairs (with the participant 
told that the individual owns the objects), compared with object-person ‘unrelated’ 
pairs. This suggests that alongside findings that we afford our own objects a memorial 
advantage, individuals also encode the ownership status of others’ property, compared 
with the recall of objects with no attributed owner, a condition not compared previously 
by Cunningham et al. (2008; 2012; 2013). Therefore, other-ownership cues possess, at 
least a recall advantage, relative to unowned items.  
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Other-ownership influences other cognitive processes. As we perceive objects, their 
ownership status is not only informative to the extent that it may be MINE, and 
therefore self-relevant, the concept of ‘mine’ or ‘yours’ is informative about what I am 
allowed to do with that object. When acting on objects, knowledge of ownership status 
may affect the visuomotor system by its contextually relevant nature of embodying 
rights to use, or not use. Embodied cognition offers a framework through which to 
understand how knowledge of ownership may influence the visuomotor system. 
Embodiment 
Embodied cognition is not one unified theory (see Wilson, 2002; Barsalou, 2008), 
but a position that, in its strongest form, posits the rejection of concepts as represented 
in an abstract manner, comprised of amodal symbols (e.g., Fodor, 1975). Instead, 
knowledge is considered as represented by, or at least, associated with, the sensorimotor 
states experienced during perception and action. For example, ‘chocolate’ is represented 
by modalities that process its taste, smell, visual features, and introspective experiences 
(such as pleasure or reward) while eating it. Later, when stumbling across chocolate in 
the kitchen cupboard (‘online’ cognition), or thinking about chocolate (‘offline’ 
cognition), the multimodal information associated with it is reactivated (simulated; 
Barsalou, 1999; 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004; Simmons 
& Barsalou, 2003; Barsalou, Santos, Kyle, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008).  
Due to the sheer volume of theory and investigative enquiry falling under the 
umbrella of embodied approaches to cognition, an exhaustive review is not tenable (for 
just two reviews, see Barsalou, 2008; Shapiro, 2010). For example, embodiment can 
also be extended to the processing of social actors, as we appear to simulate observed 
emotions and pain (Dimberg, Thunbergh, & Elmehed, 2000; Morrison, Lloyd, De 
Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004), and other’s actions (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001), offering a 
mechanism for understanding others’ behaviour (see Grafton, 2009; Fadiga, Craighero, 
& Olivier, 2005; Cavallo, Becchio, Sartori, Bucchioni, & Castiello, 2012), and mental 
states (for reviews, see Gallese, 2003; Gallese, & Sinigaglia, 2011). In addition, it 
remains disputed whether concepts are truly represented by sensory and motor 
experiences, or merely related sensorimotor experiences are activated as a result of 
conceptual processing (disembodied theories; for discussion, see Mahon & Caramazza, 
2008; Mahon, 2015). 
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Limited evidence relevant for understanding the elicitation of sensorimotor states 
during cognition can be found in the activation of motor regions associated with 
grasping (as if interacting with the object), during object observation, even in the 
absence of intention to act (Chao & Martin, 2000; Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 
1997; Grezes & Decety, 2002; Grezes, Tucker, Ellis, & Passingham, 2003; for a review, 
see Lewis, 2006). Similarly, motor regions are activated during the comprehension and 
production of action verbs (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermuller, 2004; Buccino et al., 
2005). Activation of associated sensorimotor states extends beyond motor activity to 
other modalities. For example, neural regions associated with gustation are activated 
when viewing food (Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou, 2005), and areas linked to smell 
perception are recruited during the comprehension of odour-related words (for example, 
‘cinnamon’; Gonzalez et al., 2006). Affective reactions, such as increased galvanic skin 
response, are activated during comprehension of negative emotive words (Harris, 
Aycicegi, Berko, & Gleason, 2003), and recruitment of the muscles invoked during 
smiling are active during comprehension of verbs referring to facial expressions (Foroni 
& Semin, 2009). Even abstract concepts that cannot be directly perceived, so seemingly 
cannot be rooted in perceptual experiences, appear to be associated with sensorimotor 
experiences of more concrete concepts. For example, morality appears to be linked to 
cleanliness, evidenced by hand washing reducing the extent to which immoral actions 
were perceived as wrong (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008), and an increase in desire 
for cleaning products after performing a moral transgression (Lee & Schwarz, 2010).  
Activation of such states during stimulus processing subsequently alters 
performance. For example, when responding to a graspable object, action performance 
is facilitated, providing the action executed is congruent with the motor activity 
‘primed’ during perception (Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Tucker & Ellis, 2004). Similarly, 
when perceiving emotional facial expressions, performance is impaired if the use of the 
muscles associated with the performance of facial expressions is prevented (for 
example, by holding a pen between the teeth; Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-
Ker, 2001; Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007). However, the connection 
between sensorimotor experience and cognition is bi-directional. For example, 
alongside the activation of affective bodily states when comprehending emotive stimuli, 
inducing bodily states associated with affect, such as nodding the head (Wells & Petty, 
1980), and engaging the muscles recruited in smiling (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988), 
induces positive affective evaluations in individuals.	
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Despite criticisms levied at embodied approaches, there is substantial evidence that 
associated sensorimotor states are, at least, experienced during stimulus perception and 
conceptual thought, and vice versa when inducing states. However, as the potential 
states associated with a stimulus or concept are so vast; some proponents of embodied 
cognition also emphasise the role of environmental context as guiding which elements 
become active (e.g., Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). To extend the previous example, chocolate 
may be experienced as less delicious in a situation that signals health (for example, a 
gym), compared with indulgence (a coffee shop; Roefs et al., 2006). Contextual effects 
extend beyond evaluations; individuals are more accurate at identifying objects when 
they appear in coherent scenes (a chair in a living room), than scrambled displays, 
suggesting that the scene activated related concepts, facilitating response (e.g., 
Biederman, 1972). In addition, despite experiencing the same emotional response to 
threat (fear) in social contexts, and those indicating physical danger (the presence of a 
snake), different neural regions are recruited in preparation for response depending on 
whether the context is a social or physical threat. Networks involved in thinking about 
others (mentalising), are activated in social contexts, while regions associated with 
action planning are recruited during physical danger scenarios (Wilson-Mendenhall, 
Feldman Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013). Therefore, contextual cues also appear to pose 
importance in guiding cognition.  
Embodied ownership 
Ownership as a concept, ultimately, rests on the acceptability to interact with objects 
(Snare, 1972). Therefore, ownership may be embodied; that is, characterised by 
associated motor states, influencing subsequent action execution. A recent finding that 
memory for self-owned objects was further improved when the objects were brought 
toward the torso during categorisation (vs. moved away from the body) is suggestive of 
the association of bodily (proximity) and motor states (approach; Truong, Chapman, 
Chisholm, Enns, & Handy, 2016) with ownership. In a bi-directional fashion, object 
ownership shapes movement trajectories; with self-owned coffee mugs brought closer 
toward the body during lifting (Constable et al., 2011). 
However, knowledge of other-ownership may also mediate motoric responses. We 
are motivated to maintain good social relations, as social rejection hurts akin to physical 
pain (e.g., Eisenberger & Liberman, 2004; Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 
2011). To achieve this, we naturally engage in facilitatory behaviour, such as automatic 
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mimicry of others, that increases other’s ratings of the mimicker’s likeability (Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999; for trustworthiness, see Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008). We do 
this increasingly in situations where we are excluded (Lakin, Chartrand, & Bargh, 
1999). Given that we understand from an early age that inappropriate interaction with 
other’s things can result in negative social interactions (Pewsowski & Friedman, 2016), 
to maintain good interpersonal relations and avoid the discomfort of social 
confrontation, we must remain sensitive to other’s possessions during our interactions 
with the environment.  
Constable et al. (2011), provide evidence to support this notion. In a stimulus-
response compatibility task, participants responded to the colour of a mug handle, by 
performing left and right key presses. The mugs, decorated by participants prior to the 
study, belonging to the participant, the experimenter, another participant, and a plain, 
unowned mug, were displayed with the handle oriented to the left or right. In 
accordance with typical stimulus-response compatibility mappings (for example, see 
Simon, 1969; for a review, see Hommel, 2000), participants were faster to respond to 
their own mug, a mug belonging to another, and the unowned mug, if the handle 
orientation matched the response side required, compared with incompatible responses. 
However, crucial for our understanding of whether other-ownership cues mediate 
action, this typical S-R effect was abolished for the mug belonging to the experimenter. 
This finding is suggestive of sensitivity to ownership within the action system, as 
facilitation for spatially matched responses (and impaired performance for mismatched 
executions), is assumed to reflect activation of the response produced by the spatial 
dimension of the stimulus (Hommel, 2000). Neuroimaging evidence also alludes to a 
lack of affordances for other-owned property, with activation of action-related neural 
regions responsive when viewing manipulable objects only during the viewing of self-
owned objects (relative to other-owned), in the Cunningham shopping task (Turk et al., 
2011).  
Alongside affecting response time, reticence to interact with another’s property can 
be observed in subtle changes to movement kinematics. Constable et al. (2011) 
observed that participants reached greater peak acceleration when lifting a mug they 
owned, compared with lifting a mug belonging to the another (experimenter). As 
discussed, the self-owned mug also drifted closer toward the participant’s body during 
the lift; compared with an unowned mug. However, importantly, the other owned 
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(experimenter’s) mug was held furthest away from the torso. These findings suggest we 
restrain our actions when interacting with another’s property, and the decreased 
acceleration may reflect taking extra care with another’s mug.  
Further research has replicated this effect (Constable, Kritikos, Lipp, & Bayliss, 
2014), but also observed that, in line with a situated view of cognition, this ownership 
effect is mediated by social context. When the owner of the mug was known, but not 
present, during action performance (the other-owned mug belongs to a confederate, 
rather than the experimenter), the acceleration effect observed when the owner was in 
the room was abolished (Constable et al., 2014). Therefore, taking Constable et al. 
(2011) and Constable et al.'s (2014) findings together, we can start to build an 
understanding of other-ownership, which suggests that we do not cognitively 'treat' and 
respond to all other-owned property in the same fashion. From a young age we assume 
manmade artifacts are likely to be owned (vs. natural artifacts; Neary, Van de 
Vondervoort, 2012; Van de Vondervoort & Friedman, 2015). Given this, we may 
anticipate that we cognitively 'treat' all manmade artifacts not owned by the self as 
'other-owned', processing and responding to them in an identical manner, regardless of 
whether we know an object is owned by someone not individually identified, the 
owner's identity is known, or the ownership status of the object is unspecified. 
However, Constable et al.'s (2011; 2014) findings indicate that individuals demonstrate 
sensitivity to whether the owner is known (experimenter) or unknown, and also whether 
the owner is present, during other's motoric interactions with their property.  
More recently, Constable and colleagues (2016) have extended observations of the 
modulation of motor behaviour as a function of ownership to another action context; 
joint action execution. They observed that, when passing a mug to a partner for them to 
use it, the handle of the partner’s mug was oriented more greatly towards the receiver 
(partner), compared with the mug belonging to the participant. However, again 
illustrating that even subtle contextual factors shape the influence of ownership on 
performance, this effect did not occur when the receiver was not going to act upon the 
object. Therefore, knowledge of object ownership does appear to shape action 
performance. However, these effects extend beyond the facilitation of action for self-
owned property that we may expect, given the adaptive value of self-ownership biases 
across cognitive processes, and the likelihood that self-owned property is associated 
with motor states. Combined response time and kinematic evidence also alludes to a 
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reticence to interact with other’s belongings, but only if the owner is known and 
present.  
Thesis purposes 
Although historically slow to emerge, there is now a substantial amount of evidence 
indicating that self-associated objects are privy to facilitated cognitive processing: 
demonstrating a recall advantage for self-owned objects (relative to other-owned; e.g., 
Cunningham et al., 2008), attentional biases for the selection of self-owned property 
(e.g., Yanouskaya et al., 2016; Turk et al., 2011), and facilitated stimulus discrimination 
(e.g., Sui et al., 2012). Despite this increase in interest in ownership and cognition, and 
evidence that while self-biases are prepotent, they are nevertheless flexible, 
substantially less research has investigated how knowledge of other-ownership shapes 
cognition, and subsequent motoric responses. Most frequently, self-ownership has been 
situated as another stimulus ‘category’ through which to investigate general self-
relevant cognition, with other-ownership acting as a social, but less salient, comparison 
group. The adaptive nature of self-biases is undeniable, facilitating protection of our 
property from appropriation by others, and focusing processing resources on objects 
that are more likely to be acted upon. However, developmental work illustrating that 
understandings of ownership (e.g., Neary & Friedman, 2014; Rossano et al., 2011), and 
the ability to infer other-ownership (Friedman & Neary, 2008b; Friedman et al., 2013), 
develops early in childhood, attests to the importance of sensitivity to property 
belonging to others. However, consideration of the processing, and effects, of other-
ownership remains limited to all but a few studies.  
An embodied approach to cognition would suggest that the effects of, both self-
ownership, and other-ownership, may be most observable in the sensorimotor processes 
that sociocultural norms, and everyday experiences, of ownership govern; action 
production. Indeed, initial evidence from Constable et al. (2011; 2014; 2016), indicates 
that motor responses during object-directed action are shaped by ownership status, 
including effects of other-ownership status that suggests a sensitivity to not only 'other-
ownership', but who owns the property and the presence of the other-owner during 
action performance; shifting focus beyond the influence of self-ownership. Therefore, 
the primary aim of this thesis is to further develop understanding of the influence of 
ownership, especially other-ownership, on motor behaviour in two central ways.  
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The first aim of the thesis is to extend findings concerning embodied ownership 
effects during object-directed action by investigating whether ownership produces 
affective compatibility effects: embodied motoric responses to positive and negative 
affect (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2; for example, Chen & Bargh, 1999). Given 
the positive biases we exhibit for the self, that extend to our own property, self-
ownership may be, in part, linked to positive affective states, and therefore facilitate 
approach motions. In addition, other-ownership may signal negative social 
consequences of interaction, facilitating avoidance movements.  
Findings from movement kinematics designs, that self-owned mugs are drawn 
closer to the body, compared with that belonging to another, and positioning of the 
experimenter’s furthest from the torso indirectly alludes to facilitated approach 
behaviour for self-owned property and other-ownership eliciting avoidance responses 
(Constable et al., 2011; Constable et al., 2014). Therefore, to more directly assess the 
tendency to approach and avoid as a function of ownership status, in Chapter 2, 
Experiments 1 to 3 adopted a computerised approach-avoidance task. Participants 
produced approach and avoidance movements while categorising self-owned mugs and 
property belonging to another to compare response time differences in approach and 
avoidance movements for objects of different ownership status.  
Attempting to add further evidence to the prior literature (Constable et al., 2011; 
2014), that provides initial findings suggestive of motoric responses being mediated by 
the level of other-ownership (with objects owned by a known individual (experimenter) 
being subjected to the greatest degree of  'avoidance' behaviour, vs. an object owned by 
an unknown individual, and an unowned item); we also included an object owned by the 
experimenter, an unknown other, and an unowned object. We anticipated that we would 
observe a similar pattern of effects, with the level of other-ownership producing 
differing degrees of avoidance facilitation; namely, observing the greatest degree of 
avoidance facilitation for the experimenter's object (relative to approach for this object, 
producing a significant difference), followed by the mug belonging to an unknown other 
eliciting faster avoidance responses (relative to approach). We anticipated a significant 
difference in avoidance (vs. approach) response times would be absent for the unowned 
object.  
Chapter 3 extends the investigation of approach and avoidance behaviour as a 
function of ownership status, exploring whether more informative findings concerning 
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compatibility effects can be better elucidated using measures with greater sensitivity, 
compared with response time, especially as ownership is a contextually sensitive and 
subtle variable. Participants performed approach and avoidance movements by 
physically moving the self-owned or experimenter-owned mug toward or away from the 
torso while the spatial and temporal parameters of their movements were recorded using 
motion-tracking technology.  
The secondary aim of this thesis is to investigate the influence of ownership status 
in a motoric context that has yet to be considered, and is arguably a context in which 
other-ownership may possess the greatest degree of salience: obstacle avoidance. All 
research to date, including Experiments 1 to 4, has explored action performance when 
interacting with (for example, lifting or moving), objects of differing ownership status 
(Constable et al., 2011; 2014; 2016). However, it is equally interesting to consider how 
we execute movements in the presence of obstacles belonging to the self, or other. We 
frequently navigate space inhabited by non-target objects, and we are incredibly 
proficient in doing so without colliding with obstacles.  
Discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, to achieve this, we increase movement time, 
and alter reach trajectories to optimise the passing distance of our acting limbs from the 
obstacles (Chapman & Goodale, 2008). Traditionally, it was theorised that features 
related to the identity of the obstacle (for example, whether it is fragile), did not mediate 
the temporal and spatial parameters of avoidance movements (Goodale & Milner, 1992; 
Milner & Goodale, 2008). However, recent evidence suggests that identity-related 
features do influence avoidance behaviour, with objects that pose greater consequences 
if collided with eliciting an enhanced avoidance response (De Haan, Van der Stigchel, 
Nijnens, & Dijkerman, 2014; Kangur, Billino, & Hesse, 2017). Ownership status is 
another higher order feature of objects determining the cost of colliding with an object 
(in terms of maintaining good social relationships with others). As we navigate the 
cluttered table to retrieve the biscuits, knocking over the coffee mug belonging to a 
colleague is likely to have greater implications than ‘bumping into’ our own mug. Thus, 
Experiments 5 to 7 in Chapter 4 aimed to elucidate whether temporal and spatial 
parameters of reaching movements differed in the presence of obstacles of differing 
ownership status, either owned by the experimenter, or belonging to the participant.  
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Chapter 2. Interacting with ownership: Affective compatibility 
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We act upon an environment of stimuli associated with positive and negative affect; 
we are inclined to reach and grasp some objects, while others may elicit repulsion and 
cause us to avoid them. The ownership status of objects (mine or yours) may contribute 
to an object’s valence and mediate our subsequent response tendency. 
Affective compatibility effects 
It has long been proposed that we possess an automatic affect-based processing 
system. This system is assumed to serve survival, allowing us to respond quickly to 
valenced stimuli with appropriate responses; such as avoiding dangerous animals and 
approaching high-value resources (LeDoux, 1996). This network is postulated to be 
distinct from other more lengthy cognitive processing mechanisms (LeDoux 1996; 
Zajonc, 1980). However, it is disputed whether affect processing is fundamentally 
different from the processing of other stimulus features, such as shape (for a review, see 
Eder, Hommel & Houwer, 2007). Its proposed automaticity is also challenged by 
findings that affect-related information does not alter response times when irrelevant to 
the goal of a task (only when an evaluative judgment relating to valence is made), 
suggesting that the processing of valence is subject to cognitive resources and control 
(Klauer & Musch, 2002). However, Rinck and Becker (2007) did identify an affective 
compatibility effect for angry faces, with participants faster to avoid than approach 
(relative to neutral faces), when the task required participants to categorise the stimuli 
by their type (face or puzzle), rather than respond to the affective component. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether affect processing occurs when not task-relevant.  
Regardless of how affect processing is conceptualised, as relying on a distinct 
system or recruiting similar cognitive mechanisms as non-affective information; there is 
a body of evidence indicating that motor output is influenced by our evaluation of 
objects as good or bad. For example, Chen and Bargh (1999) observed that individuals 
were faster to categorise positive and negative words if the movement required was 
congruent with word valence. Participants were faster to respond to positive words with 
lever pulls (arm flexion, an approach response of pulling the stimulus closer the self) 
compared with pushing the lever away (arm extension, classified as avoidance by 
pushing the item away). The opposite effect was found when responding to negative 
words; with participants faster to push the lever (avoid) than pull (approach). Pictorial 
stimuli elicit the same pattern of results (Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004), and a recent meta-
analysis of 68 approach-avoidance studies identified a small but significant affective 
compatibility (approach-avoidance) effect (Laham, Kashima, Dix & Wheeler, 2015).  
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In a bi-directional fashion, motor responses shape the evaluation of stimuli. 
Cacioppo, Priester and Berntson (1993) observed that objects were evaluated more 
favourably when the arm was placed in a position associated with approach (arm 
flexion), compared with evaluations after arm positioning in an avoidance position (arm 
extension). Such findings allude to the embodied nature of affective compatibility 
effects; with representations across modalities, such as action, activated by affective 
evaluation, and in turn, motor behavior associated with positive and negative affect also 
affecting concurrent stimulus evaluations (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-
Gruber & Ric, 2005).  
However, we do not passively respond to stimuli ‘pre-programmed’ with affective 
features. Albeit, some stimuli may elicit similar evaluations across individuals, stimulus 
valence varies by individual. Rinck and Becker (2007) found that spider phobics 
responded more quickly than control participants when pushing a joystick (avoid) in 
response to spider images compared with pulling (approach). Individual differences 
have also been observed between smokers and non-smokers when categorizing smoking 
paraphernalia (Mogg, Bradley, Field & De Houwer, 2003).  
Contextual mediators 
Traditionally it has been assumed that stimulus affect activates specific muscle 
patterns; with arm flexion movements associated with approach, and avoidance with 
arm extension (for example, see Cacioppo et al., 1993; Centerbar & Clore, 2006; 
Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). However, arm flexion and extension are ambiguous. Both 
movements produce differing consequences. Arm flexion can bring an object closer to 
the body, but also represents a withdrawal of the hand from an object. Conversely, arm 
extension is recruited to we reach for something we like, but also when pushing objects 
away.  
Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson and Strack (2007) varied explicit task instruction while 
performing a word categorization task, demonstrating that approach and avoidance 
movements are defined and facilitated by their consequences; rather than tied to specific 
motor responses. One group was instructed to imagine pulling an item toward the self, 
when pulling the joystick (flexion), and pushing an object away from the self (joystick 
push - extension). In the other condition, the instructions given prior to the task were 
verbally framed with reference to the object; reaching toward the object with joystick 
push movements (extension), and away from objects with the pulling movement 
(flexion). In line with Chen and Bargh (1999), participants in the self-reference 
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condition were quicker to categorise positive words with ‘pull’, and negative with 
‘push’, movements. However, this pattern was reversed in the object-reference 
condition, with faster responses to positive words with ‘push’ movements and negative 
words using ‘pull’ motions. Even adaption of the hand posture (open vs. closed grasp) 
during performance of arm flexion and extension movements can lead to a ‘remapping’ 
of compatibility effects (see Freina, Baroni, Borghi & Nicoletti, 2009).  
Offering further support to the notion that actions are defined as approaching and 
avoiding as a result of their perceived consequences; affective compatibility effects can 
also be obtained in tasks recruiting ‘neutral’ movements such as button presses, that do 
not recruit arm flexion or extension but initiate the movement of the stimulus toward or 
away from the participant (Dantzig, Pecher & Zwaan, 2008). Bamford and Ward (2008) 
also observed a typical affective compatibility effect (faster to touch positive and avoid 
unpleasant stimuli) using a novel adaptation of an Approach-Avoidance Task recruiting 
interaction with a touchscreen monitor. Participants were required to produce only 
extension arm movements, but respond by touching an image (touch object; approach), 
or touching a ‘neutral’ stimulus (not touch target object; avoid) presented on the 
opposite side of the screen.  Therefore, rather than affect recruiting specific motor 
patterns; movements appear to be facilitated on the basis of their consequences.  
Ownership and motor effects 
There is increasing evidence that the ownership status of objects (mine or yours) 
affects motor output. Constable et al. (2011) found that participants restrained their 
actions when interacting with another’s property, indexed via reduced peak acceleration 
when lifting a mug belonging to the Experimenter compared with their own mug. The 
self-owned mug also drifted closer toward the participant’s body during the lift; 
compared with the unowned and experimenter’s mug (see also, Constable et al., 2014). 
In addition to differences in ownership status mediating the manipulation of objects; 
more direct reaching paths are taken when reaching to grasp a card displaying a shape 
‘owned’ by the self, compared with the experimenter (participants were told they owned 
a 2D shape - oval or rectangle, prior to the task; Sparks et al., 2016). Both sets of 
authors suggest that the trajectory effects observed in response to self-owned objects 
may reflect facilitation of an approach response; potentially occurring as an embodied 
response to the differential valence of self-owned and other-owned property. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, self-associated stimuli, such as objects we own, are 
afforded perceptual advantages mirroring those observed for stimuli associated with 
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reward (Sui, et al., 2012). The effects of reward and self-relevance do diverge under 
other task contexts (Sui, Yankouskaya & Humphreys, 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 2015b; 
Sui & Humphreys, 2015c). However, there is some neural overlap for reward and self-
relevance (Enzi et al., 2009). We also prefer (Beggan, 1992; Huang, Wang & Shi, 
2009), and financially value more highly (Morewedge et al., 2009; Kahneman et al., 
1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984); objects we own, compared with identical objects 
owned by others and those with no owner. Therefore, although it is unlikely that self-
processing biases in general are a result of only stimulus reward value; there is likely an 
underlying reward-based component of ownership. It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that the act of owning potentially endows objects with positive valence, which may 
produce affective compatibility responses  
A recent study considered the effects of performing approach and avoidance actions 
on previously identified memory biases for self-owned objects (for example, see 
Cunningham et al., 2008). Moving owned objects (vs other-owned) toward the body 
enhanced subsequent object recall, compared with the recall of ‘own’ objects pushed 
away, and ‘other’ objects moved toward or away from the self (Truong, Chapman, 
Chisholm, Enns, & Handy, 2016). Time taken to initiate or execute the movements 
(reflective of facilitated motor processes) did not depend on the congruency of the 
movement performed (congruent: own pulled toward self; incongruent: own pushed 
away from self and vice versa for owned by another). Therefore, although memory was 
improved when action and ownership were congruent; the execution of congruent 
actions was not facilitated, as we would predict.  However, the actions were performed 
at the time of encoding the object as ‘owned’. The discussed motor effects that may 
allude to facilitated approach response for owned objects (Constable et al., 2011; Sparks 
et al., 2016), utilised stimuli with ownership assigned prior to task completion. 
Therefore, affective associations that we propose may facilitate congruent movement 
performance may have yet to be formed. 
The current research 
Prior findings allude to the possible facilitation of approach movements for self-
owned objects (Constable et al., 2011; Sparks et al., 2016), but no research to date has 
directly investigated the influence of ownership status on approach and avoidance 
movement performance with objects already owned by the participant using an 
Approach-Avoidance paradigm. Participants and the experimenter decorated coffee 
mugs in small groups and took them home to use, before returning to the laboratory to 
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complete an adapted touchscreen version of an Approach-Avoidance task (Bamford & 
Ward, 2008).  
Participants viewed images of their own, the experimenter’s, another participant’s 
and a plain mug on a grey square background; accompanied by a plain square on the 
opposite side of the screen. Participants explicitly categorised the mug as ‘mine’ or ‘not 
mine’, and also performed blocks responding to a feature of the stimulus image 
irrelevant to ownership. Participants produced approach (touch the mug) and avoid 
(touch square) movements to categorise the stimulus displayed. 
We predicted that when ownership was task-relevant (approaching or avoiding on 
the basis of ownership) approach movements (relative to avoidance) would be 
facilitated for self-owned objects; as approach responses are congruent with the positive 
affect self-ownership likely invokes. Whether other-owned objects possess negative 
valence and may facilitate avoidance movements is less clear. The positioning of the 
experimenter’s property furthest from the body during lifting (Constable et al., 2011; 
Constable et al., 2014), resulted in the tentative prediction that other-owned objects 
would invoke faster avoidance (vs. approach) responses. However, we anticipated that 
there would be no difference between time taken to avoid or approach the plain, 
undecorated mug; which signified no owner due to a lack of personalisation.  
Some argue that we possess a dynamic self-memory system, designed to serve self-
goals (such as identity stability) and ensure information relevant to these current goals is 
preferentially accessed (see Conway, 2005). Therefore, the detection of self-cues may 
be a perpetual goal, regardless of their task-relevance. However, akin to evidence that 
affective stimuli may not be processed 'automatically', when the affective component is 
not task-relevant (see Klauer & Musch, 2002), some initial findings suggest that the 
perceptual advantages afforded to self-stimuli do not occur in contexts where 
individuals are not performing judgments about whether they are associated with self or 
other (see Liu & Sui, 2016).  
To explore whether any compatibility effects elicited for self-owned property would 
also occur in task-irrelevant contexts, in addition to the task recruiting an ownership 
judgement (mine or yours), we included a task where object ownership status was not 
relevant to the judgment performed.  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from the University of East Anglia, naïve to the 
purpose of the study, participated in exchange for financial gratuity. However, due to 
technical failure, only data from 37 (27 female; M = 20.57 years, SD = 4.63) 
participants is reported. All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and 
were right-handed. The University of East Anglia's School of Psychology Ethics 
Committee approved this study. Informed consent was obtained for both participation, 
and the use of a photograph of their mug in the experiment.  
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Stimuli. Prior to the experimental task (M = 9.86, SD = 4.93 days), both the 
experimenter and the participants decorated white, ceramic coffee mugs with a design 
of their choosing. The mugs were photographed on a plain black background, with the 
handle of the mug oriented 90o to the right, compatible with the right-handedness of all 
participants. 
The images of the mugs were prepared using Adobe Photoshop Elements 11 (Adobe 
Systems Inc., 2012); the background was removed, and the mugs resized (161.50 x 162 
px). Two versions of the mug images were produced; with each mug placed on a square 
grey background (320 x 320 px), one with an orange and one with a purple border (30 
px width). Once photographed, the participants took the mugs home to use (M = 1.35, 
SD = 2.46 uses).  
Approach-Avoidance Task. The task was created and presented using E-Prime 2.0 
(Psychology Software Tools Inc., 2012). A version was produced for each participant, 
featuring their own mug, the experimenter’s, a mug belonging to an unknown other 
participant and an undecorated mug.  
The task consisted of four blocks (two task-relevant, two task-irrelevant), containing 
160 trials per block, and four practice trials. In one ownership as task-relevant block, the 
participant was required to touch the image of the mug if it belonged to them, and touch 
the plain placeholder if it was not theirs. In an ownership as task-irrelevant block the 
participant was required to tough the image with a purple border, this could be either the 
placeholder or the mug.  Task instructions were reversed for the remaining block. Per 
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block, each mug (own, experimenter’s, unknown other and unowned) was presented 40 
times, appearing in the left and right position, with an orange or purple border, an equal 
number of times. Ownership status, position and border colour was randomised across 
the block. Block order (A1A2B1B2) was counterbalanced across participants. However, 
participants always completed both task-relevant and both task-irrelevant blocks in 
succession.  
Other materials. The approach-avoidance task was presented on a Dell personal 
computer with Logitech speakers and an ELO 1900L, 19” colour touchscreen monitor, 
with a resolution of 1280 x 768 with a 60-Hz refresh. Plain white ceramic mugs (9.3 cm 
tall, with a 8.7 cm diameter), and specialist porcelain paint (blue, green, red, yellow, 
pink and black) and brushes were used to decorate the mugs.  
Design 
The study adopted a 2 × 2 × 4 within-subjects design, manipulating task type, action 
and ownership status. Task type had two levels (ownership task-relevant, ownership 
task-irrelevant). Participants completed two blocks of the task-relevant task, where they 
performed a mine / not mine categorisation, and responded by touching the image of the 
mug, or the grey placeholder, depending on block instruction.  
In the task-irrelevant block; participants touched the image with the orange border 
(either placeholder or the mug), or that with the purple border, requiring no evaluation 
of the ownership of the mug. Action consisted of two levels; with participants 
performing approach (touch the image of the mug) or avoidance (touch the placeholder 
without the mug present) movements. Four types of mug were presented: 
Experimenter’s, own (participant’s), belonging to an unknown other and no owner (a 
plain, undecorated mug).  
The dependent variable was response time recorded in milliseconds (ms), the time 
taken to lift the space bar after an auditory go signal until the index finger contacted the 
monitor.  
Procedure 
Mug decorating. Participants initially attended one of two 60 minute group 
painting sessions. During these sessions the researcher also decorated a mug, an image 
of which (one of two mugs, depending on session attendance) appeared in the 
experimental task. Once photographed, the participants were asked to use their mug, as 
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it was theirs to keep, but bring it with them upon returning to the laboratory for the 
experiment.  
Task. Upon arriving for the experiment, the participant witnessed the researcher 
interacting with their mug in a naturalistic manner. Participants were seated at the 
computer in a moderately lit room, approximately 45-50 cm from the monitor, with the 
index finger of their dominant hand resting on the spacebar (placed 20 cm from the edge 
of the table). The researcher was present, seated unobtrusively, during task completion. 
Participants were informed that they were going to view a series of mugs, on either the 
left or right of the screen (on the adjacent side, a grey square without a mug would be 
present); and perform a series of judgments (such as whether the mug was theirs, or not 
theirs), responding by pressing different locations on the monitor.  
Participants were informed of changes to task instructions (the commencement of a 
new block) via the monitor. Each trial was user initiated by pressing and holding the 
spacebar, proceeded by a fixation cross (500 ms), followed by the stimuli. 300 ms after 
the stimuli appeared, a tone sounded signaling response. The stimuli remained present 
until response (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. The time course of a trial for Experiment 1 (not to scale).  
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Participants responded by lifting the spacebar and using the index finger of the same 
hand to touch the screen, as quickly and accurately as possible. Once the participant had 
executed response, a blank inter-trial screen was presented for 750 ms, before the 
prompt to initiate the next trial. Grey placeholders remained present in the locations of 
the images throughout the trial procedure (both before and after stimuli onset). 
If participants responded before the onset of the tone, they had to repress the 
spacebar and respond once the tone had sounded. Such trials were later eliminated from 
analysis. If the participant repeatedly responded before the onset of the tone, they were 
verbally informed not to do so. The task took approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
Results & Discussion 
Response times were averaged for per participant for each condition. Trials with 
errors (0.3%), and trials where participants responded before the tone (3.11%) were 
removed. One participant performing with an error rate above 15% within a single level 
of the ownership factor (due to limiting the number of trials per condition to compare to 
performance in the other levels, and being indicative of not attending to the task 
instructions); and another who responded before the tone on more than 15% of trials, 
were excluded from the analysis. Initial cut-off values of < 300 ms and > 3000 ms were 
used to exclude unrealistic response times (0.8%).  
A 2 × 2 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the within-subjects 
variables of task type (ownership relevance), action (approach and avoid), and 
ownership status (own, experimenter’s, unknown other’s and unowned). Where 
sphericity assumptions were violated, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. Planned comparisons were not corrected, 
post-hoc tests were corrected using the Holm-Bonferroni sequential method and 
significant values were set at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).  
The 3-way ANOVA identified a significant main effect of task [F(1, 34) = 5.32, p = 
.027, np2 = .135]; with participants slower to respond to stimuli in the task-relevant 
judgment blocks (767 ms), compared with task-irrelevant (732 ms). There was no 
significant main effect of action [F(1, 34) < 1], ownership status [F(2.22, 75.63) < 2], 
task × action [F(1,34) < 2], and task × ownership status, F(1.95,66.18) < 2.  
Most relevant for our predictions, the action × ownership status interaction was 
significant [F(1.75, 59.45) = 11.71, p < .001, np2 = .256]. However, this was 
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subordinate to the significant three-way task × action × ownership status interaction, 
F(1.37, 46.64) = 18.44, p = .0111, np2 = .352. Therefore, two 2-way ANOVAs 
(ownership status × action) were conducted for the ownership task-relevant and task-
irrelevant block separately.  
Ownership as task-relevant 
When exploring response time for the task-relevant blocks, there was no significant 
main effect of action [F(1, 34) < 2] or ownership status [F(2.40, 81.52) = 2.29, p = .098, 
np2 = .062]. However, critical for our predictions, there was a significant two-way 
action × ownership status interaction, F(1.38, 46.85) = 18.80, p < .001, np2 = .356 (see 
Figure 2).  
Planned comparisons revealed that, as predicted, participants were significantly 
faster to approach (vs. avoid) their own mug, t(34) = -5.85, p < .001. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies that provide indirect evidence of facilitated approach 
for own property (Constable et al., 2011; 2014; Sparks et al., 2016). Facilitated 
avoidance for property owned by others was observed, with participants faster to avoid, 
compared with approach, the mug belonging to an unknown other, t(34) = 3.41, p = 
.002 (two-tailed). There was a clear trend toward faster avoidance for experimenter’s, 
but this narrowly failed to reach significance, t(34) = 1.89, p = .068 (two-tailed). 
Contrary to our assumption that the plain, undecorated mug would likely possess 
neutral affective value and therefore no difference in approach or avoidance response 
time would be observed; participants were significantly slower to approach, compared 
with avoid, the unowned object, t(34) = 3.05, p = .004 (see Figure 2).  
To further unpack the nature of the affective compatibility effects, the effect of 
ownership within each action was also subject to analysis. In line with facilitated 
approach for self-owned, participants were faster to approach self-owned than all levels 
of other-owned (all comparisons p < .009, see Appendix B), and participants were 
significantly faster to avoid all levels of other-owned, relative to avoiding self-owned 
(all comparisons p < .001).  
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Taken together, these findings support our predictions that approach is facilitated for 
self-owned objects; and avoidance facilitated for other-owned property. The finding of 
facilitated avoidance across all levels of other-owned property, including the unowned 
mug (although note that facilitated avoidance for experimenter’s narrowly missed 
significance), was unexpected. It is unclear why this occurred, however, it may suggest 
that any item that is not self-owned holds negative valence for the observer; possibly 
induced by the task instruction to categorise the mugs as ‘yours’ and ‘not yours’, 
creating a crude self-other distinction. 
Ownership as task-irrelevant  
Akin to task-relevant performance, there was no significant main effect of action 
[F(1,34) < 1] or ownership status [F(2.43, 82.57) <1]. However, there was no 
significant action × ownership status interaction, F(2.017, 68.563) = .068, p = .936, np2 
= .002 (see Figure 2). Therefore, unlike performance in the explicit ownership 
categorization task, ownership status did not influence the production of approach and 
avoidance movements when responding to mug images on the basis of border colour. 
This lack of effect may suggest that ownership only facilitates congruent action 
performance when task-relevant. However, the lack of effect may be attributable to task 
requirements. For example, the ownership as task-irrelevant blocks required response 
on the basis of the colour of a border framing the mug and neutral image (grey square). 
The need to visually attend to the borders, rather than the mug (as in the task-relevant 
block), could have resulted in the failure to process the mug and identify ownership.  
In addition, participants only had to contact the coloured border indicated by the task 
instruction, rather than select an appropriate response based on the presented stimulus. 
Response times were faster over all conditions of the irrelevant task, when compared 
with relevant block performance; suggesting the ownership irrelevant task was easier to 
complete; likely due to not requirement to select an appropriate response. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2, we modified the irrelevant task to more closely resemble the ownership 
categorisation blocks. 
     Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we aimed to replicate our initial findings from the task-relevant 
condition of Experiment 1. To address the possibility that an absence of ownership 
effect in the task-irrelevant condition could be due to a failure to attend to the stimulus 
and select a response based on a stimulus feature; we reformulated the task, to require 
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either an approach (touch mug) or avoid (touch square) movement depending on mug 
handle colour (e.g., if handle is purple, touch mug; if the handle is not purple, touch 
square).  
 In addition, due to a higher than anticipated number of false starts in Experiment 1 
(initiating response prior to the go-signal, 300 ms after stimulus onset), suggesting that 
participants had prepared response prior to the go-signal, the response delay was 
removed. The task upon which we modeled ours required participants to explicitly 
evaluate whether they liked or disliked the stimulus (Bamford & Ward, 2008). No such 
subjective response was required in our study, therefore, the delay was considered 
obsolete for our purposes.   
Method 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduate students from the University of East Anglia, naïve to the 
purpose of the study, volunteered in exchange for course credit. However two 
participants failed to attend for the second session and two participants’ data was lost 
due to technology failure, leaving 26 (5 male; M = 21.64, SD = 4.64 years), who all 
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were right-handed.  
Stimuli and Apparatus 
 The stimuli and apparatus were largely identical to that of Experiment 1, with the 
exception that three versions of each mug image were produced: no handle 
manipulation, orange handle, and purple handle.  
Design & Procedure  
The design and procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, aside from the 
removal of the auditory go-signal, 300 ms after stimulus onset (see Figure 3). The 
ownership task-irrelevant block also differed; with participants instructed to touch the 
mug if the handle is orange, and touch the grey square if the handle is not orange (and 
vice versa for the remaining block). 
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Figure 3. The time course of a trial for Experiment 2. Coloured borders framing the 
placeholders in Experiment 1 are absent; replaced with purple or orange swatches on the 
mug handles, in the task-irrelevant blocks only.  
 
Results & Discussion 
Data trimming and analyses were conducted in the same manner as Experiment 1; 
0.43% of trials were removed due to incorrect responses, and 1.54% were excluded as 
outliers. Three participants’ data was removed due to performing with an error rate 
above 15% within a single level of the ownership factor (due to limiting the number of 
trials per condition to compare to performance in the other levels, and being indicative 
of not attending to the task instructions). Response times were averaged per participant 
for each condition (see Table 1) and subjected to a 3-way ANOVA.  
The 2 × 2 × 4 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of task (ownership 
relevant vs. task-irrelevant), F(1, 22) < .1. Therefore, the amendments to the task-
irrelevant blocks, implemented to ensure attention was oriented to the mug; and require 
response selection based on a mug feature (akin to the explicit ownership judgment 
required in the task-relevant blocks) abolished task differences in response time; 
suggestive of increased similarity of task requirements. 
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Table 1 
Means and T-tests for simple main effects of ownership (response time for own, 
experimenter’s, unknown other and unowned averaged across movement type) in the 
task-relevant condition of Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. ** = p < .01, * = p < .05. 
 
There was a significant main effect of action, F(1, 22) = 12.22, p = .002, np2 = .357. 
Averaged over ownership and task, participants were significantly slower to perform 
avoidance movements (841 ms) compared with approach (824 ms). There was also a 
significant main effect of ownership [F(3, 6) = 9.74, p = .001, np2 = .307]; participants 
were significantly slower to respond to their own mug (845 ms) compared with the 
experimenter’s (828 ms), t(22) = 4.845, p < .012, unknown other’s [830 ms; t(22) = 
3.867, p = .01] and the unowned mug (828 ms; t(22) = 3.962 p = .008). All other 
comparisons were not significant (p > .4).  
We also observed significant two-way interactions between task and action [F(1, 
22) = 6, p = .23, np2 = .306], task and ownership [F(3, 66) = 9.7, p < .001, np2 = .306] 
and critically, ownership status and action [F(1.66, 36.48) = 16.2, p < .001, np2 = .424]. 
However, akin to Experiment 1, the two-way ownership by action interaction were 
superseded by the significant three-way task × action × ownership status interaction, 
F(1.85, 40.74) = 12.57, p < .001, np2 = .36. Therefore, two 2 (action) × 4 (ownership) 
ANOVA’s were conducted for the relevant and irrelevant tasks separately.   
Comparison  M (SD)  df t p 
Own - Experimenter’s 855 (87); 818 (99) 22 6.65 .006 ** 
Own - Another’s 855 (87); 829 (96) 22 5.05 .005 ** 
Own - Unowned 855 (87); 829 (97) 22 3.95 .004 ** 
Experimenter’s - Another’s 818 (99); 829 (96) 22 -2.29 .064  
Experimenter’s - Unowned 818 (99); 829 (97) 22 -2.78 .033 * 
Another’s - Unowned 829 (96); 829 (97)  22 .111 .913 
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Ownership as task-relevant  
There was no significant main effect of action, [F(1, 22) < 1.5]; but there was a 
significant main effect of ownership [F(2.13, 46.76) = 15.74, p < .001, np2 = .417]. Of 
less interest for our predictions, post-hoc comparisons (see Table 1) revealed that 
participants were significantly slower to respond to their own mug compared with the 
experimenter’s, another participant’s and the unowned mug. Participants were faster to 
respond to the experimenter’s mug, compared with the unowned mug. There was no 
difference in response time between the mug belonging to another and the unowned or 
experimenter’s mug. This lengthening of time to respond to the self-owned mug, 
averaged over action types, is led by the delay in avoidance response for self-owned 
objects (see Figure 4).  
Central to our predictions, there was a significant two-way interaction between 
action and ownership status, F(1.45, 31.85) = 17.22, p < .001, np2 = .439 (see Figure 4). 
Planned pairwise comparisons comparing mean approach response time with mean 
avoid response time for each level of ownership status was conducted. As predicted and 
in line with Experiment 1, participants were significantly faster to approach their own 
mug, compared with avoiding it, t(22) = -6.9, p < .001 (two-tailed); and significantly 
faster to avoid the mug belonging to an unknown other than approach it, t(22) = 2.58, p 
= .017 (two-tailed). However, the trend toward faster avoid actions (vs. approach) for 
the experimenter’s mug observed in Experiment 1 dissipated, t(22) = 0.96, p = .346 
(two-tailed). Also in contrast to Experiment 1, there was no significant difference when 
comparing approach with avoid time for the unowned mug, t(22) = 0.16, p = .874.  
Comparing ownership level within each action type aids in identifying the 
abolishment of the effect within this experiment. Unlike Experiment 1, where 
participants were faster to approach own (vs. all other-owned levels) and faster to avoid 
all other-owned (relative to avoiding self-owned), approach was only faster for self-
owned when compared with unknown other's [t(22) = -2.117, p = .046; all other self - 
other-owned comparisons p > .4, see Appendix B]. However, faster avoidance was 
observed for all other-owned levels (vs. self-owned, all comparisons = p < .001).  
It is not clear why the compatibility effects observed in Experiment 1 failed to fully 
replicate, given that only the delay in movement onset (300 ms, in Experiment 1) was 
altered in Experiment 2. Given that ‘automatic’ affective priming in other task contexts 
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is assumed be reflected up to a stimulus onset asynchrony (between prime and target 
judgment/stimulus) of less than 300 ms (Fazio et al., 1986; for a review, see Fazio, 
2001), the findings from Experiment 2 may be more reflective of the true priming of 
motoric responses, rather than the response time differences possibly resulting from 
explicit effortful evaluation. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the power achieved within Experiment 2 was less 
than that of Experiment 1. We conducted post hoc power analyses using G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) with power set at 0.80 and α = 05, two-tailed. 
This illustrated that we only obtained 0.51 power (sufficient power is ruled to be 0.80, 
Cohen, 1988) for the effect size (dz = .44) for the approach own - approach unknown 
other's comparison in Experiment 2 (but we did achieve sufficient power for 'avoid own 
vs. avoid unknown other'). An N of 43 would be required to obtain sufficient power. In 
contrast, we obtained .97 (dz = .69) for the same approach comparison in Experiment 1. 
Thus, we cannot eliminate the possibility that we did not possess sufficient power to 
detect the effects obtained (in Experiment 1), within Experiment 2.  
Ownership as task-irrelevant  
 A significant main effect of action [F(1, 22) = 40.69, p < .001, np2 = . 649], but not 
ownership [F(3, 66) = 1.81, p = .153, np2 = .076] was observed. Participants were 
quicker to produce approach (820 ms), compared with avoidance (845 ms), responses. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was a significant two-way interaction between action 
and ownership, F(3, 66) = 3.85, p = .013, np2 = .149. However, unlike the task-relevant 
block, all levels of ownership status (own, experimenter’s, unknown other’s and 
unowned) elicited significantly faster approach, compared with avoidance, responses (p 
< .02; see Figure 4). Two one-way repeated measures ANOVA’s were conducted to 
explore the interaction.  
The one-way ‘Approach’ ANOVA revealed a significant effect of ownership, F(3, 
66) = 4.43, p = .007, np2 = .167). Post-hoc comparisons indicated that participants were 
slower to approach the experimenter’s, compared with the unowned mug [t(22) = 3.75 p 
= .006] and also slower to approach the mug belonging to another participant, compared 
with the unowned mug, t(22) = 2.98, p = .035. All other comparisons were non-
significant, (p > .2).
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The one-way ‘Avoid’ ANOVA revealed no significant effect of ownership, F(3, 66) 
= .70, p = .553, np2 = .031. Therefore, despite amendments in Experiment 2 to the task-
irrelevant condition which ensured attention to the mug stimulus; and response on the 
basis of a stimulus feature (ultimately making the task more similar to the demands of 
the task-relevant blocks), there was still no significant difference when comparing 
approach and avoidance times for the own and unknown other’s object. Although 
findings from the two block types are not directly comparable due to differences in the 
distribution of action for ownership level within blocks; we tentatively suggest that 
ownership only influences congruent action performance when task-relevant.  
In summary, performance in the task-relevant blocks of Experiment 2 somewhat 
replicated Experiment 1. Consistent with our predictions, participants were significantly 
quicker to approach their own mug (but only relative to approaching the mug belonging 
to an unknown other) and quicker to avoid the mugs belonging to other individuals. One 
contextual factor worthy of note when considering the other-ownership effect identified 
(and in our initial pilot - Experiment 1) is the imbalance of stimulus probability for 
‘self’ and ‘other-owned’ trials.  
New findings published during the conduction of Experiment 2 indicated that 
increasing the probability of other-associated stimuli (relative to self-associated) in the 
label-shape matching task, discussed in Chapter 1, improves object categorization 
performance for other-associated shapes. However, time to respond to the self-shape 
pair was not affected by low frequency presentation; with a clear self-advantage still 
present (Sui et al., 2014). Although each level of ownership (own, experimenter’s, 
other, unowned) was presented an equal number of times within Experiment 1 and 2; 
the task requirement to categorise stimuli according to ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ (therefore, 
requiring three times as many ‘not mine’ categorisation responses per block) produces 
altered probability at a categorical level. Therefore, to examine whether the affective 
compatibility effects obtained for other-owned property in Experiment 1 and 2 are 
bound to differential stimulus probability, equal probability of responses for self and 
other-owned property was induced in Experiment 3 by only including two levels of 
ownership; self and unknown other. 
Experiment 3 
To establish whether the other-ownership compatibility effect elicited in 
Experiments 1 and 2 was a function of greater ‘other-ownership’ stimulus and response 
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probability, Experiment 3 reduced the levels of other-owned stimuli, comparing 
approach and avoidance response time for only the self-owned and unknown other’s 
mug. A secondary task was also included; recruiting ‘typical’ valenced pictorial stimuli 
(positive and negative), to compare typical affective compatibility effects (see Bamford 
& Ward, 2008; Chen & Bargh, 1999; Laham, et al., 2015; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004) with 
those elicited by the ownership task. It was predicted that we would observe faster 
approach (vs. avoidance) for positive images, and vice versa for negatively valenced 
pictures.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-eight right-handed students from the University of East Anglia were initially 
recruited and participated in exchange for course credit. However four individuals failed 
to attend the second experimental session. Data from the remaining 34 participants is 
reported (one male; M = 21.68, SD = 5.89 years).  
Stimuli & Apparatus 
Ownership stimuli. As in Experiment 1 and 2, participants decorated a mug with a 
design of their choosing in small group sessions. Participants took the mugs home to 
use and keep (M = 3.74, SD = 4.08 uses), before later returning with the mug to 
complete the task (M = 12.12, SD = 5.64 days owned). The processing of the mug 
images (own and unknown other’s) was identical to that of Experiment 2.  
Affective stimuli. Eight pictures (four positive, and four negative) were selected 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 
2008). They were selected on the basis of a mean valence rating greater than 7 for 
positive stimuli, and less than 2.5 for negative images (see Table 2). Three versions of 
each image were produced: One with no colour alterations (however the image was 
cropped to replicate the size of the grey square in the ownership blocks), and two 
versions with a transparent orange and purple filter imposed upon the image. 
Approach-Avoidance Task. A version of the task featuring the participant’s own 
mug, a mug belonging to an unknown other participant, four positive and four negative 
valence images was produced. The task consisted of eight blocks (four task-relevant, 
four task-irrelevant) and four practice trials. The ownership relevant and irrelevant 
blocks were identical to those of Experiment 2 aside from only the ‘own’ and ‘unknown 
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other’s’ mugs being presented. In the relevant and irrelevant affective image blocks, 
participants were issued similar task instructions to those provided for the ownership 
blocks (i.e., ‘if the image shown is negative, touch the image; if the image is positive, 
touch the plain grey square’ and vice versa).  
 
Table 2 
Mean ratings for valence and arousal of affective image stimuli taken from the 
International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 2008). 
Mean Ratings for Valence 
and Arousal of Affective 
Image Stimuli taken from 
the International Affective 
Picture System (Lang et al., 
2008)  
Image Name 
Valence Arousal 
Bunnies (1750)  8.28 (1.07) 4.1 (2.31)  
Baby (2070)  8.17 (1.46)  4.51 (2.74)  
Children (2345)  7.41 (1.72) 5.42 (2.47)  
Romance (4599)  7.12 (1.48)  5.69 (1.94)  
De d cows (9181)  2.26 (1.85) 5.39 (2.41)  
Bloody kiss (2352.2) 2.09 (1.5)  6.25 (2.1)  
Sad child (2800)  1.78 (1.14)  5.49 (2.11)  
Mutilations (3150)  2.26 (1.57)  6.5 (2.2)  
Note. The images are identified by their numbers in the International Affective Picture 
System (Lang et al., 2008). Standard deviations are given in parentheses.  
 
Participants completed 80 trials in each block (each mug image appearing 40 times, 
and each valenced image presented ten times, per block). Each mug and affective image 
appeared in each object position (left or right), and with each handle or filter colour (in 
the task-irrelevant blocks), an equal number of times, but identity (own vs. another’s, or 
positive vs negative), position and handle or swatch colour was randomised within each 
block. Block order was counterbalanced across participants, however participants 
always completed the relevant and irrelevant blocks in succession. The affective image 
blocks were always completed after the ownership blocks.  
Design & Procedure  
The experiment adopted a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 within-subjects design, manipulating 
stimulus type (ownership or affect), task type (task-relevant, task-irrelevant), stimulus 
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(own vs unknown other’s for the ownership blocks, positive vs negative for affect) and 
action (approach vs avoid). The dependent variable was response time recorded in 
milliseconds (ms). The procedure and task set up was identical to Experiment 2, with 
the addition of the positive and negative images blocks. The affective images blocks 
were always performed after the ownership blocks.  
Results & Discussion 
Trials with errors (0.44%) were removed. Four participants with an error rate above 
15% within one level of the ownership factor, which limited the number of trials per 
condition to compare to performance in the other levels; and is also indicative of not 
attending to the task instructions, were excluded from the analysis. 1.15% of trials were 
classified as outliers, and removed. Two participants produced errors on more than 15% 
of trials, resulting in their data being eliminated. The remaining trials were averaged by 
task type, stimulus type and action (see Figure 5). Two 2 × 2 × 2 within-subjects 
ANOVAs were conducted to examine approach-avoidance effects in the ownership and 
affect blocks separately.  
Ownership 
The 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of task, F(1,28) < 1.5. 
However, unlike Experiment 1 and 2; there was a significant main effect of ownership 
F(1,28) = 8.725, p = .006, np2 = .238. Averaged across action and task type, participants 
were faster to respond to their own mug (875 ms) compared with the unknown other’s 
(881 ms). The main effect of action was also significant, F(1, 28) = 89.487, p < .001, 
np2 = .762; with participants generally faster to perform approach actions (857 ms) 
compared with avoidance (900 ms). There were also significant two-way interactions 
between task and action [F(1, 28) = 9.689, p = .004, np2 = .257] and task and ownership 
[F(1, 28) = 19.123, p < .001, np2 = .406].  
Most relevant for the study predictions and in accordance with Experiment 1 and 2, 
we again observed a significant ownership and action interaction [F(1,28) = 9.023, p = 
.006, np2 = .244]. However, as before, it was superseded by the significant three-way 
interaction between task, action and ownership status, F(1, 28) = 11.048, p = .002, np
2 = 
.283.  
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To explore this, two 2 × 2 ANOVA’s were conducted to separately explore the 
simple two-way interactions between ownership status and action for both the task-
irrelevant and task-relevant conditions. 
Ownership as task-relevant. The main effect of ownership was significant [F(1, 
28) = 21.14, p < .001, np2 = .43], with participants producing quicker responses for their 
own mug (M = 856 ms, SD = 90) compared with the unknown other’s (M = 873 ms, SD 
= 101). Additionally there was a significant main effect of action, F(1,28) = 50.84, p < 
.001, np2 = .65; participants were faster to perform approach (847 ms) compared with 
avoid movements (881 ms).  
Of most interest, we again observed a significant two-way interaction between 
action and ownership status, F(1, 28) = 11.39, p = .002, np2 = .29. Planned pairwise 
comparisons indicated that, again, participants were significantly faster to approach 
their own mug compared with avoiding it, t(28) = -5.81, p = .002. However, upon 
adjustment of stimulus probability (the removal of experimenter’s and unowned levels 
of ownership), there was no significant difference for unknown other in this experiment, 
t(28) = .359, p = .722 (see Figure 5).  
When comparing ownership for each action, participants were significantly faster to 
approach own (vs another's, t(28) = 4.312, p < .001, two-tailed), but despite a 
descriptive trend suggesting faster avoidance for another's compared with avoiding 
own, there was no significant difference [t(28) = -1.708 p = .099, two-tailed, see Figure 
6]. The lack of effect for avoiding unknown other in this study, unlike Experiment 1 and 
2, is suggestive of increased stimulus probability for other-owned objects acting as a 
mechanism in producing the affective compatibility effect previously observed. Note 
that we achieved adequate (98%) power for the approach own - approach unknown 
other comparison in the present study (unlike Experiment 2) but only 36% power (lower 
than the 80% threshold considered sufficient, see Cohen, 1988), for the avoid own avoid 
other comparison, with an N of 84 required to detect the observed effect size (dz = .32). 
Therefore, although we cannot rule out an underpowered design resulting in the failure 
to observe a significant effect for avoidance actions, the N required is reasonably 
substantial for a within subjects design, suggesting any effect to be observed is much 
smaller than that for approach behaviour observed within the current study.  
Ownership as task-irrelevant. As in Experiment 2, there was a significant main 
effect of action [F(1, 29) = 85.61, p < .001, np2 = .75]. Participants were faster to 
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perform approach (860 ms) movements, compared with avoid (912 ms) responses. 
There was no significant main effect of ownership [F(1, 29) = .51, p = .48, np2 = .02], 
nor ownership status by action interaction, F(1, 29) = .16, p = .7, np2 = .01; again 
supporting our finding that ownership status only produces affective compatibility 
effects when it is task-relevant.  
Affect  
The 2 (task) × 2 (affect) × 2 (action) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
task [F(1,30) = 70.238, p < .001, np2 = .701] and action [F(1,30) = 71.349, p = < .001, 
np2 = .704]. Participants were faster to respond in the affect as task-irrelevant (797 ms) 
compared with affect as task-relevant (880 ms) blocks; and faster to perform approach 
(822 ms) responses (vs. avoid; 855 ms). There was no main effect of affect [F(1,30) < 
1], nor a two-way interaction between task and affect [F(1,30) < 1, p > .5]. 
Contrary to our prediction that we would observe faster approach responses for 
positive images (vs avoid), and faster avoid responses for negative images (vs 
approach); no significant two-way interaction was found between affect and action, F(1, 
30) = .249, p = .622, np2 = .008. Task × affect × action also failed to reach significance, 
F(1, 30) = .301, p = .587, np2 = .01. Of less interest, there was a significant two-way 
interaction between task and action, [F(1, 30) = 7.572, p = .01, np2 = .202]. Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed that, in the task-relevant condition, participants were significantly 
quicker to approach objects than avoid them, t(30) = -7.45, p < .002). The same pattern 
was observed in the task-irrelevant condition, t(30) = -9.252, p < .004.  
However, the difference between avoiding and approaching was significantly 
greater in the task-irrelevant (M = 40 ms, SD = 28) compared with the task-relevant (M 
= 25 ms, SD = 24), t(30) = 2.752, p < .004. There was no significant two-way 
interaction between task and affect [F(1,30) < 1, p > .5].  
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General discussion 
Previous findings investigating movement trajectories when reaching for, or 
interacting with, self and other-owned property, indirectly allude to the production of 
facilitated approach movements for self-owned objects (Constable et al., 2011; 2014; 
Sparks et al., 2016). Therefore, the experiments presented in the present chapter aimed 
to directly investigate whether affective compatibility effects, that is, facilitated 
approach responses for positively valenced objects, and facilitated avoidance responses 
for negative items, occur as a function of object ownership status; using a touchscreen 
paradigm based on that of Bamford and Ward (2008).  
As predicted, and consistent with indirect evidence from kinematic studies 
(Constable et al., 2011; 2014; Sparks et al., 2016), across all three experiments, we 
observed evidence of approach facilitation for self-owned property (note in Experiment 
2 this was only evident when compared with approaching the mug belonging to an 
unknown other), under conditions where ownership is task-relevant. Although present, 
evidence for facilitated avoidance movements in response to other-owned items was 
less robust. In the first two experiments, when more than one other-owned stimulus was 
presented, facilitated avoidance was observed when responding to the mug owned by 
another participant. However, emergent findings during the course of the testing of our 
paradigm indicated that increased stimulus probability facilitates response time for 
stimuli associated with ‘other’ (Sui et al., 2014). Although each stimulus level was 
presented an equal number of times in Experiment 1 and 2; we propose that the 
requirement to categorise stimuli as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ (resulting in the probability 
of categorising a stimulus as ‘not mine’ three times more often in Experiment 1 and 2) 
Therefore, we compared approach and avoidance for only the self-mug and unknown 
other’s object in Experiment 3.  
Under equal probability conditions, no significant affective compatibility effect for 
the other-owned mug was observed (but the compatibility effect for self-owned 
remained). Therefore, stimulus probability appears to be an important contextual factor 
mediating effects associated with responses to other-owned objects and shapes. 
However, given that increased stimulus probably facilitated categorization time in Sui et 
al. (2014); what is unclear is how increased probability of other-ownership within our 
task context (Experiment 1 and 2) differentially influenced the time taken to approach 
and avoid. On the basis of their findings that when presented with increased probability 
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of self and other-owned shapes, the advantage for ‘other’ was abolished, Sui et al. 
(2014) proposed that stimulus probability acts to mediate expectancy (supposing that 
expectancies for self-shapes override other, even when the stimulus probability of both 
is equal). However, on the basis of increased expectancy for other-owned property; we 
might anticipate reduced response time for the unknown other’s mug in general (for 
both movement types) under increased probability conditions (vs. equal probability 
conditions). However, there was no difference in approach time between Experiment 2 
and 3 for unknown other (Experiment 2: 845 ms; Experiment 3: 876 ms, p < .3); with an 
increase only observed in time to avoid (Experiment 2: 814 ms; Experiment 3: 872 ms, 
p = .05) in Experiment 3. Therefore, stimulus probability appears to have selectively 
mediated the affective compatibility effect.  
Under conditions where ownership was not task-relevant, but participants were 
instead required to attend to a physical feature of the mug stimulus (handle colour), no 
differences between approach and avoidance time as a function of ownership were 
observed. Time taken to avoid was slower than approach across ownership conditions in 
Experiment 2 and 3. Although caution should be executed in interpreting null effects, 
we tentatively suggest that this absence of effect when ownership is task-irrelevant 
indicates that the construct of ownership needs to be activated in order to influence 
action. This is in line with emergent findings that self-associated shapes are not be privy 
to the perceptual advantages observed under task-relevant conditions, when their self-
relevant nature is irrelevant to the task judgment performed (see Liu & Sui, 2016). 
However, this is not unique to ownership, but the case for the influence of valence on 
approach and avoidance response tendencies in general. Across the literature, the 
elicitation of affective compatibility effects when stimulus valence is task-irrelevant is 
inconsistent (for example, see Klauer & Musch, 2002; although see Rinck & Becker, 
2007).  
What remains unclear from the present experiments is the extent to which the 
observed facilitation of approach (vs. avoidance) for self-owned property may result 
from attentional processes; rather than action facilitation. The nature of the recruited 
task confounded attentional processes; requiring participants to attend to the stimulus 
(mug), and either respond by touching its location, or avoid it, requiring them to re-
orient their attention in order to contact the plain grey square. This design is reminiscent 
of the peripheral cueing task, where participants are presented with an initial cue, 
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followed by a target in the same (valid), or different  (invalid), location. This typically 
leads to faster responses for valid cue trials than invalid (Posner, 1980). However, when 
the cues are self-relevant (own name) and other-relevant (other’s name), the cueing 
effect is larger for self-relevant information (Alexopoulos, et al., 2012). Alongside a 
significant number of other studies observing an influence of self-relevance (e.g., Gray 
et al., 2004; Mack & Rock, 1998), and self-object association (Truong et al., 2016; Turk 
et al., 2011; Yanouskaya et al., 2016) on attention; this enhanced distracting effect of 
self-cues does suggest that our effect could alternatively be interpreted as a result of 
attention being ‘held’ by the self-owned mug, and subsequently increasing the delay 
observed when avoiding the self-owned mug. However, this effect is unlikely to 
completely account for our findings, given the trend toward faster avoidance, than 
approach, for other-owned items in Experiment 1 and 2. This suggests some delay in 
preparation of a response for the ‘cued’ location, which, we would anticipate under an 
attentional explanation, would always be faster than production of avoidance responses 
(as in the implicit task blocks).  
The failure to replicate the typical affective congruency effect that Bamford and 
Ward (2008) observed in our adapted version of their paradigm is potentially surprising, 
and could also be interpreted as further support for an attentional (rather than motoric) 
account of our effect. However, methodological differences may account for the 
absence of typical affective congruency effects. In the current study, the affect blocks 
were always completed secondary to the ownership task. Therefore, continued practice 
may have masked differences. Additionally, to more closely mimic the ownership 
blocks, fewer stimuli with were used in our task (four of each valence category; in 
contrast to 40 in Bamford & Ward, 2008). Repeated exposure to the same valenced 
stimuli reduces physiological measures of arousal (for example, see Bradley, Lang & 
Cuthbert, 1993) and implicit and explicit evaluations of stimulus valence (Dijksterhuis 
& Smith, 2002). Therefore, the repetition of stimuli in our affect task may have reduced 
perceived valence, abolishing congruency effects.  
In summary, we have presented evidence that has attempted to directly support the 
notion that self-owned property facilitates approach actions, relative to avoidance. Due 
to methodological factors, the extent to which the observed approach facilitation is 
underpinned by embodied affective motor processes and attentional capture cannot be 
ascertained. However, this finding remains interesting in further demonstrating self-
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ownership biases; regardless of mechanism. In addition, our evidence also indicates 
that, to a less robust degree, avoidance actions are facilitated for other-owned property, 
relative to approach. However, this effect was dependent on greater stimulus probability 
for ‘other-owned’ objects. This finding further supports the notion that, beyond 
ownership purely operating as another facet of advantaged processing of self-relevant 
stimuli; the socially situated construct of ownership, and its associated norms and 
consequences, influences action performance (for example, see Constable et al., 2011; 
2014). Future research considering affective compatibility effects and ownership should 
endeavour to reduce attentional confounds in the task paradigm recruited, and establish 
how stimulus probability mediates affective compatibility responses. 
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Chapter 3. Affective compatibility: Away from screens, toward kinematics   
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The experiments presented in the previous chapter aimed to provide the first direct 
evidence that ownership facilitates approach for self-owned property; and avoidance for 
other-owned objects. An advantage when producing approach movements for self-
owned mugs (vs. avoidance) was observed. However, the design confounded attention 
allocation and response processes. Therefore, as previously discussed, the slowing of 
avoidance for self-owned items (which required participants to re-orient their attention 
away from the stimulus), which is suggestive of an affective compatibility effect; could 
also reflect difficulty in disengaging attention from the self-owned stimulus in order to 
produce the avoidance movement; or a combination of both processes. Establishing 
another instance of attentional biases for self-ownership would further add to findings 
illustrating the facilitated attentional processing of, and orienting to, objects associated 
with the self (for example, see Truong et al., 2016; Turk et al., 2011; Yanouskaya et al., 
2016). However, this was not the aim of the present thesis. Therefore, to clarify whether 
self-ownership produces a pattern of motor responses consistent with affective 
compatibility, Experiment 4 recruited an Approach-Avoidance task design that does not 
confound attentional factors.  
A number of paradigm options were considered, for example, a more normative 
joystick or keyboard-based response process (for example, see Chen & Bargh, 1999). 
However, alongside identifying additional self-ownership effects, another core aim of 
the experimental work presented was to further delineate the effects that other-
ownership elicits. In the experiments presented in the last chapter, evidence for the 
facilitation of avoidance movements, relative to approach, for other-owned stimuli, was 
inconsistent. Some degree of facilitated avoidance for other-owned objects was 
observed in Experiment 1 and 2, when more than one level of ‘other’ ownership was 
utilised. However, in Experiment 3, when participants only responded to their own, and 
an unknown other’s, object, this effect dissipated.  
The difficulty in identifying robust other-ownership effects, when compared with 
self-ownership advantages, is not surprising; such effects are subtle and susceptible to 
contextual mediation. For example, the care taken to interact with a mug belonging to 
another is abolished when the owner is known, but not present, during action 
performance (Constable et al., 2014). This suggests that other-ownership needs to be 
salient in order to influence action performance. The increased weighting of other-
owned stimuli within Experiment 1 and 2, relative to Experiment 3, may have boosted 
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the salience of other-ownership. Although we cannot fully identify how altered stimulus 
probability, which facilitates the identification of other-owned stimuli (Sui et al., 2014), 
would differentially affect avoidance and approach movements, it may, through 
increased salience of ‘other’ ownership; facilitate production of congruent movements 
(avoidance) in increased other-owned probability conditions. As the influence of 
ownership status on action appears to be contextually sensitive, and we wished to 
directly assess approach and avoidance behaviour alluded to during tasks requiring 
interaction with real objects within a workspace; we opted to replicate this environment. 
Therefore, we produced a version of an approach-avoidance task with similar 
contextual properties to tasks that have indirectly identified potential affective 
congruency effects (see Constable et al., 2011; Constable et al., 2014; Sparks et al., 
2016). Akin to Experiment 1 to 3, participants decorated a coffee mug with a design of 
their choosing alongside the experimenter. They took their mug home to use, before 
returning to the laboratory with their mug to complete the task. In Experiment 4, 
participants again categorised the mugs (own and experimenter’s) as ‘mine’ and ‘not 
mine’, however in response to its ownership they pushed the physical mug away, or 
pulled it toward, the torso; to occlude a white target, as quickly as possible.  
We predicted that participants would be faster to initiate and execute approach 
movements (toward the body) for their own mug, relative to approaching the 
experimenter's Despite an absence of consistent effect for the experimenter’s mug in 
Chapter 1 (Experiment 1 & 2); given that the owner (experimenter) was present during 
task execution, and owner presence appears to predict reticence to interact with 
another’s property during interaction with 3D objects (Constable et al., 2014), we 
tentatively predicted that participants would be faster to initiate and execute avoidance 
movements for the experimenter’s mug (vs. approach).  
Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants 
Constable et al.'s (2011) N of 19 was used to determine the minimum acceptable 
sample size for the present study. Allowing for some attrition, thirty students were 
initially recruited from the University of East Anglia and participated in return for 
payment. However, three participants failed to attend the laboratory after decorating 
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their mug. Two participants’ data was lost due to recording errors; therefore, data from 
the remaining 25 is reported (two male; M = 20.88, SD = 7.1 years). Participants were 
right handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological 
or motor disorders. Participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment and gave 
informed consent. The study was approved by the University of East Anglia School of 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee. 
Apparatus and Stimuli  
Stimuli. Participants attended small group sessions to decorate a white ceramic 
coffee mug, which they were instructed to take home and use (M = 2.18, SD = 4.4 uses), 
prior to returning to the laboratory with their mug to complete the task (M = 15, SD = 
3.32 days after painting). The researcher also decorated a mug for inclusion in the task. 
Before the task, four adhesive felt furniture floor protector pads were attached to the 
base of the mugs to protect the table surface and facilitate ease of movement.   
Experimental set-up. Participants were seated in an ambiently lit room at a 60 x 
120 cm grey table, with a black start button (button box 3.2 x 2.2 cm, 1 cm diameter) 
placed on the front edge. Two white target crosses were fixed to the surface of the table 
(each arm being 9 cm long, with a width of 1 cm), positioned 40 cm apart, one toward 
the near edge of and one toward the far edge (see Figure 7). The mug, either belonging 
to the participant or the researcher, was positioned centrally between the targets. To 
ensure accuracy of mug placement, ultraviolet (UV) markings were used to indicate 
placement position with a handheld UV light used to expose these markings to the 
experimenter during placement.  
Participants wore PLATO LCD goggles to control vision while the object was 
placed, between trials (Translucent Technologies, Toronto, Canada). Six Qualisys Oqus 
(Sweden) motion-tracking cameras recorded the X, Y, Z positions at a sampling 
frequency of 179 Hz of the infrared reflective markers attached to the centre of the nail 
of the right index finger, and a marker on the mug. A custom designed program written 
in Matlab (The MathWorks, USA) was used to control trial order, the goggles and 
recordings.   
Design 
We employed a 2 × 2 design, manipulating ownership (own or experimenter’s) and 
action (approach or avoid). Participants reached toward the mug (own and 
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experimenter’s) and pushed or pulled it to cover the target, depending on task 
instruction. In the congruent block, participants pushed the mug away from their body 
(avoid) if the object belonged to the experimenter, and pulled it toward the self 
(approach) if it was theirs. In the incongruent block, they performed the opposite task. 
Participants completed both blocks; order was counterbalanced.  
 
 
Figure 7. Experimental set-up (not to scale). Participants were seated at a table in front 
of a black push button. Two white targets; 40 cm apart, were adhered to the table 
surface. The mug was placed centrally between the two targets (centre of mug placed at 
20 cm).   
 
The dependent variables recorded were; reaction time (time in ms from goggles 
opening to release of start button), reach movement time (time in ms between release of 
push button and contact with the mug), reach peak velocity (maximum velocity in mm/s 
during the index movement), We also recorded movement time and peak velocity for 
the mug movement; and calculated the difference between start and end position of the 
mug on y (distance moved).  
Procedure 
Mug painting and preparation. Participants and the experimenter initially 
decorated a coffee mug, with a design of their choosing, using ceramic paints. Once 
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painted, participants took their mug home to use. Participants were informed they would 
need to recall instances where they used it upon returning to the laboratory. This 
manipulation was intended to encourage use. Upon returning with their mug, adhesive 
felt furniture floor protector pads were attached to the base of the participant and 
researcher’s mug, and an IRED placed on the mug, and the participant’s index finger, to 
allow the tracking of movement.  
Task. The task consisted of two blocks; instructions were delivered verbally prior to 
the block commencing. Participants were required to quickly pull the mug toward 
themselves, occluding the white target cross, if it belonged to them; and push the mug 
away from themselves if it belonged to the experimenter (and vice versa for the 
remaining block). Block order was counterbalanced across participants.  
At the beginning of each trial, the PLATO goggles were in an opaque configuration, 
restricting vision for the participant while the experimenter placed the mug.  Each trial 
started with an auditory cue from the researcher (“ready?”), signaling that the 
participant should press and hold down the start button. The researcher then manually 
triggered the trial, resulting in the PLATO goggles becoming transparent, allowing the 
participant to view the table and mug. When ready to perform the movement, the 
participant released the push button and executed the push or pull. Once completed, the 
researcher triggered the PLATO goggles to return to their opaque configuration, 
preventing vision, while the next trial was set up. There were 48 trials in a block (24 per 
condition), 96 total, and up to 5 practice trials, only practicing until they became 
comfortable with the procedure. Trial order was randomised. The task took 
approximately twenty-five minutes to complete.  
Data processing. The raw data from the index and mug IREDs was filtered using a 
low-pass second-order Butterworth filter with a cut-off frequency of 10 Hz and 
analysed using customised software written in Matlab. Missing marker coordinates were 
infilled using linear interpolation, however this was not successful on 26 trials, these 
were excluded from analysis. The beginning of the ‘reach toward mug’ component was 
defined using a velocity-based criterion of 50 mm/s, the end of the index portion was 
defined as when the mug reached a velocity of 50 mm/s. Mug push or pull was 
segmented by a start and end velocity of 50 mm/s. A trial-by-trial inspection was carried 
out to remove any trials in which participants did not complete the task correctly 
(performing the wrong direction movement) resulting in the exclusion of 17 trials from 
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further analysis. Three participants’ data was removed due to performing more than 
15% erroneous responses.  
For each trial the analysis program extracted the following dependent measures: 
reaction time (time in ms from the goggles revealing the display to release of start 
button), reach movement time (time in ms between start and end of movement as 
defined by the velocity-based criteria described above), mug movement time, reach 
peak velocity (maximum velocity in mm/s during index movement time), mug peak 
velocity. We also calculated the distance moved from the start and end position of the 
mug on Y (depth).  
Results  
The dependent measures were calculated for every trial and then averaged for each 
condition (see Table 3), and subjected to a 2 × 2 (ownership × action) ANOVA. 
Significant values were set at p < .05.   
 
Table 3 
Means by condition for dependent measures. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
  Action 
 
Ownership Approach Avoid 
RT (ms) Own  276 (74) 311 (108) 
 
Experimenter’s 303 (107) 282 (78) 
MT (ms) Own 458 (98) 408 (78) 
 
Experimenter’s 472 (91) 411 (85) 
PV (mm/s) Own 1667 (340) 1632 (292) 
 
Experimenter’s 1655 (296) 1625 (332) 
Mug MT (ms)  Own 435 (94) 458 (85) 
 
Experimenter’s 432 (76) 454 (95) 
Mug PV (mm/s) Own 832 (192) 749 (152) 
 Experimenter’s 837 (183) 770 (182)  
Distance moved (mm)  Own  196.8 (6.8) 192.8 (8.1) 
 Experimenter’s 195.4 (7.3) 193.6 (6.2) 
Note. RT (reaction time), MT (movement time), PV (peak velocity), Mug MT 
(movement time of mug), Mug PV (peak velocity of mug movement) 
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Reaction time (movement initiation)  
There was no significant main effects of ownership [F(1, 21) < 1 p > .7, or action 
[F(1, 21) = 1.470 , p = .239, np2 = .065]. However, central to our predictions, the 
ownership × action interaction was significant [F(1, 21) = 4.832, p = .039, np2 = .187].  
Pairwise comparisons revealed that, as predicted, participants were significantly 
faster to initiate approach movements for self-owned mugs, compared with 
commencing approach for the experimenter's, t(21) = 2.111, p = .047 (two-tailed).	
Although failing to reach significance, there was a trend toward faster initiation of 
avoidance for experimenter's (when comparing initiation of avoidance for self-owned; 
see Figure 8), t(21) = 1.865, p = .076 (two-tailed).   
 
 
Figure 8. Average time taken to initiate movement for approach and avoidance 
movements, by ownership status (own and experimenter’s). Error bars represent within-
subjects standard error (Loftus & Masson, 1994). Asterisk denotes  p < .05.  
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Reach toward mug 
Movement time. There was a significant main effect of ownership on reach 
movement time [F(1, 21) = 5.103, p = .035, np2 = .195]. Averaged over movement 
type, participants were faster to reach toward their own mug (M = 434, SD = 83) than 
the experimenter’s (M = 441, SD = 85). There was also a significant main effect of 
action [F(1, 21) = 84.881, p < .001, np2 = .802]. Participants were faster to reach toward 
the mug when they were about to perform an avoid action (M = 410, SD = 79), 
compared with approach (M = 465, SD = 90). However, the ownership × action 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 21) = .267, p  = .611, np2 = .013.   
Peak velocity. There was no significant main effects of ownership [F(1, 21) = .935, 
p = .345, np2 = .043], action [F(1, 21) = 2.915, p = .102, np2 = .122], nor ownership × 
action interaction [F(1, 21) = .004, p = .950, np2  < .001].  
Mug movement  
Movement time. There was a significant main effect of action on time taken to 
move the mug, F(1, 21) = 16.842, p < .001, np2 = .457. Participants were slower to push 
the mug away from the body (M = 456, SD = 89), compared with pulling it toward the 
body (M = 434, SD = 83). Contrary to our predictions that participants would execute 
actions with more care during interactions with the experimenter’s mug, there was no 
significant effect of ownership [F(1, 21) = 1.315, p = .264, np2 = .059], nor a significant 
ownership × action interaction, F(1, 21) = .019,  p = .892, np2 < .001.  
Peak velocity. There was a significant main effect of action on peak velocity [F(1, 
21) = 37.843, p < .001, np2 = .643. Participants reached greater peak velocity when 
pulling the mug toward the body (M = 834, SD = 181), compared with pushing away (M 
= 760, SD = 162). Again, we failed to observe greater care taken with the 
experimenter’s (vs. self-owned) mug: The main effects of ownership [F(1, 21) = .935, p 
= .345, np2 = .043], and ownership × action [F(1, 21) = .279, p = .603, np2 = .013] were 
not significant.  
Distance moved. There were no significant main effects or interactions for 
movement distance [F(1, 20) < 2, p > .07].   
Discussion 
The present study aimed to disentangle the influence of attention from motoric 
response processes underlying the robust approach advantage observed for self-owned 
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property in Experiments 1 to 3. As we were also interested in effects elicited by other-
ownership which may be best elucidated using real motor movements in response to 
physical objects (Constable et al., 2011; 2014; 2016); Experiment 4 investigated 
approach and avoidance responses via the performance of real motor movements; 
pulling the mug toward, or pushing it away, from the torso; with motion tracking used 
to record movement parameters. Importantly for the aims of the present thesis, subtle 
differences in movement initiation time are supportive of a motoric affective 
compatibility effect for self-owned property. Counter to our predictions, we failed to 
elicit a robust effect for other-ownership.  
In accordance with Experiments 1 to 3, participants were significantly quicker to 
initiate their movement (reaction time) when required to bring their own mug toward 
the body (approach); compared with approaching the experimenter's. Somewhat 
surprisingly, there was no difference as a function of ownership in the kinematics of the 
actual object interaction phase of the movement. That is, there were no spatial or 
temporal differences in participants’ manipulation of property as they moved it toward 
or away from the self. Nevertheless, as there was no requirement to re-orient attention 
in order to produce the avoidance response in the current paradigm (unlike Experiments 
1 to 3), this difference in reaction time can be more confidently attributed as an 
embodied motoric response to self-owned property; akin to differentiation in the 
execution approach and avoidance time for objects of differing valence (for example, 
see Chen & Bargh, 1999).  
Given that the manner, or at least degree, in which differential reward or affective 
value contributes to self-object biases is still unclear (Sui et al., 2015; Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015b; Sui & Humphreys, 2015c); the present findings which are, albeit 
indirectly, suggestive of a relationship between ownership and stimulus value reiterate 
the need for continued consideration of the interactivity of affect or reward in ownership 
representations and biases. Although not of primary concern in the present thesis (due to 
the inherently confounded nature of real world experiences of ownership with other 
factors; and the desire to maintain such conditions for the elucidation of more subtle 
other-ownership effects); we note that the manner in which ownership was manipulated 
(customisation of a mug, which was then taken home to use) potentially confounds 
effects of preference, choice and familiarity with that of ownership. Therefore, a logical 
next step for follow up research is to explore whether this affective compatibility pattern 
is obtained when removing these intertwined variables.  
EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP ON ACTION 
 
	
74 
 
Despite a descriptive trend toward the reverse pattern of response facilitation for the 
mug belonging to the experimenter (faster initiation of avoidance movements vs 
avoiding own), there was no significant difference in time to initiate avoidance 
movements, relative to avoiding own. Note that we also failed to observe consistent 
compatibility effects for the experimenter’s property in Chapter 2 (see Experiment 1 
and 2). However, we elected to maintain the use of the experimenter as the level of 
other-ownership in the current paradigm, rather than extend the use of ‘unknown other’ 
included in Chapter 2; due to the consistency of previously identified embodied effects 
for experimenter-owned possessions in real world object interactions, and the apparent 
importance of owner presence in such contexts (Constable et al., 2011; 2014; 2016). 
Our failure to elicit robust embodied effects for property owned by the experimenter 
reflects an unexpected difference between the work of Constable and the findings of the 
present thesis. It is unclear why their recruitment of the researcher was successful in 
eliciting deviation in mug positioning from the torso (which we interpreted to reflect 
avoidance processes for others’ property); while we failed to observe significant effects 
for property belonging to the experimenter.  
However, note that limited statistical power may have played a role in limiting the 
significance of some of the statistical comparisons conducted. A post hoc power 
analysis revealed that the effect size (dz) of the pairwise comparisons (reaction time) for 
approach own vs. approach experimenter's (dz = .45) and avoid own vs avoid 
experimenter's (dz = .42) required a sample size of 41 and 53, respectively, to obtain 
statistical power at the recommended .80 level (Cohen, 1988). 
Given the lack of spatial and temporal differentiation during the mug movements 
within the current study (although note with regards to spatial effects that participants 
had to achieve accuracy by occluding a target in the present paradigm; no accuracy 
requirements were present in Constable’s lifting task), it is perhaps possible that the 
spatial deviations observed in Constable’s work do not in fact reflect avoidance 
behaviour, as we initially proposed. Alternatively, although difficult to quantify; 
perhaps researcher characteristics and their dyadic behaviour with participants mediates 
the elicitation of such effects. Given that we achieved more robust results for property 
belonging to an unknown other in Chapter 2; a follow up study, recruiting the present 
task with this level of other-ownership would aid in beginning to disentangle whether 
there is a lack of response congruency effects for property belonging to another; or 
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whether the experimenter (or some feature of the experimenter) tempered other-owned 
effects in the current work.  
On the basis of our findings from the present chapter, and those of Chapter 2, target-
directed action processes appear to be most robustly influenced by self-ownership (at 
least in the presence of its ecologically relevant contaminants, such as choice and 
preference). Given that self-owned property permits and requires action, this is perhaps 
unsurprising. Therefore, we began to consider action contexts where other-ownership 
cues may possess greater salience for the actor than self-ownership.  
One possible context, that we frequently encounter, may be limb navigation of the 
environment in the presence of obstacles. Alongside the mediation of distance from the 
torso as a function of ownership, Constable observed that individuals temper their 
interactions with others’ property (vs. their own), appearing to result from the desire to 
take care of others’ belongings, in order to maintain good social relationships with 
owners (Constable et al., 2011; Constable et al., 2014). Interestingly, this mediation of 
temporal signatures of lifting movements that alluded to greater care was dissociable 
from the spatial differences in drawing self and other-owned property near the body. As 
discussed in more detail in the upcoming chapter, obstacles within the environment are 
encoded, and subsequent reaching movements adjusted, in relation to their 
consequences of collision. Given that previous work suggests that individuals take 
greater care when interacting with another’s property (Constable et al., 2011; Constable 
et al., 2014), other-owned objects serving as an obstacle during reaches for a target 
object may differentially influence reach execution (vs. reaching in the presence of self-
owned obstacles); in order to prevent collision, and its social consequences.  
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Chapter 4. Avoiding ownership: Obstacle avoidance 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, most research investigating the processing and effects of 
ownership has focused on biases associated with self-ownership (for example, see 
Cunningham et al., 2008; 2013; van den Bos et al., 2010; Sui et al., 2012; 2013; Sui & 
Humphreys 2015a; Turk et al., 2011; Truong et al., 2016). When other-ownership has 
been considered of interest in itself (rather than functioning as a less salient comparison 
level), including the experimental work previously presented in this thesis, it has been 
explored in the context of action performance when interacting with (lifting, moving) 
objects (Constable et al., 2011; 2014; 2016). Akin to the effects that self-ownership has 
been found to exert on perceptual, attentional and mnemonic processes, the work 
presented within this thesis has observed that target-directed action processes appear to 
be more robustly influenced by self-ownership (vs. other-ownership, at least in the 
presence of its ecologically relevant contaminants, such as choice and preference). Given 
that self-owned property permits and requires action, this is perhaps unsurprising.  
As Constable's work has illustrated that the embodied visuomotor effects elicited by 
other-ownership are contextually sensitive (Constable et al., 2011; 2014; 2016), we began 
to consider action contexts where other-ownership cues may possess greater salience for 
the actor than self-ownership. One possible context that we frequently encounter may be 
limb navigation in the presence of obstacles. We reside in cluttered environments, where 
we often need to act upon objects in the presence of non-target items, owned by 
ourselves, but also belonging to others. For example, when having coffee with friends we 
must navigate their, and our own, coffee cups when retrieving the sugar. Most of the time 
we successfully achieve this without colliding with other objects within the space.  
Recent findings that identity-related features of obstacles (such as its fragility, see 
Kangur, Billino & Hesse, 2017) alter reach trajectories, alongside Constable's observation 
that individuals temper their interactions with others’ property (vs. their own), appearing 
to result from the desire to take care of others’ belongings, in order to maintain good 
social relationships with owners (Constable et al., 2011; Constable et al., 2014), is 
suggestive of the need to explore the possible effects of other-ownership on obstacle 
avoidance behaviour. Other-owned objects serving as an obstacle during reaches for a 
target object may differentially influence reach execution (vs. reaching in the presence of 
self-owned obstacles); in order to prevent collision, and its social consequences. 
Although much is known about our general ability to plan and execute movements while 
avoiding obstacles, whether ownership may mediate movement kinematics within this 
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action context has yet to be explored; but would allow further exploration of the limited 
evidence for the 'care' effect for other-ownership (Constable et al., 2011; 2014).   
Obstacle avoidance 
Our ability to avoid obstacles is achieved by altering the temporal and spatial 
parameters of our movements; with movement times increasing, and the trajectory of the 
acting limb deviating, to increase the distance of the arm from the obstacle(s). This 
occurs even when the obstacles do not physically obstruct the movement (Biegstraaten, 
Smeets, & Brenner, 2003; Chapman & Goodale, 2010a; Dean & Bruwer, 1994; Grimme, 
Lipinski, & Schoner, 2012; Kritikos, Bennett, Dunai, & Castiello, 2000; Menger, Van der 
Stigchel, & Dijkerman, 2013; Mon-Williams & McIntosh, 2000; Mon-Williams, 
Tresilian, Coppard, & Carson, 2001; Tipper, Howard & Jackson, 1997; Tresilian, 1998; 
Tresilian, Mon-Williams, Coppard, & Carson, 2005). These effects remain in open loop 
conditions (without vision), where visual feedback of the hand and objects is unavailable 
during the reach, but available during the movement planning stage (for example, see 
Chapman & Goodale, 2008). Therefore, obstacles must be represented at the planning 
stage, rather than merely responded to via visual feedback during execution.  
It is theorised that these effects result from non-target objects being treated as 
physical obstacles, with movements preplanned to maintain a preferred distance between 
the limb and the obstacle, to avoid knocking them over (Tresilian, 1998). Evidence 
supports this account, as the risk of collision increases, for example, when obstacles are 
placed closer to the reaching limb, greater alterations in movement time and trajectory 
deviations are observed (Chapman & Goodale, 2008; Mon-Williams et al., 2001; 
Tresilian, 1998). In addition, obstacles placed beyond the target do not produce the same 
effects on reach behaviour, likely because there is no real risk of collision (Chapman & 
Goodale, 2008). Changing the starting posture of the limb to heighten the risk of 
collision, rather than workspace layout, has also been found to influence reach behaviour 
(Menger, Van der Stigchel, & Dijkerman, 2012). However, all obstacles placed close to 
the target within the workspace do not have the same degree of effect on our movements; 
obstacles on the right side have a greater influence compared with obstacles on the left 
side (Chapman & Goodale, 2008). This side effect results from participants commonly 
using the right hand to respond during tasks; ipsilateral objects appearing on the outside 
of the limb place greater constraints on the movement compared with the contralateral 
object, on the inside of the acting limb. When participants respond using the left hand, 
regardless of handedness (ruling out motor lateralisation), the effect is observed with the 
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left obstacle (Menger et al., 2013). This further supports the hypothesis that the spatial 
and temporal characteristics of movements are altered to avoid collision.  
To understand how obstacle avoidance is so efficiently achieved, the two visual 
streams hypothesis, proposing that one stream (dorsal) serves ‘vision for action’ and the 
other (ventral), underpins ‘vision for perception’, must be explored (Goodale & Milner, 
1992, Milner & Goodale, 1995; Milner & Goodale, 2006; Milner & Goodale, 2008). This 
theory proposes that the ventral and dorsal stream of visual processing, although utilising 
the same inputs from early visual areas, processes visual information in different ways for 
different purposes.  
The ventral stream processes information to form perceptual representations, 
containing characteristics of objects and their spatial relations within the environment, 
enabling us to consciously think about objects and perform perceptual judgments. The 
wealth of findings demonstrating that self-ownership influences early visual perception 
illustrates the effect ownership exerts on the ventral processing pathway (see Schäfer et 
al., 2015, Sui et al., 2012; 2013, Sui & Humphreys 2015a). In contrast, the dorsal stream 
processes visual input ‘online’ to guide skilled actions, such as reaching and grasping 
objects. Milner and Goodale proposed this stream does not rely on high-level mental 
representations of objects to guide action, but encodes information about the size and 
shape of the object, to purely guide movement. The dorsal stream is believed to underpin 
our fine-grained ability to quickly and accurately avoid obstacles (Goodale & Milner, 
1992; Milner & Goodale, 2008).  
Evidence for the role of the dorsal stream in obstacle avoidance arises from studies 
with patients who exhibit damage to regions involved in the dorsal network and display 
disordered obstacle avoidance (Rice et al., 2008; Schindler et al., 2004). Conversely, 
obstacle avoidance is preserved in those with damage to ventral stream structures, but an 
intact dorsal stream network (for example, see Rice et al., 2006). Taken together, such 
findings provide support for the role of the dorsal stream in obstacle avoidance.  
Non-dorsal features and obstacle avoidance 
Obstacle avoidance seems to depend upon dorsal stream functioning, however, there 
is some evidence indicating that higher order semantic features of obstacles, assumed to 
be encoded by the ventral stream, may also influence the movement path. Indeed, Milner 
and Goodale (2008), concede that the ventral stream, and the mental representations of 
objects embedded with semantics which result from this processing network, can play a 
EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP ON ACTION 
 
	
80 
 
role in the ability to avoid obstacles. This is especially likely in circumstances when the 
obstacles’ semantic and material properties need to be considered, such as reaching in the 
presence of fragile or dangerous items. However, despite Goodale and Milner’s (2008) 
claim that the ventral stream may have a role to play in obstacle avoidance, whether 
higher-order properties of the obstacles to be avoided influence movement parameters has 
not received much attention in the literature. 
In a recent study, De Haan, Van der Stigchel, Nijnens, and Dijkerman (2014) 
observed that obstacle identity influenced reach trajectory. De Haan et al. (2014) placed a 
full or empty water glass on either the right or left side of space, at a distance halfway 
between the start position and the target button. Participants were instructed to make a 
speeded response with their right hand, moving from the start position and pressing the 
push button target. They found that individuals’ movements veered further away from the 
full water glass obstacles, compared with the empty water glass, but only when the 
obstacle appeared on the right side of space (it was more obstructing). This study 
suggests that, under some conditions, object identity (a higher order feature of objects) 
does influence avoidance responses; likely resulting from the differing consequences of 
colliding with an empty glass compared with one containing water.  
Similarly, Kangur et al. (2017) observed slower movement times when participants 
reached for a target in the presence of a more fragile obstacle (martini glass) compared 
with a less fragile item (lager glass). Although both objects were made of glass, the 
martini glass can be perceived as more fragile because its shape makes it more prone to 
fall and break if contacted by the arm. Participants’ maintained the same distance 
(trajectory) from the obstacle for both the lager glass and martini glass as the hand passed 
by the obstacle, but given the narrow stem of the martini glass compared with the lager 
glass, this suggests that participants did maintain more distance from the martini glass.  
The findings of both De Haan et al. (2014) and Kangur et al. (2017) demonstrate that 
higher-order knowledge about the identity and fragility of objects (attributable to ventral 
stream perceptual processes), and what this knowledge informs us about the 
consequences of colliding with the item, shape avoidance processes. Ownership status is 
another important feature of obstacles that may similarly alter trajectories through its 
effects on the consequences of collision. However, ownership knowledge cannot be 
'obtained' or influence avoidance behaviour through dorsal stream processing, as it is not 
a physically perceivable property of the object, instead requiring higher-order 
representations in order to identify the ownership status. Akin to differing consequences 
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of collision if we were to collide with a full compared with an empty water glass (De 
Haan et al., 2014), the cost of collision (in terms of maintaining good social 
relationships), with an object belonging to another may be greater than the cost of 
‘bumping into’ our own possessions, and therefore alter the temporal and spatial 
parameters of movements. In addition to extending findings concerning the influence of 
ownership on action mechanisms, manipulating ownership as another higher-order 
feature of objects in obstacle avoidance tasks informs us, more generally, about how 
features outside dorsal stream processing influence this phenomenon. 
Therefore, the three experiments presented within this chapter aimed to elucidate 
whether the ownership status of obstacles (own or experimenter’s) mediates spatial and 
temporal parameters of reaching movements. Broadly, we predicted that participants 
would take more care when performing reaches in the presence of an obstacle owned by 
the experimenter, due to the greater possible costs of collision, observable through greater 
deviation away from the obstacle and increased movement time for the obstacle 
belonging to the experimenter, compared with self-owned obstacle trials.  
Pilot study 
An initial pilot study was conducted to establish whether a less typical task set-up, 
where participants reached over obstacles (that should not physically obstruct the 
reaching movement), would elicit obstacle avoidance effects observed in more standard 
paradigms that require the participant to reach between obstacles (for example, see 
Chapman & Goodale, 2008). Rather than recruit a standard paradigm, this set-up, adapted 
from Verheij, Brenner, and Smeets (2014), was trialed to allow the coffee mugs 
previously recruited as owned objects to be utilised. Previous research indicates that 
shorter obstacles do not produce the same degree of avoidance behaviour in paradigms 
requiring the participant to reach between obstacles (Chapman & Goodale, 2008), and the 
mugs are comparatively shorter than the obstacles traditionally used in such tasks (for 
example, 25 cm tall cylinders, Chapman & Goodale, 2008). However, Verheij et al. 
(2014) observed that very short obstacles altered movement performance when placed 
underneath the acting limb, rather than to the side. Therefore, the task appeared to possess 
greater suitability for the obstacle height.  
Participants performed reach-to-grasp movements, grasping the centre of a white 
cylinder (target). Decorated coffee mugs functioned as obstacles in the task, with their 
own or the experimenter’s mug appearing in the movement path, placed between the start 
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position and target. To act as a baseline, reaches in the presence of no obstacle were also 
performed. Participants performed the reaches in open loop (no vision) conditions. Open 
loop performance of obstacle avoidance tasks results from the use of obstacle avoidance 
paradigms with patient samples, to assess whether damage to dorsal areas impacts 
movement planning (for example, see Schindler et al., 2004). No vision conditions ensure 
deficits in movement planning, as a result of dorsal stream damage, can be isolated from 
deficits in the online control of movements (Chapman & Goodale, 2010a). Akin to 
Chapman and Goodale (2008), we opted to implement the open loop nature of 
performing an obstacle avoidance task in a non-patient sample, to assess whether 
ownership was encoded during movement planning, rather than potentially influencing 
the online control element of movement.  
The movements were recorded using motion-tracking equipment to analyse spatial 
and temporal movement parameters. We predicted that the recruitment of taller obstacles 
in our task (compared with Verheij et al., 2014) may potentially elicit more robust 
avoidance effects, and that movement time would be reduced, and reach height at the 
obstacle location increased, for experimenter versus self-owned obstacles. 
Method 
Participants 
Ten participants (two male; M = 19.56, SD = 1.42 years) were recruited from the 
University of East Anglia and participated in exchange for curricular credit. Participants 
were right handed, as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971; 
see Appendix A), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, reported no history of 
neurological or motor disorders, and were naïve to the purpose of the study. 
Apparatus and Stimuli  
Participants were seated in an ambiently lit room alongside a 60 x 120 cm grey table, 
with a black start button (button box 3.2 x 2.2 cm, button 1 cm diameter) placed 20 cm to 
the right and 10 cm in front of their trunk. A target (white cylinder; 24 cm tall, 5.5 cm 
diameter) was fixed to the table, 40 cm from the start button. On obstacle trials, the 
obstacle (mug, experimenter’s or own) appeared between the start button and target, with 
the centre of the mug placed 22 cm from the start position and the handle pointing toward 
the target (not visible from the start position, see Figure 9).   
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Figure 9. Experimental set up of the pilot study (not to scale). 
 
Participants wore PLATO LCD goggles to control visual feedback (Translucent 
Technologies, Toronto, Canada). Six Qualisys Oqus (Sweden) motion-tracking cameras 
recorded the X, Y, Z positions at a sampling frequency of 179 Hz of the infrared 
reflective markers attached to the centre of the nail of the right index finger, thumb and 
wrist. A custom designed programme written in Matlab (The MathWorks, USA) was 
used to control trial order, the goggles, and recordings. The obstacles were white coffee 
mugs (9.5 cm tall, 8 cm diameter), one belonging to the experimenter and one to the 
participant, hand painted by the participants and experimenter with personalised designs. 
The participants took their mugs home to use (M = 5.67, SD = 5.34 uses) before bringing 
them back for part two of the experiment, where plastic furniture buffer pads were 
attached to the base of each mug, to minimise auditory cues that may have revealed 
obstacle placement. 
Design 
A one-way within-subjects design was implemented, with obstacle status 
manipulated. Participants reached over an obstacle (mug) belonging to themselves, the 
experimenter, or performed reaches with no obstacle.  Participants painted the mug in 
stage one of the study, which they took home and used for a week prior to the 
experimental task.   
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The dependent variables recorded were; reaction time (time in ms from goggles 
becoming translucent to release of start button), movement time (time in ms between start 
and end of movement), peak velocity (maximum velocity in mm/s during the movement), 
time to peak velocity (time in ms from start of movement to peak velocity), and Z @ 220 
(the height, z, deviation in mm when the hand passed over the middle of the obstacle [i.e., 
220 mm in depth (Y) from the start button]). 
Procedure 
Ownership assignment. Prior to the experimental task, participants attended the lab 
in small groups to decorate their coffee mug with a design of their choosing, applied 
using ceramic paints. Participants could keep the object after the experiment, and took the 
mugs home to use.  
Task. Participants had to perform a simple reach-and-grasp task, in the presence of no 
obstacle, self-owned, or experimenter-owned obstacle. Each trial started with the goggles 
in the opaque configuration, allowing the researcher to place one of the obstacles, if 
required. The experimenter gave an auditory signal to the participant to press and hold 
down the start button with their index finger and thumb in a precision grip formation 
(pinched). The researcher then triggered the trial to start, causing the goggles to become 
transparent, enabling the participant to see the target and obstacle (if present). The 
participant was instructed to release the button and grasp the target (cylinder) with their 
thumb and index finger, at a natural movement speed. They were informed that 
sometimes there would be other objects present on the table, but they were to ignore these 
objects and grasp the target. Upon release of the push button (i.e., movement initiation), 
the goggles became opaque, resulting in the participant completing the grasping action 
without visual feedback of the hand, obstacle and target (in open loop).  
Participants completed 42 trials, with 14 repetitions of each of the 3 obstacle 
configurations (no obstacle, own, experimenter’s) in a randomised order. Before the 
experiment the participants completed a maximum of 10 practice trials. The task took 
around fifteen minutes to complete.  
Data processing. The raw data recordings were examined for missing data points, 
and linear interpolation was used to complete missing coordinates. However, due to 
camera positioning issues, some index marker frames could not be interpolated. 
Therefore, the wrist marker was selected for subsequent data analysis. A trial-by-trial 
inspection was conducted to eliminate trials where the participant completed the task 
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inappropriately (such as commencing the reach movement before the goggles had opened 
to revealed the display), resulting in 19 trials being removed from further analysis.  
The raw data from the infrared reflective marker positioned on the wrist was filtered 
using a low-pass second-order Butterworth filter, with a cut-off frequency of 10 Hz, and 
analysed using customised code written in Matlab (The MathWorks, USA). The 
beginning and end of each movement was defined using a velocity-based criterion of 
50mm/s. The trajectories were translated, such that the first reading of the wrist marker 
using the velocity-based criterion was taken as the origin of the trajectory for X and Z 
(i.e. 0, 0, in 3D Cartesian space, X = horizontal, Z = vertical). However, to allow for the 
analysis of Z deviation at Y coordinates corresponding to obstacle location, the original Y 
coordinates of the wrist IRED were used (as the wrist marker trajectory started in 
negative coordinates, with the start button calibrated as 0). Trajectories were normalised 
to movement time such that they had 100 position measurements, allowing for averaging. 
For each trial the following measures were calculated: reaction time (time in ms from 
trial commencement to button release), movement time (time taken between the start and 
end of movement, with the start and end defined by the velocity criteria stated above), 
time to peak velocity (time taken in ms from movement start [based on velocity criteria] 
to peak velocity), peak velocity (maximum velocity in mm/s achieved during movement) 
and the Z coordinate @ 220 (the height Z-deviation in mm when the wrist passed above 
the obstacle position [i.e., 220 mm in depth (Y) from start button]).  
Results & Discussion 
All dependent measures were calculated for every trial, and then averaged for each 
condition (see Table 4), and subjected to a one-way within-subjects ANOVA. Where 
sphericity assumptions were violated, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. Post-hoc comparisons were Holm-
Bonferroni corrected and significant values were set at p < .05 (two-tailed). 
Kinematic measures 
There was a significant effect of obstacle (own, experimenter’s or no obstacle) on 
reaction time, F (2, 18) = 4.987, p = .019, ηp2 = .357. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
participants were significantly slower to commence their movement in the no obstacle 
condition (M = 390, SD = 87 ms), compared with when the experimenter’s mug was 
present (M = 348, SD = 90 ms), t(9) = 4.1, p = .003 (two-tailed). There were no 
significant differences when comparing reaction time for own vs no obstacle (M = 362, 
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SD = 99 vs M = 390, SD = 87 ms), t(9) = 1.574, p = .150 (two-tailed); and experimenter’s 
vs own (M = 348, SD = 90 vs M = 362, SD = 99 ms), t(9) = 1.234, p = .248 (two-tailed). 
This unanticipated effect may be a result of the lower frequency of no obstacle trials, 
occurring on one third of trials, compared with an obstacle being present for two thirds of 
trials.  
 
Table 4 
Means by obstacle condition (Own, Experimenter’s No Obstacle) for each dependent 
measure.  
Dependent measure Condition 
 Own Experimenter’s No obstacle 
Reaction time (ms) 362 (99) 348 (90) 390 (87) 
Movement time (ms) 643 (99) 656 (116)  651 (106) 
Peak velocity (mm/s) 1527 (255) 1490 (260) 1469 (247) 
Time to PV (ms) 289 (39) 289 (40) 293 (46) 
Z-deviation @ 220 (mm) 148.2 (13.1) 148.4 (12.8) 116.5 (31.3) 
Z @ 400 (mm) 118.4 (12.6) 120.4 (13.2) 95.9 (29) 
Note. Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. 
 
Contrary to our prediction that the temporal elements of movements would be 
increased when reaching in the presence of an obstacle and mediated by ownership status, 
there was no significant effect of obstacle on movement time, F(2, 18) = .763, p = .481, 
ηp2 = .078, peak velocity [F(2, 18) = 2.480, p = .112, ηp2 = .216], or time to peak 
velocity [F(1.174, 10.565) = .304, p = .629, ηp2 = .033]. This absence of effect is 
surprising. Although Verheij et al. (2014) did not observe consistent mediation of 
movement time as a function of reaching in the presence of an obstacle or not, other 
obstacle avoidance task set-ups do frequently elicit differences in peak velocity and 
movement time, with movements slowed when reaching in the presence of an obstacle, 
particularly on the right hand side (e.g., Chapman & Goodale, 2008; Chapman & 
Goodale, 2010). The obstacles recruited in the current study were three times taller (9 cm 
vs 3 cm) than those used by Verheij et al. (2014), therefore, we anticipated they would be 
more likely to alter measures of performance time, with a slowing of movement 
execution to decrease the risk of collision. However, this was not the case here.  
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Spatial measures  
For each participant, trajectories were averaged across trials for each condition, 
before being averaged and plotted per condition across all participants (see Figure 10). 
When analysing the Z-deviation at Y = 220, the depth (Y) that the middle of the obstacles 
appeared, there was a significant influence of obstacle, F(1.037, 9.331) = 17.934, p = 
.002, ηp2 = .666. 
 Pairwise comparisons revealed that, in line with our predictions, participants passed 
over the obstacle location significantly lower in the no obstacle present (M = 116.5, SD = 
31.3 mm), than experimenter’s (M =148.4, SD =12.8 mm), t(9) = 4.278, p = .006 (two-
tailed), and own obstacle condition (M = 116.5, SD = 31.3 mm), t(9) = 4.243, p = .006 
(two-tailed). However, despite anticipating that participants would further increase the 
distance between the limb and the mug in the experimenter’s condition, to minimise the 
risk of collision with an object owned by another individual, there was no significant 
difference in Z deviation when comparing own (M = 148.2, SD = 13.1) and 
experimenter’s (M = 148.4, SD = 12.8, t(9) = .171, p = 1). Unlike the absence of an effect 
of obstacle on movement time, peak velocity, and time to peak velocity, there was an 
effect of obstacle on the wrist height at the placement position, with the wrist positioned 
higher when an obstacle was present (replicating Verheij et al., 2014). However, there 
was no significant effect of obstacle ownership.  
To assess whether our non-significant effect of obstacle ownership could be due to a 
lack of statistical power, we conducted post hoc power analyses using G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) with power set at 0.80 and α = 05, two-tailed. This 
illustrated that	to obtain sufficient power (0.80, Cohen, 1988) for the effect size (dz = .05) 
obtained for the Z-deviation of own vs experimenter's obstacle, a sample size of 2652 
would be required, compared with a sample of 7 required when comparing own vs no 
obstacle (dz = 1.34, 96% power obtained within the present study). Thus, it is unlikely 
that our failure to identify an effect here can reasonably be attributed to the limited 
sample size, as the N required is unreasonably large for the discipline, and especially the 
design in question.  
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     Although not initially anticipated, presuming that participants would adopt a similar 
grasping position across obstacle and no obstacle conditions due to the instruction to 
grasp the centre of the cylinder, there was a significant effect of obstacle on Z-deviation 
at the end point of the movement, F (1.115, 10.035) = 14.319, p = .003, np2 = .614. 
Again, planned comparisons revealed that participants’ wrist position was lower when no 
object was present (M = 95.9, SD = 29 mm), compared with reaching in the presence of 
their own mug (M = 118.4; SD = 12.6; t(9) = 3.633, p = .005), and the experimenters (M 
= 120.4, SD = 13.2, t(9) = 4.062, p = .003). Again, there was no significant difference in 
final wrist position when comparing own and experimenter’s, t(9) = -1.213, p = .256. 
Although it is not possible to analyse final target grasping position as a measure of end-
point consistency due to the aforementioned index and thumb marker recording issues, 
the variation in wrist height alludes to the adoption of differing grasping points when 
obstacles were present, rather than not present. Constraining wrist and arm movement 
with obstacles does alter the grasping points selected (Voudouris, Smeets, & Brenner, 
2012; Alberts, Saling, & Stelmach, 2002), and note that the limb was nearing full 
extension at the end of the reach, reducing the range of adoptable joint angles. Therefore, 
it is possible that the mug placement physically constrained the feasible movement paths, 
which may mask any differences of ownership.  
In summary, our initial pilot study did identify deviation, but not movement time, 
differences between reach-to-grasp movements when reaching over an obstacle, or no 
obstacle. However, ownership did not appear to interact with this. It is not possible to 
dismiss that participants’ movements were physically constrained by the obstacle, 
reducing the flexibility to adapt trajectory. The failure to replicate common temporal 
effects is difficult to account for, especially if the obstacle did physically constrain 
movements. Therefore, in Experiment 5 we decided to change the owned stimuli for 
objects of a suitable height for a more traditional obstacle avoidance set-up (Chapman & 
Goodale, 2008), considering horizontal deviation away from the sides of the obstacles. 
 
Experiment 5 
Given the failure to replicate typical obstacle avoidance effects in our pilot study, in 
Experiment 5 we opted to modify a more traditional obstacle avoidance task (for 
example, see Chapman & Goodale, 2008) to incorporate obstacle ownership status as a 
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variable. As previous research indicates that shorter obstacles do not produce the same 
degree of avoidance behaviour in paradigms requiring the participant to reach between 
obstacles (Chapman & Goodale, 2008), and the mugs used in the pilot study are 
comparatively shorter than the obstacles traditionally used in 'reach-between' tasks (for 
example, 25 cm tall cylinders, Chapman & Goodale, 2008), we instead utilised 21 cm tall 
reusable water bottles as obstacles in this task.  
Participants performed reach-to-point movements directed at a target light, moving 
between two obstacles, one owned by the participant, and one belonging to the 
experimenter (one to the left and one to the right of midline; side of space was 
counterbalanced). As predicted for the pilot study, we anticipated that a ‘care’ effect 
would be observed on temporal and spatial measures would occur when the 
experimenter’s object appeared on the right, as objects on the right produce the largest 
trajectory effects when using the right hand to respond (Menger et al., 2013).  
Method 
Participants 
Utilising Chapman and Goodale's (2008) N = 20 as an acceptable sample size, 
informed consent was obtained from 28 participants from the University of East Anglia. 
All participants were naive to the purpose of the study, and took part in return for course 
credit or payment. However, motion-tracking data from five participants was corrupted, 
leaving 23 (M = 23.09, SD = 7.4 years; eight male). Participants were right-handed 
(Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and no history of neurological, or motor disorders.  
Apparatus and Stimuli  
Participants sat in a dimly lit room at a custom built 1 m × 1 m grey table, with a 
black start button (button box 32 x 22 mm, button 10 mm diameter) attached centrally to 
the front edge of the table, and a target red LED 40 cm away from the start button (see 
Figure 11). Participants wore PLATO LCD goggles to control visual feedback 
(Translucent Technologies, Toronto, Canada). Six Qualisys Oqus (Sweden) motion-
tracking cameras recorded the X, Y, and Z positions of an infrared reflective marker 
attached to the nail of the right index finger at a sampling frequency of 179 Hz.  
Two obstacles, in the form of reusable transparent plastic water bottles (21 cm tall, 
6.37 cm diameter at narrowest point, 7.96 cm diameter at widest; see Figure 10), were 
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placed to the left and right of the midline 23 cm away (depth) from the start position. The 
obstacles (bottles) were identical for the participant and the experimenter, except that the 
bottle top was either green or yellow according to who owned them. Importantly, the 
colour of bottle (obstacle) top was counterbalanced between participants (the 
experimenter always possessed the opposite colour to each participant during testing), so 
that any effects of ownership could not be simply explained by low-level or familiarity 
differences between the obstacles. 
 
 
Figure 11. Experiment 5 set up (not to scale). Centre of obstacles (water bottles) were 
placed 23 cm from edge of table and start button, 17 cm in front of target light. Two 
obstacles appeared on each trial (one to the left and one to the right of midline, either 15 
or 20 cm from midline). 
 
To ensure the experimenter placed the obstacles in the correct configuration for each 
trial, four LEDs attached to the underside of the table (which were only visible when 
illuminated) were illuminated in between trials (not visible to participants). To prevent 
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participants from using auditory cues from obstacle placement, plastic furniture buffer 
pads were attached to the base of each bottle and participants wore noise-cancelling 
headphones (Quiet Comfort, Bose, USA). A custom designed programme written in 
Matlab (The MathWorks, USA) was used to control the LED illumination, goggles, 
auditory cue, and recordings.  
Design 
In a 2 × 4 within-subjects design, participants performed reaches to the target in the 
presence of two bottles that differed in ownership status (own and experimenter’s). 
During each trial, each obstacle (own and experimenter’s bottle) appeared in one of four 
locations (15 or 20 cm left or right from table midline), resulting in eight possible 
configurations (See Figure 1): Own-In - Experimenter-In (the centre of the base at 15 cm 
from midline), Experimenter-In - Own-In (the centre at 15 cm from midline), Own-Out - 
Experimenter-Out (the centre at 20 cm from midline), Experimenter-Out - Own-Out (the 
centre of the object at 20 cm from midline), Own-In - Experimenter-Out (Left 15 cm, 
Right 20 cm away from midline), Experimenter-In - Own-Out (Left 15 cm, Right 20 cm 
away from midline), Own-Out - Experimenter-In (Left 20 cm, Right 15 cm away from 
midline), and Experimenter-Out - Own-In (Left 20 cm, Right 15 cm away from midline; 
see Figure 12). Own and Experimenter’s appeared equally on the right side and left side 
of space, resulting in eight conditions.  
 
 
Figure 12. Obstacle configuration conditions for Experiment 5.  
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The dependent variables recorded were: reaction time (time in ms from auditory go 
cue to release of start button), movement time (time in ms between start and end of 
movement), peak velocity (maximum velocity in mm/s during the movement), time to 
peak velocity (time in ms from start of movement to peak velocity), and X @ 225 (the 
deviation from midline in mm when the hand passed between the approximate centre of 
the obstacle depth, Y = 225).  
Procedure 
Ownership assignment (bottle distribution). Prior to attending the laboratory for 
the testing session, participants met with the experimenter to receive a water bottle to take 
away and use for at least three days prior to the experiment (M = 12.14, SD = 4.17 days). 
Participants were informed that they could keep the bottle (i.e., they owned it), but would 
need to bring it with them to the testing session and report details of instances when they 
used the water bottle at the start of the experiment (this manipulation was implemented to 
encourage use).   
Obstacle avoidance task. At the beginning of each trial, participants held down the 
start button with their right index finger. The PLATO goggles were in opaque 
configuration, preventing the participating from viewing the experimenter place the 
obstacles in one of the above configurations by the experimenter. The trial was triggered 
by the experimenter, who opened the goggles (transparent configuration) for a viewing 
period of 150 ms, lit the target (red LED), and initiated the motion-tracking recording for 
3 s. At the end of the viewing period, an auditory go-signal (beep, 50 Hz, 150 ms 
duration) was played, cuing the participant to quickly and accurately perform a reach-to-
point movement toward the target. Participants were told to ignore any other objects 
placed on the table, and to focus on the target. However, a viewing period was included 
in the design to ensure participants attended to the obstacles in order to process their 
ownership status, before acting. Simultaneously, with button release (i.e., at movement 
initiation) the goggles returned to opaque configuration, and thus all reaches were 
performed without visual feedback of the hand, obstacle position, and target (in open 
loop). 
Each participant completed 120 trials, with 15 repetitions for each of the eight 
obstacle configurations in a pseudo-randomised,	one-back	controlled	order. Before the 
experiment, participants were given a maximum of 10 practise trials. At the end of the 
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testing session, static recordings of the index at the start position and occluding the target 
were taken, to allow end-point accuracy calculations.  
Data processing. The raw data from the infrared reflective marker was filtered using 
a low-pass second-order Butterworth filter with a cut-off frequency of 10 Hz, and 
analysed using customised software written in Matlab. The beginning and end of each 
reach was defined using a velocity-based criterion of 50 mm/s. A trial-by-trial inspection 
was carried out to remove any trials in which participants did not complete the task 
appropriately (such as returning to start position without touching the target, or initiating 
a reach before the auditory cue), resulting in the exclusion of 61 trials, and one 
participant, from further analysis. All trajectories were translated so that the first reading 
of the index finger marker was taken as origin of the trajectory (i.e. 0, 0, 0 in 3D 
Cartesian space, X = horizontal, Y = depth, Z = vertical), and were normalised to 
movement time so they had 100 position measurements, allowing for averaging. 
For each trial, the programme extracted the following dependent measures: reaction 
time (time in ms from go-signal to release of start button), movement time (time in ms 
between start and of movement as defined by the velocity-based criteria described 
above), peak velocity (maximum velocity in mm/s during movement time), time to peak 
velocity (time in ms from start of movement to peak velocity), and the X @ 225 (the 
horizontal X-deviation in mm when the index finger passed through the obstacles [i.e., 
225 mm in depth (Y) from start button]).  
Results & Discussion 
All dependent measures were calculated for every trial, averaged for each condition 
(see Table 5), and subjected to a 2 × 4 (ownership × position) within-subjects ANOVA. 
Where sphericity assumptions were violated, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. Post-hoc comparisons were Bonferroni 
corrected. Significant values were set at p < 0.05 (two-tailed). 
Spatial measures 
X@225. For each participant, trajectories were averaged across trials for each 
condition, before being averaged and plotted per condition across all participants (see 
Figure 12). As the distance between the obstacle and the index finger was expected to be 
greatest at around the point the hand passed through the water bottles, the values of X per 
condition at Y = 225 were subjected to a 4 × 2 ANOVA.  
EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP ON ACTION 
 
	
95 
 
There was a significant main effect of position at Y = 225 [F(3, 63) = 45.439, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .684]. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that all obstacle configurations 
produced significantly different X-deviations as the finger passed through the water 
bottles. 
 
Table 5 
Averages by condition (ownership by orientation) for each dependent measure 
  
 
 
Obstacle orientation  
 
Object 
on right 
 
In - In Out - Out In - Out Out - In 
RT (ms) Own  372 (100) 371 (92) 377 (97) 376 (99) 
 
Exp 370 (103) 374 (89) 372.8 (90) 384 (97) 
MT (ms) Own 535 (84) 521 (83) 520 (83) 524 (84) 
 
Exp 527 (85) 519 (82) 516 (76) 523 (77) 
PV (mm/s) Own 1618 (289) 1647 (281) 1642 (290) 1640 (303) 
 
Exp 1642 (323) 1656 (299) 1670 (285) 1628 (295) 
TPV (ms) Own 201 (32) 199 (36) 197 (34) 196 (31) 
 
Exp 203 (36) 199 (33) 198 (31) 203 (35) 
X @ 225 Own  -16 (14.6) -12.11 (14.8) -9.5 (13.7) -17.9 (14.9) 
 Exp -16 (14.1) -12.9 (15.1) -9.3 (12.9) -18.4 (14.9) 
Note. Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. 
 
Broadly, these comparisons (see Table 6) revealed participants deviated further away 
from the right object in the ‘In - In’ configuration, compared with the ‘Out - Out’ 
position. When presented with the ‘Out - In’ and ‘In - Out’ configurations, participants 
moved in the opposite direction, away from, the object placed closest to midline. These 
deviation differences confirm that a basic obstacle avoidance effect was successfully 
replicated (for example, see Chapman & Goodale, 2008).  
However, contrary to our prediction that greater X-deviation would be observed when 
the experimenter’s obstacle appeared on the right, neither ownership [F (1, 21) = .565, p 
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= .461, ηp2 = .026], nor configuration × ownership [F (2.016, 42.326) = .619, p = .544, 
ηp2 = .029], were significant.  
To assess whether our non-significant effect of obstacle ownership was due to a lack 
of statistical power, we conducted post hoc power analyses using G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) with power set at 0.80 and α = 05, two-tailed. This 
illustrated that	to obtain sufficient power (0.80, Cohen, 1988) for the observed effect size 
(dz = .27, 23% power obtained) for the X-deviation of own vs experimenter's obstacle 
(right side, averaged over configuration), a sample size of 109 would be required. Thus, 
the present study was potentially underpowered and we cannot rule out that there was an 
effect of obstacle ownership to be identified, but the sample size required to detect the 
effect size observed illustrates its small magnitude.  
 
Table 6 
Means and comparisons of X deviation for the main effect of configuration (averaged 
across ownership). Standard deviations displayed in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05 (Holm-Bonferroni corrected, two-tailed). 
 
A lack of effect of ownership in the present task context was surprising as the plotted 
averaged trajectories (see Figure 13) are suggestive of potential deviation differences as a 
function of ownership in the ‘Out – Out’ condition.  
Configurations M (SD) mm N df t 
In - in  -  out - out -16 (14.3); -12.5 (14.9) 22 21 -4.209** 
In - in  -  in - out -16 (14.3); -9.4 (13.3) 22 21 -9.481** 
In - in  -  out - in -16 (14.3); -18.1 (14.8) 22 21 2.946* 
Out - out   -  in - out -12.5 (14.9); -9.4 (13.3) 22 21 -3.799** 
Out - out  - out - in -12.5 (14.9); -18.1 (14.8) 22 21 7.404** 
In - out  -  out - in -9.4 (13.3); -18.1 (14.8) 22 21 8.845** 
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Figure 13. Average trajectories (X, Y) by configuration condition. Shaded area illustrates 
depth of obstacles. 
 
It is important to note that trajectory deviation differences resulting from identity-
related features present in prior studies are subtle. For example, De Haan et al. (2014) 
only observed a ‘shift’ of 3.3 mm between the averages of passing full and empty water 
glasses placed on the right. A dual obstacle configuration, as our task used, restricts 
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trajectory deviation compared with only one obstacle appearing to the left or right of 
midline (Chapman & Goodale, 2010a), especially as participants were already generally 
deviating more leftward in their movements than typically observed. Although not 
significant (p = .152, two-tailed), there was a mean deviation of 2.39 mm (SD = 7.37) 
away from the experimenter’s on the right (vs. own) for the condition that allowed the 
greatest path deviation at Y = 250.  Given this, and that previous research reporting 
identity effects during obstacle avoidance used one obstacle designs (De Haan et al., 
2014; Kangur et al., 2017); if ownership does influence obstacle avoidance, a task 
utilising only one obstacle may better allow subtle ownership effects to be revealed. 
 Kinematic measures 
Reaction time. There were no significant main effects or interactions for reaction 
time, F (1, 21) < 1.5. However, given that participants were allocated a viewing period 
and asked to respond upon receiving an auditory cue, no reaction time differences were 
expected.  
Movement time. There was a significant main effect of position on movement time, 
F (3, 63) = 4.819, p = .004, ηp2 = .187. Post-hoc tests revealed participants were 
significantly slower to complete their reaches when the obstacles were positioned in the 
‘In - In’ configuration (M = 531, SD = 84), compared with the ‘Out - Out’ (M = 520, SD 
= 82, t(21) = 3.143, p = .03), and ‘In - Out’ placements (M = 518, SD = 79), t(21) = 
3.111, p = .03. There were no significant differences when comparing the other 
configurations (p > 0.3).  
Unlike our initial pilot study, our finding that decreasing the distance between the two 
obstacles (i.e., the ‘In -In’ condition, compared with the ‘Out - Out’, or ‘In - Out’ 
condition) increased movement time suggests that our obstacle configuration affected the 
speed of the movement, mirroring the findings of previous obstacle avoidance studies (for 
examples, see Chapman & Goodale, 2008; Chapman & Goodale, 2010a, Mon-Williams 
et al., 2001). Contrary to our prediction, ownership status did not significantly effect 
movement time; no main effect or interaction was found (ownership: F (1, 21) = 2.185, p 
= .154, ηp2 = .094; ownership × position interaction: F(3, 63) = .556, p = .646, ηp2 = 
.026). 
Peak velocity. We anticipated we would find a significant main effect of position on 
peak velocity, given that other studies observed reduced peak velocity when reaching 
between obstacles placed closer to midline and on the right side (Chapman & Goodale, 
2008). There was a trend toward a main effect of position; with reduced peak velocity in 
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the ‘In - In’ (M = 1630, SD = 304) and ‘Out - In’ (M = 1634, SD = 295) condition, 
compared with the ‘In - Out’ (M = 1656, SD = 287) and ‘Out - Out’ (M = 1652, SD = 
288), but the main effect narrowly failed to reach significance, F(3, 63) = 2.55, p = .064, 
ηp2 = .10. There was no significant main effect of ownership [F(1, 21) = 1.647, p = .213, 
ηp2 = .073] and no significant ownership × position interaction [F(3, 63) = 1.452, p = 
.236, ηp2 =  .065].  
Time to peak velocity. In line with Chapman and Goodale (2008), who failed to 
observe an effect of obstacle position on time to peak velocity; there was no significant 
main effect of position on time to peak velocity, F(1.885, 39.581) = .975, p = .382, ηp2 = 
.044, and ownership did not interact with position, F(1.997, 41.933) = 1.271, p = .291, 
ηp2 = .057. 
However, there was a significant main effect of ownership for time to peak velocity, 
F (1,21) = 4.666, p = .042, ηp2 = .182. Participants took longer to reach peak velocity 
when the obstacle on the right belonged to the experimenter compared with their own 
obstacle appearing on the right (M = 201, SD = 33 vs M = 198, SD = 32, respectively).  
This length of time to peak velocity effect is surprising given that De Haan et al. 
(2014) observed no effect of object identity on this temporal measure, making our finding 
difficult to interpret, especially in the absence of other variables influenced by ownership.  
In summary, Experiment 5 successfully replicated Chapman and Goodale’s (2008) 
typical obstacle avoidance effects, however, we only found that one kinematic variable 
was affected by ownership, and no trajectory effects were observed. In previous studies 
identifying influences of higher-order object features influencing obstacle avoidance, 
participants completed the reaches under sufficiently different conditions to that of 
‘traditional’ obstacle avoidance tasks. For example, in De Haan et al. (2014), participants 
performed reaches in closed loop (vision during movement) conditions, with only one 
obstacle present in the workspace. Completing reaches in the presence of only one 
obstacle (vs two) is known to elicit greater trajectory deviation (Chapman & Goodale, 
2010a). Ownership, and other higher-order features of objects, may become irrelevant to 
the actor in a context where movements must be navigated to avoid two obstacles, as 
when reaching between two objects, a movement trajectory is constructed to maintain 
distance between both objects, centering the hand between the two. It is, therefore, not 
possible to draw firm conclusions concerning the absence of an influence of ownership 
from Experiment 5, as two obstacle locations had to be considered when planning 
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movements. In Experiment 6, we decided to adapt the obstacle avoidance design from De 
Haan et al. (2014), incorporating ownership, rather than water glass content, as our 
higher-order variable of interest.  
 
Experiment 6 
In Experiment 5, we successfully replicated a typical obstacle avoidance effect, with 
obstacle position mediating movement time and passing distance as the index finger 
passed by the location of the obstacles. Time to peak velocity did exhibit a main effect of 
ownership, but this finding is difficult to interpret given that other studies considering the 
influence of higher-order features on obstacle avoidance have found no influence of 
identity features on time to peak velocity (see De Haan et al., 2014). However, we failed 
to observe differences as a result of ownership in our primary variable of interest, X-
deviation. 
 Given that trajectory deviations observed in prior studies are subtle (mean difference, 
as a function of glass content on right side of space, of 3.3 mm in De Haan et al., 2014), 
and two obstacle set up’s reduce trajectory deviation as a preferred distance is kept 
between both obstacles (Chapman & Goodale, 2010a), the task may have restricted the 
opportunity to alter deviation in response to ownership status, as the action system plans 
to avoid collision with both items, which is arguably more complex than avoiding one 
object. Practically, there is also only so much deviation one can perform in a reach when 
flanked by two objects.  
In order to reduce the obstacle set up to one item to be avoided, and be better able to 
draw comparisons about the influence of higher-order features on obstacle avoidance, in 
Experiment 6, we adapted the task in De Haan et al. (2014), incorporating ownership 
status as our variable of interest. In addition to obstacle number, this task does differ from 
Experiment 5 on a number of other features, in order to replicate their task set-up, 
providing visual feedback throughout the reach, and allowing a longer, jittered viewing 
period before movement initiation is cued. To allow direct comparison of our obtained 
results with De Haan et al. (2014), we kept the features of this task (closed loop 
movement performance) that differed from core features of Experiment 5. Although 
much of our obstacle avoidance behaviour is assumed to be determined during movement 
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utilise visual feedback online, when available, to quickly and efficiently perform 
corrections to movements, for example, in response to ‘jumps’ in obstacle position 
(Chapman & Goodale, 2010b). This means that any alteration of the spatial or temporal 
parameters of movements observed under closed loop (vision available) conditions 
cannot be as easily attributed to movement preparation processes, as much obstacle 
avoidance work aims to do.  
Therefore, we added an additional open loop (no visual feedback during movement) 
block after the primary replication block, to compare with the performance in the vision-
available condition. If we obtained an avoidance effect in the vision available block (as in 
De Haan et al., 2014), but not in the open loop (no vision) block, this may be suggestive 
of an influence of ownership not on the planning of movements, but during movement 
execution. If we achieved this pattern of findings, it may also be somewhat informative 
about our failure to observe ownership effects in the previous two experiments, that 
utilised open loop action performance conditions.  
Similarly to Experiment 5, we anticipated that participants would deviate further 
away from the obstacle owned by the experimenter, compared with their own, when the 
obstacle appeared on the right side of space. 
Method 
Participants 
Recruiting de Haan et al.'s (2014) N = 17 as a guideline for required sample size, 
twenty female students (M = 19.35, SD = 0.79 years) from the University of East Anglia 
participated in exchange for course credit. However, one participant failed to attend the 
laboratory for the second session, leaving nineteen. All were right handed, reported 
having normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and had no history of motor or neurological 
disorders (Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971).  
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Participants sat at a 1 m × 1 m grey table. The set up broadly replicated De Haan et al. 
(2014), with a black start button (button box 32 mm x 22 mm, button 10 mm in diameter) 
attached centrally 10 cm from the front edge of the table, and a target red LED displayed 
40cm away from the centre of the start button (see Figure 14). De Haan et al. (2014) 
utilised a second button for the reach target, but this set up was not achievable. 
Participants wore PLATO LCD goggles to control visual feedback (Translucent 
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Technologies, Toronto, Canada). Six Qualisys Oqus (Sweden) motion-tracking cameras 
recorded the X, Y, Z positions of an infrared reflective marker attached to the nail of the 
right index finger and centre of the wrist, at a sampling frequency of 179 Hz. 
As in Experiment 5, reusable transparent plastic water bottles (21 cm tall, 7.96 cm 
diameter at widest point) were used as obstacles, the bottles, one belonging to the 
participant and one to the experimenter, had either yellow or green mouthpieces, with 
assigned colour counterbalanced. They were placed to the left or right of midline (8 cm 
from virtual midline), 22 cm from the start position (see Figure 14).   
 
 
Figure 14. Experimental set-up (not to scale) for Experiment 6. Participants were seated 
in front of a push button, positioned 10 cm from the front edge of the table. A target light 
appeared 40 cm from the push button, with an obstacle (when present) appearing 22 cm 
from the start button, 8 cm to the left or right of midline.  
 
To aid the researcher in placing the obstacles, two LEDs attached to the underside of 
the table were illuminated in between trials (not visible to participants). To prevent 
participants using auditory cues from obstacle placement, felt furniture buffer pads were 
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attached to the base of each bottle and participants wore noise-cancelling headphones 
(Quiet Comfort, Bose, USA). A programme written in Matlab (The MathWorks, USA) 
controlled LED illumination, the triggering of the goggles, the onset and offset of the 
auditory go cue and recordings.  
Design 
A 2 × 2 × 2 within-subjects design manipulated obstacle (own and experimenter’s), 
side (left and right), and vision (vision or no vision). Participants performed reach-to-
point movements toward an LED target, with water bottles, belonging to themself or the 
researcher (or no obstacle), appearing to the left or right of the target. They performed 
one block of trials with visual feedback available during the reach (closed loop), and a 
further block with no visual feedback during the reach (open loop, as in Experiment 5). 
As the closed loop condition was of primary interest, this block was always completed 
first.  
The dependent variables recorded were reaction time (time in ms from the go-signal 
to release of the start button), movement time (time in ms between start and end of 
movement, defined by the velocity criterion described above), peak velocity (maximum 
velocity in mm/s during movement time), time to peak velocity (time in ms from start of 
movement to peak velocity), and passing distance at y = 220 (the horizontal X-deviation 
in mm when the index finger passed the centre of the obstacle [i.e., 220 mm in depth (Y) 
from start button]). 
Procedure 
Ownership assignment. Prior to attending the laboratory to complete the task, 
participants received a water bottle to take away and use for at least one week prior to the 
experiment (M = 13.05, SD = 5.37 days). Participants saw the researcher’s water bottle 
(opposite colour to the bottle assigned to the participant), containing water during this 
initial session. Participants were told that they could keep the bottle (i.e., they owned it), 
but would need to bring it with them to the testing session and report details of instances 
when they used the water bottle at the start of the experiment (this instruction was 
delivered to encourage use).   
Task. Participants were asked to perform quick and accurate reach-to-point 
movements to occlude a red LED target, appearing on the table. Prior to the task, 
participants were informed that their own and the researcher’s water bottle, would appear 
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on the table during some trials. Participants completed two blocks, one with vision during 
the execution of the pointing movement, and one without visual feedback.  At the 
beginning of each trial, the participant held down the start button with their right index 
finger. The PLATO goggles were in opaque configuration preventing the participating 
from viewing the experimenter place the obstacles. To provide the same inter-trial 
experience for the participant across all obstacle conditions, both water bottles were 
placed on the table, before removing one or both.  
The trial was triggered by the experimenter, who opened the goggles (transparent 
configuration) for a viewing period of between 800-1200 ms (randomly generated), 
activated the target (red LED), and initiated the motion-tracking recording for 3000 ms. 
At the end of the viewing period, an auditory go-signal (50 Hz, 150 ms duration) was 
played, cuing the participant to quickly and accurately perform a reach-to-point 
movement toward the target. In the closed loop condition, upon completing the 
movement, the researcher manually triggered the PLATO goggles to return to an opaque 
configuration to set up the next trial.   
In the open loop block, simultaneously with button release (i.e., at movement 
initiation), the goggles returned to opaque configuration, and the reaches were performed 
without visual feedback of the hand, obstacle, and target. Participants completed 90 trials 
in total; 45 trials in each block, with 9 repetitions for each of the 5 obstacle configurations 
in a pseudo-randomised,	one-back	controlled	order. The closed loop (visual feedback 
available) block was always completed first. Participants completed a maximum of 10 
practise trials.  
Data processing. The raw data from the infrared reflective markers was filtered using 
a low-pass second-order Butterworth filter with a cut-off frequency of 10Hz. A trial-by-
trial inspection was completed to eliminate trials where participants did not complete the 
task appropriately, resulting in the exclusion of 29 trials, and one participant, from further 
analysis. A further participant was excluded due to incorrect starting position resulting in 
an extreme leftward bias on all reaches. The beginning and end of each reach was defined 
using velocity-based criterion of 50 mm/s. All trajectories were translated, such that the 
first reading of the index finger marker was taken as the horizontal (X - width) origin of 
the trajectory. The true vertical starting coordinate (Y - depth) was maintained. 
Trajectories were normalised to movement time such that they had 100 position 
measurements, allowing for averaging.  
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Results & Discussion 
All dependent measures were calculated for every trial and averaged for each 
condition (see Table 7). A within-subjects 2 × 2 × 2 (vision × side × ownership) ANOVA 
was conducted for each dependent variable. 
Spatial measures 
X@220. For illustrative purposes, trajectories were averaged across trials for each 
condition, along with the baseline no obstacle reaches (see Figure 15). To analyse passing 
distance, Y = 220 (the depth of the centre of the obstacle) was chosen as the distance 
from which to extract X-coordinates (horizontal deviation), which were then averaged 
across trials for each condition. 
 
Table 7 
Means by condition for each dependent measure. 
  
 
Own                                          Experimenter’s 
 
Dependent 
measure 
Feedback 
condition 
 
Left Right Left Right 
RT (ms) Vision 289 (59) 289 (59) 292 (53) 294 (44) 
 
No vision 335 (97) 316 (85) 312 (94) 326 (72) 
MT (ms) Vision 568 (85) 599 (76)  561 (81) 597 (73) 
 
No vision 570 (95) 602 (101) 558 (90) 602 (111)  
PV (mm/s) Vision 1483 (235) 1435 (228) 1494 (249) 1428 (224) 
 No vision 1505 (353) 1450 (339) 1490 (306) 1437 (330) 
TPV (ms) Vision 192 (34) 203 (43) 188 (41) 202 (41) 
 
No vision 196 (36) 199 (44) 196 (42) 203 (36) 
X@220 Vision  5.6 (3.7) -30.6 (11.8) 5.2 (5.3) -30 (13.2) 
 No vision 2.2 (9.5) -29.6 (10.6) 4 (8.9) -31.1 (12.5) 
Note. RT (reaction time), MT (movement time), PV (peak velocity), TPV (time to peak 
velocity), X@220 (horizontal deviation at y = 220).  
 
As anticipated, given findings from Experiment 5 and other obstacle avoidance work 
EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP ON ACTION 
 
	
106 
 
(Chapman & Goodale, 2008, De Haan et al., 2014), there was a significant main effect of 
side, F(1, 16) = 135.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .894. Participants deviated more when the 
obstacle appeared to the right of midline (M = -30.3, SD = 11.1 mm), compared with the 
left (M = 4.3, SD = 5.7 mm). Contrary to our prediction that participants would deviate 
more when the experimenter’s bottle appeared on the right side of space, both with and 
without vision, the ownership × side interaction was not significant, F(1, 16) = 2.796, p = 
.114, ηp2 = .149. The main effects of vision and ownership [F(1, 16) > 1], vision by side, 
and vision by ownership, [F(1, 16) > 3] were not significant. However, the three-way 
interaction narrowly missed significance, F(1, 16) = 4.184, p = .058, ηp2 = .207. To 
investigate this trend, a two-way ANOVA was conducted for each block (vision and no 
vision).  
Closed loop (with visual feedback). There was a significant main effect of side, F(1, 
16) = 124.337 p < .001, ηp2 = .886, but not of ownership [F(1, 16) = .043, p = .838, ηp2 = 
.003], and no significant interaction [F(1, 16) = .495, p = .492, ηp2 = .03]. In line with 
Experiment 5, participants deviated more in response to an obstacle appearing on the 
right (M = -30.3, SD = 12 mm), compared with reaching in the presence of an obstacle on 
the left (M = 5.4, SD = 4.1 mm). However, contrary to our predictions based on findings 
that greater physical consequences of collision influence movement deviation when 
visual feedback is available (De Haan et al., 2014), ownership did not mediate deviation 
under such conditions.  
Open loop (without feedback). Again, a significant main effect of side was 
observed, F(1, 16) = 7.421, p = .015, ηp2 = .317, with average X-deviation away from the 
obstacle greater when it appeared on the right; and the main effect of ownership was not 
significant [F(1, 16) = .132, p = .721, ηp2 = .008]. 
In contrast to the closed loop block, there was a significant ownership × side 
interaction [F(1, 16) = 6119.609, p < .001, ηp2 = .882. Planned comparisons indicated 
that when reaching in the presence of an obstacle, participants deviated further away from 
the experimenter’s obstacle, compared with their own, but only when placed on the left, 
t(16) = -3.088, p = .007 (two-tailed). There was no significant difference between 
deviation when the experimenter’s or participant’s own was placed on the right, t(16) = 
1.43, p = .172 (two-tailed).  
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Figure 15. Average trajectories (X, Y) by condition (own or experimenter’s obstacle 
when appearing to the left and right of midline), for visual feedback and no visual 
feedback. Shaded area illustrates depth of obstacles.  
 
Participants in De Haan et al. (2014) only performed movements under closed loop 
(visual feedback conditions), and an effect of identity on passing distance was only 
observed when the glass appeared on the right. Therefore, when considering the lack of 
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an effect of ownership on X-deviation in the visual feedback block, it is surprising that 
we failed to observe an effect of ownership. It is unlikely that practice or carryover 
effects are responsible for introducing this ownership effect in the no vision block, as a 
difference in only certain conditions emerged, rather than generically across reaches. 
However, counterbalancing block order or reversing block order would be worthy of 
attention in a follow-up study. We elected not to counterbalance in the current study to 
more easily compare findings from De Haan et al. (2014) with our results.   
Temporal measures 
Reaction time. There was a significant main effect of vision, F(1, 16) = 7.868, p = 
.013, ηp2 = .330. Participants took longer to respond after the tone in the no vision 
condition (M = 322, SD = 76), compared with vision (M = 291, SD = 49). No other main 
effects or interactions were significant [F(1, 16) > 1]. Reaction time differences were not 
expected as participants received a viewing period of 800-1200 ms before being cued to 
respond to perform a simple movement. The slightly longer response time in the no 
vision block was likely due to movement planning prior to initiation, given that online 
control would be restricted when visual feedback was removed.   
Movement time. Unlike reaction time, there was no significant main effect of vision 
on movement time, F(1, 16) < .1. However, there was a significant main effect of side of 
space, F(1, 16) = 29.985, p < .001, ηp2 = .652. Movements were slower when the 
obstacle appeared on the right (M = 600, SD = 82 ms), compared with left (M = 554, SD 
= 20 ms). The main effect of ownership narrowly missed significance, F(1, 16) = 4.103, p 
= .06, ηp2 = .204, but was superseded by a significant 2-way ownership by side 
interaction, F(1, 16) = 6.618, p = .02, ηp2 = .293.  
Simple main effects analysis indicated that average movement time was slower than 
when their own object appeared on the left (M = 569, SD = 85), compared with the 
experimenter’s on the left (M = 559, SD = 81), t(16) = 3.017, p = .016 (two-tailed, Holm-
Bonferroni corrected). There was no significant difference for ownership on the right side 
of space, t(16) = .226, p =  .412. The two-way interactions vision × side and vision × 
ownership, and the 3-way vision × side × ownership, were not significant [F(1, 16) < .5].  
Peak velocity and time to peak velocity. Contrary to De Haan et al. (2014), who 
found no effect of position on peak velocity, a significant main effect of side was 
observed in both the closed loop and open loop conditions, F(1, 16) = 10.985, p = .004, 
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ηp2 = .407. Participants achieved greater peak velocity when the obstacle appeared on the 
left (M =1493, SD = 265 mm/s) compared with the right (M = 1438, SD = 253 mm/s).  
However, there was no significant main effect of vision or ownership, and no 
significant interactions [F(1, 16) < 1.5]. Similarly, there was a main effect of side for time 
to peak velocity [F(1, 16) = 6.086, p = .025, ηp2 = .276]. Participants took longer to 
achieve peak velocity when the obstacle appeared on the right side (M = 206, SD = 33) 
vs left (M = 197, SD = 32). All other main effects and interactions were non-significant 
[F(1, 16) > 2].  
Given that other studies have observed reduced peak velocity and increased 
movement time when reaching between obstacles placed closer to midline and on the 
right side, this effect is not surprising (for example, see Chapman & Goodale, 2008). It is 
possible that the irregular shape of the water bottles used as obstacles in our task may 
have been more obstructing, and therefore movements were planned and executed with 
more caution (regardless of identity), than movements produced in the presence of the 
cylindrical glasses De Haan et al. (2014) adopted as obstacles. The average X-deviation 
observed for the obstacle placed on the right side of space, was slightly larger in our 
study than the passing distance they observed, also eluding to the possibility that our 
obstacles may have been more ‘obstructing’. However, in general, the core obstacle 
avoidance effect observed is consistent with that reported by De Haan et al. (2014), and 
the rest of the literature (for example, see Chapman & Goodale, 2008, Chapman & 
Goodale, 2010a).   
General discussion 
The purpose of the experiments presented in this chapter was to extend findings 
concerning the effects of ownership status on action beyond the context of object-directed 
movement (see Constable et al., 2011, 2014, 2016), investigating whether higher-order 
knowledge of ownership status influences movement kinematics when self and 
experimenter-owned objects are obstacles, rather than targets. Obstacle avoidance is 
assumed to be predominantly underpinned by the dorsal stream (Goodale & Milner, 
1992, Milner & Goodale, 2008), but there is evidence to suggest features of objects 
processed outside the realm of the dorsal network do influence obstacle avoidance (De 
Haan et al., 2014, Kangur et al. 2017). Ownership represents another such feature, but 
had yet to be investigated. Broadly, Experiment 6 found that ownership status appears to 
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be another non-spatial identity-related feature that can influence obstacle avoidance. 
However, the lack of effect observed in Experiment 5, and subtleties of the results in 
Experiment 6, suggests that this only occurs under certain conditions. 
In the pilot study, we initially trialed a task set-up less normatively adopted in order 
to investigate obstacle avoidance; requiring participants to reach over obstacles of 
differing ownership status. Rather than initially recruiting a more normative obstacle 
avoidance task, this design was piloted in order to allow the recruitment of owned objects 
that have yielded action-related ownership effects in both our own, and others, studies of 
motor control; coffee mugs. Given findings that shorter obstacles exert less influence on 
horizontal deviation of movements in general (Chapman & Goodale, 2008), we attempted 
to replicate a general avoidance effect in a task requiring participants to reach over 
obstacles. However, this design failed to elicit typical obstacle avoidance findings, 
regardless of ownership status. Given that this task set-up did not produce typical 
obstacle avoidance behaviour, in Experiment 5, we adapted a traditional obstacle 
avoidance task (Chapman & Goodale, 2008), utilising reusable water bottles as obstacles 
of differing ownership status (own or experimenter’s). After a short preview period, 
participants performed reaches toward a target light, reaching between two obstacles. 
They had no visual feedback of obstacle position, hand, or target once they had 
commenced their movement. In accordance with previous research (Biegstraaten et al., 
2003, Chapman & Goodale, 2008, Chapman & Goodale, 2010a, Menger et al., 2013, 
Mon-Williams & McIntosh, 2000, Mon-Williams et al., 2001, Tipper et al., 1997, 
Tresilian, 1998), we successfully replicated a traditional obstacle avoidance effect with 
this task; with more deviation away from the object on the right side of space when it was 
closer to the participant, and slower movements under these conditions.  
In establishing whether ownership status mediated avoidance behaviour, we were 
most interested in the X-deviation measure at the point the index finger passed the 
obstacles. However, no differences in deviation as a function of ownership were observed 
in Experiment 5. A main effect of ownership status on time to peak velocity was 
observed, with participants taking longer to reach peak velocity when the object on the 
right belonged to the experimenter (vs. own on right). However, this effect is difficult to 
interpret as previous research has not identified any influence of identity-related features 
on time to peak velocity (De Haan et al., 2014, Kangur et al., 2017), and it failed to 
replicate in Experiment 6. Although note, as outlined previously, the set up of our task 
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made drawing comparisons between other research investigating identity-related features 
and Experiment 5 difficult. To ensure that the dual obstacle configuration adopted, which 
restricts the potential for limb deviation, was not limiting possible ownership effects (due 
to, arguably, increased movement complexity), in Experiment 6, we chose to adapt the 
task from De Haan et al. (2014), substituting water glass content for ownership status. 
The recruitment of this task also facilitated direct comparison of results with their finding 
that obstacle identity mediated avoidance behaviour.  
In Experiment 6, participants again performed reaches toward a target light. However, 
only one obstacle was presented to the left or right of midline, and the viewing period 
before the auditory go-signal was significantly extended. Participants also completed one 
block with visual feedback of the obstacle, hand, and target, but an open loop (no vision) 
block was also conducted subsequent to the closed loop block.  
In line with Experiment 5 and the obstacle avoidance literature, we again successfully 
replicated a typical obstacle avoidance response. When the obstacle appeared on the 
right, compared with the left, movement time was increased, peak velocity was reduced, 
and movements veered away from the obstacle to a greater degree. Unlike Experiment 5, 
in addition to observing typical obstacle avoidance behaviour, there was some evidence 
that ownership status also influenced movement deviation, with participants veering 
further away from the obstacle when it belonged to the experimenter, compared with the 
‘self-owned’ obstacle. However, this effect was only observed in the no vision (open 
loop) block, and contrary to what we anticipated, this effect was only significant for 
obstacle placement on the left side of space. Participants in De Haan et al. (2014) only 
performed movements under closed loop (visual feedback conditions), and an effect of 
identity on passing distance was only observed when the glass appeared on the right. 
Therefore, our pattern of effects, namely a lack of effect in the visual feedback block, and 
presence of an effect when the experimenter’s appeared on the left during the open loop 
block, initially appears irregular when contrasted with that of De Haan and colleagues.  
It is assumed that the influence of higher order features of obstacles on avoidance 
responses is due to the consequences of collision associated with those features. The 
consequences of collision in De Haan et al. (2014) were physical (and potentially 
dangerous!); knocking over a full glass of water may be a more salient and worrisome 
consequence than the faux pas of colliding with someone’s item (that is not breakable). In 
Experiment 6, the salience of ownership, and the associated consequences of colliding 
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with an object belonging to another person, may only be sufficiently salient in order to 
influence trajectory when no online control is available. This may beg the question as to 
why we failed to observe ownership-related effects in the open loop task set-up in 
Experiment 5. However, the obstacle set-up within Experiment 6 saw the obstacles 
placed closer to midline than the positioning adopted in Experiment 5, increasing the 
possibility of collision (and therefore requiring greater care) than Experiment 5, while 
removing the second obstacle allowed greater deviation.  
Although much of our obstacle avoidance behaviour is assumed to be determined 
during movement planning, prior to execution (Goodale & Milner, 1992, Milner & 
Goodale, 2008), when available, we do utilise visual feedback online (Chapman & 
Goodale, 2010b). Therefore, the lack of ability to perform online corrections to avoid 
collision, especially after completing the task with visual feedback, may have made 
participants more sensitive to ownership and the costs of knocking over the 
experimenter’s object, resulting in a greater deviation away from the obstacle owned by 
the experimenter. Removal of vision may be the further ‘boost’ needed to increase the 
salience of the ramifications of collision under our task conditions. In future studies, 
further increasing the consequences of collision by using more fragile objects, or those 
with greater sentimental value, may strengthen the avoidance response observed in our 
study, and render the effect observable under visual feedback conditions. 
The finding that under no vision conditions, ownership status only influenced X-
deviation when the object appeared on the left is also contrary to what we anticipated, 
based on previous work that only found an effect of identity when the obstacle appeared 
on the right (De Haan et al., 2014). However, it is worth noting that the difference 
between X-deviation when comparing own and experimenter’s obstacle on the right is 
similar to the significant difference in deviation as a function of ownership for the left 
side of space, but there was greater variance for the right side of space condition, 
compared with the left. Why movements varied more in response to the right obstacle is 
somewhat unclear. It is possible that inconsistent starting posture caused more variance in 
the movements produced when the obstacle appeared on the right hand side. There is 
evidence that wrist position (when the wrist is placed slightly diagonally across the table 
with the elbow protruding to the right; compared with the wrist placed in line with the 
trunk, behind the index finger) influences horizontal deviation during obstacle avoidance. 
Further supportive of the possibility that inconsistencies in wrist position could 
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introduced greater variance in X-deviation for right sided obstacles only, wrist position 
was found to more greatly affect deviation for ipsilateral than contralateral obstacles 
(Menger, Van der Stigchel, & Dijkerman, 2012). Attempts were made to ensure 
participants adopted an appropriate, and consistent, wrist position. However, future 
research should endeavour to ensure consistent wrist position to avoid additional 
movement variance. The X-deviation differences observed as a function of identity in 
studies like De Haan et al. (2014) are small. Therefore, it is imperative that variance as a 
result of other factors is reduced.  
In addition, it is worth noting that Experiment 6 may have suffered from an 
underpowered design, reducing the capability to detect spatial deviation effects in some 
conditions. Post-hoc power analysis indicated that we only had 27% power to detect the 
effect size obtained (dz = .345) for X-deviation when comparing Own and Experimenter's 
on the right. Therefore, as the obtained power fell below the recommended 80% (Cohen, 
1988), we cannot rule out the possibility of detecting a significant effect in X-deviation to 
objects when on the right if our design possessed greater power. Based on this, increasing 
sample size would also be beneficial in future research.  
To conclude, this chapter aimed to investigate whether top-down knowledge of 
ownership status influences obstacle avoidance. To date, the limited research considering 
the effects of ownership status on action has focused on the execution of movements 
performed on objects of differing ownership status, establishing that we take more care 
when interacting with others’ possessions. However, we also move within environments 
cluttered with others’ belongings. How we navigate movements in the presence of objects 
belonging to others is of equal interest ecologically. In Experiment 6, we observed that 
ownership status could influence the movement paths executed when reaching for a target 
in the presence of own or experimenter-owned obstacles. However, this effect is subtle 
and potentially limited only to certain conditions. Methodological considerations, such as 
the counterbalancing of block order and consistency in the start position of the wrist need 
to be addressed in follow up research. As the influence of object features on avoidance is 
assumed to only impact due to differing consequences of collision, future research could 
aim to increase the salience of the consequences of colliding with property belonging to 
another, for example, by using breakable possessions, to establish whether this further 
elucidates the subtle trajectory effects observed. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion  
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Reminder of thesis purposes 
While many disciplines have long considered the origins, functions, and 
consequences of ownership, there has been a historical absence of work considering the 
cognitive basis of ownership. Interest in the cognitive processing biases afforded to 
personal property is growing, with publications proliferating during the production of the 
present thesis. A plethora of findings indicate that objects associated with the self (vs. 
those associated with another) receive enhanced processing at early stages of object 
discrimination (Sui et al., 2012), are afforded prioritised attentional selection (Truong et 
al., 2016, Yanouskaya et al., 2016), extended a greater degree of attentional processing 
(Turk et al., 2011), and are advantageously encoded, and subsequently better recalled 
(Cunningham et al., 2010, Van den Bos et al., 20102). However, research addressing how 
ownership status affects the motor system remains relatively underdeveloped.  
As the concept of ownership is partly comprised of permission to interact with our 
own objects, and deny others such use without permission (Snare, 1972), it may represent 
another abstract concept that exerts embodied effects on the motor system. Constable and 
colleagues (2011, 2014, 2016) have provided initial evidence that the visuomotor system 
is sensitive to the ownership status of objects, and that beyond facilitation for self-objects, 
knowledge of other-ownership is also pertinent to the nature of planned and executed 
responses. Therefore, embodied ownership effects warrant further investigation, and the 
present thesis aimed to extend evidence for such motor effects. Importantly, we were 
interested in the possible effects of ownership status for self-owned and other-owned 
objects, as aside from Constable’s work, focus remains on the facilitated processing of 
self-associated objects.  
This chapter will initially summarise key findings from the present experiments, 
situating them in the context of previous work on both self and other-ownership biases. 
Based on the offered synthesis of our and others’ findings concerning ownership, I will 
discuss future theoretical directions, and the potential applications of a growing body of 
knowledge concerning the cognitive treatment of ownership. Finally, methodological 
challenges experienced during attempts to establish the effects of ownership on the motor 
system via indirect methods, such as response time, will be outlined; before proposing a 
viable technique for more directly studying motoric effects (which we aimed to 
implement, but were constrained in achieving this by equipment limitations).  
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Summary and evaluation of findings 
Aiming to directly extend on previous movement kinematics work that is suggestive 
of the elicitation of affective compatibility effects as a function of ownership (Constable 
et al., 2011, 2014), the experiments presented in Chapter 2 utilised a touchscreen version 
of an Approach-Avoidance Task (Bamford & Ward, 2008), progressively developed 
across the three experiments. Participants performed approach or avoidance movements 
to categorise self-owned and other-owned (experimenter’s, unknown other and unowned 
in Experiment 1 & 2, unknown other in Experiment 3) coffee mugs. Broadly in line with 
our predictions and previous indirect evidence, participants were significantly faster to 
approach the mug belonging to themselves, and faster to avoid the mug belonging to an 
unknown other (vs. approach).  
However, such effects were limited by task context. For example, affective 
compatibility effects only emerged when ownership was rendered explicit by task 
demands to categorise objects based on ownership. Even under task-relevant conditions, 
other-ownership effects were subtler, and mediated by the probability of ownership 
category (self and other). When participants only responded to self and unknown other 
mugs (vs. own, experimenter’s, another’s, and unowned), the facilitation of avoidance 
time for the unknown other’s mug dissipated.  
While the work presented in Chapter 2 aimed to extend findings concerning motor 
effects, the adopted task design inherently confounded alternative explanations of 
facilitated approach (vs. avoidance time) for self-owned property, such as attention 
capture, which is known to be mediated by self-relevance in general (e.g., Alexopoulos et 
al., 2012, Bredart et al., 2006, Mack & Rock, 1998, Shi et al., 2011), and self-ownership 
in particular (e.g., Turk et al., 2011, Yanouskaya et al., 2016). Therefore, Experiment 4 
aimed to eliminate the requirement for attentional shifts to produce avoidance 
movements. This could have been achieved by adopting a number of alternative 
computerised paradigms, for example, through the recruitment of a joystick-based task 
(Chen & Bargh, 1999). However, given that both our own, and others’ (Constable et al., 
2014), experimental work alludes to the greater influence of design and contextual factors 
on other-ownership conditions, we wished to recruit a task that was potentially more 
ecologically relevant than computer-based paradigms.  
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Therefore, Chapter 3 returned to the use (see Constable et al., 2011, 2014, 2016) of 
motion kinematics, as a means of recording real motor responses while interacting with 
objects of differing ownership status. Participants categorised the self-owned and 
experimenter-owned mug on the basis of ownership, by pushing the mug away from the 
torso, or bringing it toward the self. Consistent with findings from the computerised 
AAT, but more adequately controlling for attentional confounds, participants were faster 
to initiate approach movements for self-owned relative to for experimenter-owned 
property. However, despite a context that, arguably, increases the salience of other-
ownership as an object property; there was no difference in the initiation of avoidance 
when responding to the experimenter’s or self-owned mug. However, note that limited 
statistical power may have played a role in limiting the significance of some of the 
statistical comparisons conducted. 
Based on findings (dissociable from indirect trajectory deviations that allude to 
affective compatibility; Constable et al., 2014) that participants take greater care with 
objects belonging to another (vs. self and unowned) during interactions with the object, 
indexed by reduced peak acceleration during lifting (Constable et al., 2011, 2014), 
Chapter 4 aimed to expand knowledge of motoric ownership effects beyond its influence 
on object-directed action to another action context that, to the best of my knowledge, has 
yet to be investigated. Given there is a ‘care’ effect when interacting with others’ 
belongings, movements in the presence of another’s property while reaching for a target 
object may be equally mediated by ownership. Recent findings that increasing the 
physical consequences of collision (empty vs. full water glass) mediated avoidance reach 
trajectory, with greater distance maintained between the limb and the obstacle (De Haan 
et al., 2014), further supported this notion. Therefore, this chapter explored whether the 
ownership status of obstacles within the environment mediates the temporal and spatial 
parameters of reaching movements (directed toward a target). Participants performed 
reaches in the presence of an object owned by themselves or the experimenter, while 
reaching for a target object.  
Broadly, we found evidence of mediation of obstacle avoidance as a function of 
ownership, with subtle differences in trajectory deviation (away from the experimenter’s 
obstacle) observed in Experiment 6. However, this effect was not observed when 
reaching in the presence of two obstacles (self and experimenter’s, Experiment 5). Given 
that movements between two obstacles are executed in a manner maintaining a minimum 
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preferred distance between both objects (Tresilian, 1998, Chapman & Goodale, 2008), it 
appears that ownership only possesses relevance for obstacle avoidance movement plans 
when there is no cost associated (such as colliding with the other object) with taking 
greater care to avoid the experimenter’s property. Alongside revealing other-ownership 
effects in a new context, Chapter 4 also contributes to the, still largely uninvestigated, 
influence of non-dorsal stream object properties on obstacle avoidance; suggesting that 
identity-related features of objects can influence avoidance behaviour.  
In summary, across Experiments 1, 3 and 4, self-property consistently received 
enhanced motoric responses in contexts where ownership status was task-relevant, with 
response time illustrating a tendency to approach self-owned objects faster than property 
belonging to another. Such a finding extends the rapidly growing body of literature that 
has identified numerous processing biases for objects associated with the self, namely, 
mnemonic advantages (Cunningham et al., 2008, 2013, van den Bos et al., 2010), 
attentional prioritisation (Turk et al., 2011, Truong et al., 2016, Yanouskaya et al., 2016) 
and facilitated stimulus discrimination (Schäfer et al., 2015, Sui et al., 2012; 2013, Sui & 
Humphreys 2015a); by demonstrating that self-owned objects also facilitate the execution 
of congruent (approach) motor responses. However, the failure to observe affective 
compatibility effects for self-owned objects when asked to make a judgment based on an 
object feature, such as mug handle colour (rendering ownership irrelevant to the task), 
bolsters a notion that self-ownership does not possess absolute salience during stimulus 
processing and response preparation (for similar findings in perceptual matching tasks, 
see Liu & Sui, 2016; Stein, Siebold, & van Zoest, 2016).  
Note that in the interests of replication of previous embodied ownership work and the 
preservation of ecological validity (particularly for investigation of other-ownership 
effects), we initially opted not to control for other object characteristics that are 
inherently confounded with ownership occurring in normative settings, such as choice, 
and familiarity. Therefore, we do note that we cannot exclude that such characteristics 
may be accountable for the effects observed. Given that affective compatibility effects 
theoretically arise from stimulus valence, factors such as choice, which influence 
stimulus evaluation (Huang et al., 2009) are also likely to elicit similar effects (see 
Constable et al., 2014). Therefore, there is clearly future need to investigate affective 
compatibility effects for self-owned property in the absence of contaminating variables.  
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Additionally, neural evidence alludes to overlap in the mechanisms of self and 
reward/affective processing (Enzi et al., 2009; Phan et al., 2004). While self-object 
processing biases do not appear to result solely from the rewarding or affective nature of 
the stimulus (for example, see Sui et al., 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 2015b; Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015c); the precise nature of the relationship is not yet clear. Given the 
findings concerning congruency effects for self-owned property presented within this 
thesis, and their theoretical basis in differences in stimulus affect (see Niedenthal et al., 
2005), it will be fruitful to continue to elucidate the manner in which, and extent that, 
ownership representations are underpinned by valence or reward-based components.   
However, the elicitation of subtle other-ownership effects, which are less easily 
accounted for by factors such as choice or familiarity does lend support to the 
accessibility of the construct of ownership during action planning (Experiment 1, 2 & 6; 
Nevertheless, future research should endeavor to explore affective compatibility effects in 
the absence of such confounds). Specifically, our findings that property belonging to 
another can facilitate avoidance motor performance and affect movement execution when 
property is not the subject of object-directed action, but an obstacle during action 
performance, broadly supports, and further extends, the work of Constable et al. (2011, 
2014, 2016), who observed that lifting and passing actions are mediated by other-
ownership (alongside self-ownership).  
The work of Constable and colleagues was the first to demonstrate visuomotor 
effects for both other and self-owned property, illustrating that while self-ownership is an 
important ‘category’ of stimuli eliciting embodied motor effects, the action system is not 
blind to the importance of other-ownership. Similarly, the present thesis also situates 
other-ownership as a category of interest in itself, rather than as a social but less salient 
comparison group (for self-owned). More broadly, considering the visuomotor effects of 
ownership also extends evidence that more abstract, sociocultural concepts, that cannot 
be directly perceived (and therefore seemingly cannot be represented with perceptual 
experiences), do appear to be associated with embodied sensorimotor states, influencing 
subsequent responses (for investigation of the embodied nature of the abstract concept of 
morality, see Schnall, Benton & Harvey, 2008; Lee & Schwarz, 2010).  
However, perhaps the most significant contribution the present thesis makes to the 
investigation of the embodiment of an abstract concept, such as ownership, is the 
identification of the difficulty in observing, and consistently eliciting, effects. Some 
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existing findings do reflect the criticality of task context in the elicitation of embodied 
other-ownership effects. For example, Constable et al. (2016) found that when passing a 
mug (owned by the passer or the receiver) to another individual, the difference in the 
orienting of the handle in order to facilitate the receiver's grasp only reached significance 
in a condition where the receiver was to act upon the object. Similarly, findings 
pertaining to the influence of other-ownership within the present thesis were subtle and 
appeared to be contextually mediated. As discussed, the elicitation of affective 
compatibility effects for property belonging to an unknown other (Chapter 2) seemed to 
depend upon the increased salience of, or top down expectancies for, ‘other’s things’ (see 
Sui, Sun, Peng, & Humphreys, 2014). In Chapter 4, other-ownership only appeared to 
influence movement kinematics when acting in the presence of one obstacle; rather than 
two; suggesting that the visuomotor system may only be sensitive to other-ownership 
when contextual demands allow alterations in action performance, without significant 
cost to action production (as is potentially the case in needing to navigate two obstacles).   
In addition, we failed to consistently identify any motoric effects when an other-owner 
was the experimenter in Chapter 2 and 3 (instead observing facilitated avoidance for the 
mug belonging to an unknown other in Chapter 2), reflecting an unanticipated difference 
between the work of Constable et al. (2011; 2014) and the findings of the present thesis. 
It is unclear why their recruitment of the researcher was successful in eliciting deviation 
in mug positioning from the torso (which we interpreted to reflect avoidance processes 
for others’ property); while we failed to observe significant effects for property belonging 
to the experimenter in the affective compatibility task, even in a similar task context 
(requiring participants to physically interact with the items). It is of course possible that 
the spatial deviations observed in Constable’s work do not in fact reflect avoidance 
behaviour, as proposed. However, as so little is presently known about the manner in 
which other-ownership is cognitively represented, and how it comes to influence 
response processes, further research is required to better understand the causes of such 
disparities.  
Future directions  
Theoretical challenges  
The relative paucity of work exploring other-ownership effects (relative to self-
ownership) at present means that there remains much for future studies to investigate. 
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Firstly, there exists an overarching need for further consideration of how to suitably 
operationalise ownership; controlling for contaminating factors such as choice, 
preference, and familiarity (if also using self-ownership as a level); while maintaining the 
ecological validity of the stimuli and authenticity of participants’ experiences of 
ownership in experimental contexts (note that Experiment 5 and 6 did remove choice and 
differences in low-level perceptual factors; however participants still owned and used the 
water bottles prior to testing). Paradigms such as the label-shape matching task (Sui et al., 
2012) do successfully reduce higher-order contaminating variables, such as choice and 
preference, and control lower-level perceptual features and stimulus exposure 
(familiarity). However, it can be argued that much of what makes ownership interesting 
as a non-perceivable; socio-culturally constructed stimulus feature is also eliminated. 
Findings from such ‘pure’ paradigms are informative about how self-ownership, which is 
seemingly underpinned to a degree by a core self-object association (for example, 
similarly elicited by choice, Huang et al., 2014) likely affects fundamental cognitive 
processes in everyday contexts. 
However, the arbitrary nature of the label-shape associations and task context may be 
insufficient for gaining understanding of how other-ownership cues, which appear to be 
much subtler, and rooted in the right to use and respect other’s belongings, influence 
cognitive and motor processes. For example, interacting with a mug chosen by the 
experimenter, but not owned by them, does not elicit the same kinematic effects as 
interacting with a mug owned by the experimenter; while both self-choice and self-
ownership produces similar kinematic patterns (Constable et al., 2014). Therefore, while 
choice appears sufficient to produce a self-object association like that of ownership 
(Huang et al., 2017), the influence of other-ownership knowledge on cognitive processes 
appears more greatly tied to the notion of property. At present, the temporal nature of 
visuomotor self and other-ownership effects remains largely unexplored (although see 
Sparks et al., 2016). For example, akin to the ‘instantaneous’ effects of self and other 
label-shape associations, do the types of visuomotor effects observed in the present thesis 
and the work of Constable and colleagues (2011, 2014, 2016) emerge when ownership of 
an object is assigned to both self and experimenter at the start of the testing session? 
Future research should endeavour to explore this, as one route for reducing contaminating 
variables (such as self-object familiarity), while maintaining an ecologically valid 
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experimental construct of ownership that appears necessary for exploring other-
ownership effects.  
In addition, given that other-ownership effects are sensitive to contextual factors, 
such as experimenter presence (Constable et al., 2014), elements of task designs and the 
broader testing session, that may typically be overlooked, must be carefully considered in 
terms of their possible effects on other-ownership conditions. For example, if utilising the 
researcher as the other-owner, even experimental demeanour and consistency in the dyad 
between participant and researcher potentially requires close attention. Rather than 
situating the contextual and interpersonal sensitivity of other-ownership effects as a 
contaminant requiring elimination, the mediation of other-ownership effects by 
contextual and social conditions presents an interesting avenue for future investigation.  
How characteristics of the other owner and interpersonal behaviour mediate action 
effects has yet to be pertained. However, evidence that others’ faces which possess 
greater levels of social threat (e.g., boss vs. lab mate) receive recognition advantages over 
less threatening others (Liew, Ma, Han & Aziz-Zadeh, 2011) suggests that social 
differences in hierarchy or status as a mediator of responses to other-owned property 
should be explored. For example, do individuals take even greater care when moving in 
the presence of obstacles if the owner is of greater social status? Whether the researcher 
is an undergraduate or eminent professor may shape experimental findings. Similarly, if 
the other-owner is a close friend, are the differences in action performance for other-
ownership identified in the present thesis, and Constable’s (2011; 2014; 2016) work, 
attenuated? Motoric sensitivity to others’ belongings may be even more tied to social 
context due to its socioconstructed nature and implications for social relations. Given that 
findings from face processing advantage work identify that contextual factors, such as 
priming threat (Guan et al., 2015), improve other-face processing performance (reducing 
the self-face bias) should prompt future work to endeavour to explore how (social) 
context mediates embodied ownership effects. For example, given that individuals 
engage in behaviour such as automatic mimicry in order to facilitate social interactions 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Maddux et al., 2008), and such smoothing techniques are 
recruited even more so when individuals feel ostracised (Lakin et al., 1999); does 
inducing a sense of ostracism mediate the care taken when moving in the presence of 
property owned by the individual ostracising?  
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Finally, alongside exploring the contextual mediators and boundary conditions (for 
example, the temporal robustness of effects) of ownership effects, another route through 
which to potentially gain greater insight, is to extend investigation to different 
populations who likely possess greater sensitivity to the notion of property. For example, 
given the early development of attachment to objects (Furby & Wilke, 1982; Lehman et 
al., 1995) and the possession of a concept of ownership that appears quite concretely 
rooted in the rights to use objects (especially at only around two years of age; Ross, 1996; 
Neary & Friedman, 2014); exploring whether children exhibit similar (and possibly more 
tangible) embodied motor effects for self-owned belongings; but also when interacting 
with others’ property, will be one interesting route for exploration.  
Future research should also seek to extend the exploration of visuomotor biases for 
property to a clinical sample whose disorder is characterised by the tendency to over-
acquire possessions to a dysfunctional degree, and experience extreme difficulty 
discarding belongings, even when some possessions have little to no functional value 
(Steketee & Frost, 2003); those with hoarding disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Although hoarding was once considered a symptom or subtype of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, since the publication of the 5th Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, it now exists as a clinical diagnosis in its own right 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). To the best of my knowledge, little is 
currently known about whether hoarding is, at least in part, underpinned by biased 
perceptual and visuomotor processing of self-associated objects. Instead, research 
concerning associated cognitive processing characteristics has tended to focus on more 
general impairments associated with hoarding behaviour, such as memory impairments 
(Hartl et al., 2004). Given that those with hoarding disorder experience 
hypersentimentality for their personal possessions (Frost, Hartl, Christian & Williams, 
1995; Grisham et al., 2009), it may be interesting to futuristically explore whether they 
therefore exhibit greater embodied affective responses for self-owned belongings 
(heightened approach tendencies for property). If such approach biases were observed; it 
could prompt the development of Approach-tendency bias modification training 
programmes as one psychological treatment method; which are proven to have some 
success in attenuating maladaptive biases exhibited for stimuli relevant to disordered 
behaviour in other clinical groups, such as those with alcoholism (for example, see Spruyt 
et al., 2013; Eberl et al., 2014; Ostafin, Palfai & Wechsler, 2003).  
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Owning new methods 
Alongside the need to greatly expand the study of other-ownership in future research, 
the methods used to consider such subtle effects requires further consideration. Indirect 
evidence (behavioural, see Constable et al., 2011, and through functional neuroimaging; 
see Turk et al., 2011) indicates that motor affordances of manipulable objects are 
mediated by ownership, elicited when viewing objects that the participant owned, 
compared with objects owned by another individual. However, the mediation of the 
recruitment of motor regions by ownership (in an embodied fashion) can more directly be 
established through Motor Evoked Potentials (MEPs). MEPs are elicited by delivering a 
brief, single pulse of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to a region of the primary 
motor cortex (M1) contralateral to the associated limb or bodily region identified for 
investigation (although for use of a paired-pulse procedure, see Oliveri et al., 2004). The 
pulse subsequently stimulates neurons in the region of the cortex proximate to the coil. 
Electromyography (either electrodes inserted into the muscle, or adhered to the surface of 
the skin above the muscle) is used to record the evoked muscle activity that results from 
the stimulation of the associated motor region (see Figure 16; Rothwell, 1997, Rothwell 
et al., 1999), allowing precise measurement of the functioning, and corcticospinal 
connectivity, of neural populations within the motor system.  
Although most pervasively used as a technique to assess the functional integrity of 
the corticomotor pathway when it may have suffered damage. For example, following 
stroke (for a review, see Talelli, Greenwood, & Rothwell, 2006, Stinear, 2010); cognitive 
neuroscience has also adopted MEPs as a measure through which to more directly 
investigate the motor system. For example, object affordances, the finding that simply 
viewing common objects results in activation of the premotor cortex (e.g., Grafton et al., 
1997) can also be investigated via the mediation of MEP amplitudes after TMS applied 
over M1, as regions involved in selecting and activating object-directed action plans upon 
passive viewing, such as the premotor-parietal circuits, project to the primary motor 
cortex (Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001). Buccino, Sato, Cattaneo, Roda, and Riggio (2009), 
investigated the notion of action affordances during the passive viewing of graspable 
objects (drinking receptacles with intact and broken handles), by measuring MEP 
amplitude of the right FDI, first dorsalis interosseous, a muscle in the hand recruited 
during grasping. As anticipated under an affordance account of grasp planning, objects 
with the handle oriented to the side of space of the recorded hand (right) elicited MEPs of 
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a greater amplitude than those oriented to the left, suggesting that the corticomotor 
network supporting the execution of grasping actions is sensitive to affordances. The 
amplitude was significantly reduced for the ‘ungraspable’ broken handle (Buccino et al., 
2009, see also McNair, Behrens & Harris, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 16. Example of a motor evoked potential recorded using surface 
electromyography, (a) illustrates an MEP using a single pulse stimulation and (b) 
resulting from a paired pulse technique (from Feil & Zangen, 2010).  
 
Dissatisfied with the challenges of using indirect measures (such as reaction time and 
spatial differences in movement kinematics) in establishing such subtle motoric effects, 
and the limited ability such measures offer in distinguishing response patterns resulting 
from action planning, rather than alternative mechanisms; we explored the recruitment of 
more direct means through which to measure embodied ownership effects, by localised 
neurophysiological measures of motoric activity, during the production of this thesis (see 
Appendix C). Technical issues, combined with time constraints, ultimately prevented the 
collection of sufficient data for analysis and inclusion in the present work. However, 
future research would benefit from consideration of MEPs as a measure of motor 
processes when exploring embodied ownership effects. 
Overall summary 
This thesis has further extended findings concerning the effects of ownership status 
on visuomotor behaviour; while also highlighting the methodological and theoretical 
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challenges of elucidating the embodied effects of other-ownership. Chapter 2 presented 
findings suggestive of an affective compatibility effect (in this case, the facilitated 
performance of approach movements) for self-owned property; alongside some tentative 
evidence that other-owned property primes avoidance responses (although this effect was 
only present under conditions of increased other-ownership stimulus probability). Given 
that the paradigm developed in Chapter 2 inherently confounded attentional factors, and 
embodied motor effects for other-ownership have, to date, been most consistently elicited 
during real world motor movements, Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) developed a version of the 
task requiring participants to physically manipulate the self and other-owned property, 
moving the mug toward or away from the body. The spatial and temporal parameters of 
movement performance were recorded using motion-tracking technology. Further 
supporting a motoric basis for the effects elicited in Chapter 2, participants displayed 
response initiation biases when producing approach movements for self-owned property. 
Therefore, self-ownership does appear to prime affectively congruent motor responses.  
However, future research should endeavour to reduce the potentially contaminating 
effects of other variables inextricably intertwined with ownership under ecologically 
normative conditions; such as choice, preference, and familiarity; which are also likely to 
mediate the evaluation of stimuli, and therefore contribute to the congruency effects 
observed. Somewhat surprisingly, given that previous research has observed consistent 
mediation of the kinematics of interactions with property belonging to another, Chapter 3 
failed to observe a robust effect of other-ownership status on the facilitation of congruent 
(avoidance) movements. Given that the present thesis failed to consistently elicit effects 
of other-ownership in object-directed action contexts; Chapter 4 explored the influence of 
ownership on an element of environmental interaction that has yet to be explored, 
obstacle avoidance.  
Alongside the influence of ownership status during object-directed action, how we 
navigate movements in the presence of objects belonging to the self and others is of equal 
interest; particularly as other-ownership may possess more salience in obstacle avoidance 
contexts, where identify-related features of non-target objects that mediate the 
consequences of collision influence the degree of care (movement deviation) taken. We 
observed that ownership status can influence the movement paths executed when 
reaching for a target in the presence of own or experimenter-owned obstacles. 
Specifically, participants maintained greater limb-obstacle passing distance when 
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reaching for a target while the experimenter’s property was within the workspace. 
However, this effect was only present when navigating movements in the presence of one 
obstacle; rather than two. Therefore, it is possible that the visuomotor system may only 
be sensitive to other-ownership when contextual demands, such as the requirement to 
plan and execute a more complex avoidance movement (navigating two objects), or the 
requirement to quickly and accurately produce object-directed action (during speeded 
approach-avoidance tasks), allow alterations in action performance, without significant 
cost to action production.  
Finally, this thesis illustrated the challenging nature of investigating such subtle 
effects of other-ownership status using indirect measures, such as response time (which, 
in addition to action planning and execution, reflect other cognitive processing 
mechanisms), and spatial alterations in movement paths (which, albeit sensitive, are 
vulnerable to greater deviation as a function of inconsistent wrist positioning, than the 
deviation differences arising from the variables of interest). Future research that 
endeavours to further elucidate the influence of other-ownership status on the visuomotor 
system should consider adopting more direct outcome measures of motor preparation; 
such as motor evoked potentials. 
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Appendix A 
Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire 
 
Study Title:  
Researcher Name:  
Participant ID Code:  
 
Please fill in this questionnaire only if you have agreed to take part in our studies and have 
signed the appropriate consent form.  Please note that you may omit answering any question 
without penalty and that this information will be kept strictly confidential. 
 
For each of the activities below, please tell us: 
Which hand do you prefer for that activity? Do you ever use the other hand for the activity? 
 
 Left (L) or Right (R) Do you ever use the other 
hand? Yes or No 
Signing   
Writing   
Drawing   
Throwing   
Using scissors   
Using a Toothbrush   
Using a Knife (without a fork)   
Using a Spoon   
Using a Broom (upper hand)   
Striking a Match   
Opening a Box (lid)   
Foot to Kick With   
Bat (swing)   
 
1. Do you consider yourself: (circle appropriate) 
 
Right-handed                              Left Handed                             Ambidextrous (both 
hands) 
 
2. Is there anyone in your family who is Left-handed? (circle appropriate) 
Yes or No        
If yes, who  
 
3. Did you ever change handedness? (circle appropriate) 
Yes or No 
If yes, please explain 
 
 
4. Is there any activity not on this list that you do consistently with your left hand? If 
so, please  
explain 
 
This handedness questionnaire was adapted from: Oldfield, R.C. (1971) The assessment and analysis of handedness: the 
Edinburgh inventory.  
Neuropsychologia, 9(1), 97-113. 
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Appendix B 
Effect of ownership for each action level for Experiments 1 - 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment Comparison  df t p 
Experiment 1 Approach    
    Own vs Experimenter 34 -2.84 .008 
    Own vs Unknown Other 34 -4.07 < .001 
    Own vs Unowned 34 -4.15 " 
    Own vs All other (avg) 34 -3.78 .001 
 Avoid    
    Own vs Experimenter 34 4.86 < .001 
    Own vs Unknown Other 34 5.04 " 
    Own vs Unowned 34 4.89 " 
    Own vs All Other (avg)  34 5.15 " 
Experiment 2 Approach    
    Own vs Experimenter 22 -.53 .603 
    Own vs Unknown Other 22 -2.12 .046 
    Own vs Unowned 22 -.93 .361 
    Own vs All other (avg) 22 -1.27 .218 
 Avoid    
    Own vs Experimenter 22 7.92 < .001 
    Own vs Unknown Other 22 8.22  " 
    Own vs Unowned 22 5.55 " 
    Own vs All Other (avg)  22 7.39 " 
Experiment 3 Approach    
    Own vs Unknown Other 28 -4.31 < .001 
 Avoid    
    Own vs Unknown Other 28 1.708 .099 
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Appendix C 
 
Motor Evoked Potential (MEP) lab set-up 
 
During the production of this thesis, significant time was dedicated to establishing an 
MEP lab (see Figure 17), to directly investigate whether the modulation of MEP 
amplitude (right FDI at rest, during passive viewing of coffee mugs) by object affordance 
was further mediated by ownership status. Broadly, we intended to utilise Buccino et al.’s 
(2009) affordance task, including ownership as a factor. We predicted that MEP 
amplitude for mugs with handles oriented to the right would be mediated by ownership, 
with a reduction in MEP amplitude for the experimenter’s property, relative to own and 
unowned stimuli.  
 
 
Figure 17. The completed lab set-up for eliciting motor evoked potentials.  
EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP ON ACTION 
 
	
160 
 
EMG recordings were obtained using pre-gelled disposable surface electrodes, 
placed in a standard belly-tendon montage (see Figure 18). TMS was delivered to the 
associated region of the left hemisphere of M1, using a figure of eight coil, 200 ms after 
mug presentation (handle oriented to the left or right, own, experimenter’s and unowned). 
The suitable stimulation site for each participant was localised by the elicitation of a 
visible twitch in the target site, with stimulation intensity then reduced until five out of 
ten MEPs of at least 50 µV was obtained. Subsequent stimulation intensity was then set at 
120% of this threshold; a normative procedure, see Rossini et al., 1994). 
 
Figure 18. Belly-tendon montage electrode placement for the FDI muscle.  
 
 An articulated clamp was used to maintain coil position, and head and coil location 
were tracked using Brainsight TMS Navigation (Brainsight, Cardiff, UK). Extensive 
piloting was conducted, however, continual equipment limitations prevented completion 
of testing sessions. Specifically, persistent overheating (and therefore, shut down) of the 
TMS coil was experienced. This resulted from the machine used (Magstim Rapid2, The 
Magstim Company Ltd, Whitland, UK) possessing lower overall output, and therefore 
needing to be operated at a greater percentage of overall capability; than machines 
typically recruited for MEP investigation (Magstim 200, The Magstim Company Limited, 
Whitland, UK, for further discussion of stimulator differences, see Sommer et al., 2006).  
 
 
 
